Opinion of the Court- REAVIS, J. [19 Wash. the same; and also that Jane Selber, his wife, performed work and labor for the appellant at its request, of a certain reasonable value, and that such claim was assigned to respondent; and that his son, George Selber, a minor, performed work and labor for the appellant at its request, stating the value of the same, and that it was assigned to respondent. Appellant in its answer denied that the services of respondent were worth the amount alleged in the complaint or any greater sum than had been paid; alleged the payment; denied that Jane Selber or George Selber performed work and labor for it at its request; and alleged that a contract had been entered into between appellant and respondent by which the respondent was to work for appellant for his board, and that Jane Selber should do the cooking for the men employed by appellant in consideration for board and lodging furnished respondent's family by appellant. There are two assignments of error: First, that the court erred in admitting as evidence against appellant's objection respondent's exhibit A, which was a statement of a portion of time that respondent worked for appellant; and, second, that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. While respondent was testifying in his own behalf he was handed the paper, exhibit A, and testified that it was a statement of time kept under the direction of the foreman or general manager of appellant and purported to be respondent's time. Respondent stated that this time was kept by authority of the foreman. It is sufficient to dispose of this assignment to say that from the witness's statement this paper was received as an admission of the appellant, i. e., as it was made by one having authority from the appellant to keep such a memorandum, it could be received as a part of the respondent's case. The second Feb. 1898.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, J. assignment, that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, has been examined in connection with the evidence brought here in the transcript. The respondent and his wife testified that they were engaged by the general manager of appellant to perform work and labor on the Springbrook Trout Farm. The respondent testified relative to wages as follows: "Q.-What, if anything, was said in regard to what compensation you should receive for your wages? "A.-No, sir; there was no real wages stated. He said that he was always paying the best going wages, and he never had a man to work for him but what was willing to come back and work for him again." Respondent and his wife testified to the reasonable value of the work and labor performed for appellant. Several witnesses, including the manager of appellant, contradicted some of the statements of respondent and his wife, and especially endeavored to show that they were to receive nothing more than their board. But there was a well defined conflict in the evidence submitted to the jury, and we think it falls fairly within the rule that the appellate court will not disturb the verdict where testimony is conflicting and there is evidence of a substantial character sustaining the verdict, especially after a motion for a new trial has been presented to the superior court and denied. The judgment of the superior court must be affirmed. SCOTT, C. J., and ANDERS, DUNBAR and GORDON, JJ., concur. [No. 2798. Decided February 26, 1898.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. PAT LARCENY SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION-DESCRIPTION OF MONEY CONTINUANCE - EVIDENCE — COMMENT BY JUDGES ON TESTIMONY — In an information charging the larceny of money a description of the property stolen as being two one hundred dollar bills and one fifty dollar bill, lawful money of the United States, is sufficient under Code Proc., § 1253 (Bal. Code, § 6859), which provides that in such cases it is sufficient to allege the larceny to be of money or bank notes, without specifying the coin, number, denomination or kind thereof. The fact that an information charging the larceny of money, after naming the number and denomination of the bills, alleges further "a more exact description being not now known," while a witness for the state gives an exact description of the bills in his testimony, does not constitute a fatal variance, when there is no showing of want of diligence on the part of the prosecuting attorney to ascertain and charge the exact description. The refusal of a continuance in a criminal cause does not show an abuse of discretion, when the cause has been finally set for trial more than five weeks after defendant's arrest, one continuance having been granted him in the meantime. A remark by the court concerning a criminal action, that "it is mostly a case of positive testimony," is not objectionable on the ground of being an expression of the court's opinion on the weight of the testimony. In a prosecution for the larceny of money, it is competent to put in evidence the money taken from defendant's person when arrested, although not identified as a part of the stolen money, merely as a circumstance showing he had money when arrested, which the jury might properly consider. Error of the court in stating to the jury that it was not permissible to introduce evidence affecting the character of the defendant, that the court would not permit it, for instance, to be shown that he had committed another offense, is harmless, when the instructions were fair to the defendant otherwise and correctly stated the law, and it does not appear that prejudicial error resulted from the remark. The fact that, after an order against the separation of jurors, one of them who was taken sick while the jury was out for a meal, was brought separately on a street car to the courthouse in charge of one bailiff, while the remainder of the jury walked there in charge of another bailiff, is not error, when there is no showing that any of the jurors were tampered with in any manner. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. ORANGE JACOBS, Judge. Affirmed. Tremper & Winstock, for appellant: An averment in an information that the name of a person or fact necessary to be alleged is unknown is permissible only from necessity, and the information is rendered invalid and the defendant entitled to a discharge therefrom, when it appears at the trial that the name or the fact was either known or could, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have become known to the prosecuting attorney. State v. Stowe, 33 S. W. 799; Presley v. State, 24 Tex. App. 494; Jackson v. State, 28 N. W. 815; Merwin v. People, 26 Mich. 301 (12 Am. Rep. 314); Commonwealth v. Thornton, 14 Gray, 41; Drechsel v. State, 34 S. W. 934; Commonwealth v. Blood, 4 Gray, 33; 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure (3d ed.), p. 343. James F. McElroy, Prosecuting Attorney, and John B. Hart, for The State: This court has held under § 1253, 2 Hill's Code, that a description of money stolen is not a necessary allegation in an information. State v. Hanshaw, 3 Wash. 12; State v. Blanchard, 11 Wash. 116. Under 1245, subd. 4, 2 Hill's Code, this court has disregarded useless and unnecessary allegations in an information as surplusage. State v. Ackles, 8 Wash. 462; State v. Miller, 3 Wash. 131. Opinion of the Court-SCOTT, C. J. [19 Wash. Where they are contained in an information it is not necessary to prove same. People v. Nelson, 56 Cal. 77. The opinion of the court was delivered by now SCOTT, C. J.-The defendant was convicted of grand larceny and has appealed. The property stolen was described in the information as being two one hundred dollar bills and one fifty dollar bill, lawful money of the United States, etc., "a more exact description being not known." The testimony showed that one of the one hundred dollar bills was a United States treasury note, that the other was a national bank note, and that the fifty dollar bill was a silver certificate, and it is alleged that the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of ordinary diligence could have ascertained these facts and given an exact description of the money. It is contended that this constituted a fatal variSection 1253, Vol. 2, Hill's Code (Bal. Code, 6859), provides: ance. "In an information for larceny money, bank notes, etc., the larceny of it is sufficient to allege to be of money, bank notes, etc., without specifying the coin, number, denomination, or kind thereof." And while it may be conceded that the information should give as correct a description as can be done under the facts known or readily ascertainable, where a description is attempted, we think there is nothing in the case to show want of diligence on the part of the prosecuting attorney, and that the description was sufficient under said statute. Nor do we think any injury resulted to the defendant. It is next alleged that the court erred in refusing to grant a continuance. The record shows that the defendant was charged with the offense and arrested on the 20th day of May. The cause was once continued and finally called for |