Opinion of the Court-GORDON, J. [19 Wash. erty is applied to the payment of a valid, subsisting mortgage, and in this case the bill of sale was taken subject to the mortgage. The rule which permits a trespasser to show a subsequent appropriation to the plaintiff's use proceeds upon the theory that the plaintiff has consented, either expressly or impliedly, to such appropriation, and the law implies such consent where the property is legally seized and sold. Bates v. Courtwright, supra. But in the present case defendant was not entitled to have the record of the foreclosure proceedings submitted to the jury, because, as we have seen, the proceedings were not taken pursuant to the statute. The posting of notices of the sale was essential to a legal foreclosure, and a sale without such notice would be absolutely void. Nor was appellant entitled to have the costs of such invalid foreclosure proceeding added to the mortgage debt, and deducted from the value of the property, as found by the jury. The court charged the jury that their verdict, if in plaintiff's favor, should be for the value of the property at the time it was taken, less the amount of the mortgage, and appellant has no substantial ground for complaining of this instruction. In the reply brief, counsel urges that the objection that the record of the foreclosure proceeding was incompetent is made in this court for the first time, and that the papers were excluded by the trial court because they were deemed to be immaterial. So long as the court was right in excluding the proffered evidence, it is not important what the reason assigned therefor was. The court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requests 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The subject matter to which these requests referred was properly and fully covered by instruction No. 4, as given by the court. That instruction was full and ample, and certainly as favorable to the appellant as he had any right to demand. Indeed, we think it July, 1898.] Opinion of the Court- GORDON, J. would have been highly improper for the court to have emphasized particular portions of the evidence by giving the instructions as requested by appellant. Error is also predicated upon the giving of the following instruction, viz. : "As a general rule, to render a sale or conveyance fraudulent as to creditors of the vendor, there must be mutuality of participation in the fraudulent intent on the part of both the vendor and the purchaser. Thus, applying the rule to this case, if you do not believe from a preponderance of the evidence that both Likens and the plaintiff Chezum shared in a fraudulent intent pursuant to which the bill of sale was made and delivered, you will not be justified in finding it to be a fraudulent transaction." It is contended that the jury should not have been instructed that actual knowledge of Likens' fraudulent intent was necessary; that, if the plaintiff had notice sufficient to put him on inquiry, he could not be a bona fide purchaser. As applied to the evidence, the instruction complained of was right. While the rule contended for by appellant might in many cases be proper, it is not applicable to the evidence in this case. Wait, Fraudulent Conveyances, § 199; Jaeger v. Kelley, 52 N. Y. 274. Without specific mention of other objections urged to the charge, we deem it sufficient to say that we regard them as without merit, and are convinced that the charge, as a whole, fairly submitted the case to the jury and embraced all of the issues upon which they were required to pass. It is contended that the court committed reversible error in refusing to stop what is alleged to have been improper argument to the jury by plaintiff's counsel. Upon objection being made, the court instructed the jury, "that they would not be guided by the statements of counsel, but would be guided by the evidence." From the record we are unable to say that counsel went beyond the limit which Syllabus. [19 Wash. is permissible in a closing argument. By way of illustration, elucidation or explanation, a wide range of comment may, in the discretion of the trial court, be indulged. And it is only in a case where counsel has abused this license, and the court its discretion, in permitting unjustifiable argument to be indulged in against timely objection made to it, that this court would be warranted in reversing a judgment for that reason alone, and not then if it was reasonably apparent that no prejudice had resulted therefrom. Upon the entire record we think the judgment appealed from must be affirmed. SCOTT, C. J., and DUNBAR and REAVIS, JJ., concur. [No. 3018. Decided July 27, 1898.] COUNTY OF PIERCE, on the Relation of R. W. Maloney et al., Appellants, v. W. D. C. SPIKE, County Auditor, Respondent, C. S. GIFFORD et al., Intervenors and Respondents. TAXATION-BOARD OF EQUALIZATION -CITIES OF FIRST CLASS-STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA -REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. The act of March 9, 1893 (Laws 1893, p. 167), as amended by Laws 1895, p. 407 (Bal. Code, tit. 11, ch. 2), making provision for the assessment and collection of taxes in cities of the first class, being upon a special subject in regard to taxation, and the general revenue laws passed at the same session, are in pari materia, and must be construed together. Section 9 of the act of March 9, 1893, as amended by the act of March 21, 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 407, Bal. Code, § 1786), providing that, for the equalization of taxes in cities of the first class, a committee of three from the city council shall be selected to act with the county board of equalization, is not impliedly repealed by the general revenue law of 1897, which provides that July, 1898.] Opinion of the Court - REAVIS, J. the county commissioners shall constitute the board of equalization, since such provision is intended to be of general application and is in the same terms as the like provision in the general revenue law of 1893, and must be construed together with the special laws as in pari materia, in the absence of an express repealing clause. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County.-Hon. THOMAS CARROLL, Judge. Affirmed. A. R. Titlow, for appellants. O. G. Ellis, and W. H. Pritchard, for respondents. The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, J.-Application for a writ of prohibition to the superior court of Pierce county against the auditor of Pierce county, as ex-officio clerk of the board of equalization, to prohibit him from administering oaths to Gifford, Sampson and Holgate, as a committee selected by the city council of the city of Tacoma, for the purpose of sitting with relators, who are the county commissioners of Pierce county, to form the board of equalization for the equalization of tax assessments and values of property in the city of Tacoma for the year 1898. Upon hearing, the writ was denied in the superior court and relators have appealed. Upon the argument here the respective parties, conceding the emergency demanding an immediate decision of the merits involved in the controversy, have submitted the cause to this court without any question upon the method of procedure, or the parties to the action; and the court does not now decide any such questions. The single question presented here and decided is, who constitute the board of equalization of assessment of property situated within the territorial limits of a city of the first class for all purposes of taxation, state, county and municipal, for the year 1898? Appellants maintain that the county commissioners, as ex-officio members of the board of equalization, constitute Opinion of the Court- REAVIS, J. [19 Wash. the complete board for the equalization of assessments for all purposes of state, county and city taxation. Respondents contend that in Pierce county, containing the city of Tacoma, a city of the first class, the board for the equalization of assessment of property within the limits of the city for all purposes of taxation, is composed of the county commissioners, and a committee of three members of the city council, selected by the council. Various constitutional provisions have been mentioned by counsel for appellants, in objection to the constitution of a different board of equalization in the assessment and taxation of property in a city of the first class, and property outside of the territorial limits of the city in the county; but the mandate of the constitution is that the legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation upon all property in the state, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe such regulations by general law as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property. The board of equalization of taxes within certain districts, and for correction of errors in assessments, is a part of the usual machinery in the assessment and collection of taxes. The constitution of such board and the designation of the persons composing it are matters of legislative discretion. For a long time the boards of county commissioners have been selected in their respective counties, by law, to compose the members of the board of equalization. So far as the mere question of power is considered, it is competent, however, for the legislature to constitute those boards, and select their members and designate the number of members from any qualified persons; and the only inquiry, therefore, is, what statute designates the board of equalization for cities of the first class? Prior to the legislative session of 1893, the respective cities and towns of the state had their own machinery for |