(Disqualifications for office.) done this, we are left to infer, very fairly, that they intended to use it in its legal acceptation, which was settled and known, and therefore, rendered all explanation unnecessary. Besides, the words "infamous crime" are properly a legal phrase, and are, therefore, to be taken in their legal sense, unless, from the context, it appear that such was not the intention, which cannot even be pretended to be the case here; but the contrary would seem to be most clearly indicated, by the use of the word "conviction." It becomes necessary, now, to ascertain the legal import of this phrase. Mr. Webster, who, in his Dictionary, adopts the meaning given by the Encyclopedia to the word "infamy," says, "in law," it means "that loss of character or public disgrace which a convict incurs, and by which he is rendered incapable of being a witness or juror,” and accordingly, in Tomlin's Law Dictionary, in explaining the same term, it is laid down, that infamy extends to forgery, perjury, gross cheats, &c., and disables a man to be a witness or juror. It has unquestionably been clearly settled, that the conviction of a person of an infamous crime, renders him incompetent to be a witness thereafter; but the conviction of a crime, considered not infamous at common law, has never been held, unless by statute, sufficient to disable him from being a witness. See Co. Lit. 6 b; Com. Dig., tit. Testimony, A, 3, 4; Clancey's Case, Fortescue 208; Baring v. Shippen, 2 Binn. 165; 1 Phil. Ev. 24-5; Bushel v. Barrett, Ry. & Mood. 434; s. c. 21 Eng. C. L. Rep. 483. The offences which disqualify a person to give evidence, when convicted of the same, are treason, felony, and every species of the crimen falsi, such as forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, attaint of false verdict, and other offences of the like description, which involve the charge of falsehood, and affect the public administration of justice. 2 Hale, P. C. 277; Com. Dig., tit. Testimony, A, 3, 4; Co. Lit. 6 b; 1 Phil. Ev. 20-2; 2 Russell on Crimes 502-3.*. * And see Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457. (Disqualifications for office.) So bribery, taken in a somewhat restricted sense, may be regarded as an infamous offence, and for that reason, renders the party convicted of the same, an incompetent witness; as, for instance, in the case of receiving or offering any undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, whose ordinary profession or business relates to the administration of public justice, in order to influence his behavior in office, and incline him to act contrary to the known rules of honor and honesty. 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 67, § 2; 3 Inst. 145; 4 Bl. Com. 139; 1 Russell on Crimes 156. Though, in Clancey's Case, Fortescue 208, where, after great deliberation, a conviction of bribing a witness to absent himself and not give evidence, was held to be an infamous offence by seven of the judges, and for that reason, rendered the party incapable of giving evidence, that great and distinguished judge, Lord Holt, then chief justice of the king's bench, doubted the propriety of the decision. The ground of the decision in Clancey's Case, was, that the purpose of the bribery was to obstruct and pervert the administration of public justice, by preventing the truth from being made known. The same ground was adopted in a late case of Bushel v. Barrett, Ry. & Mood. 434; in this latter case, the objection to the witness was, that he had been convicted of a conspiracy to bribe a person, summoned as a witness (on an information for an offence against the revenue laws), not to appear before the justices of the peace, who were to investigate the matter and decide on it; and it was held by the court, according to the principles of Clancey's Case, that he was rendered incompetent by the conviction. And it is perfectly clear, from what the court say in this latter case, as also in the case of Clancey, that it was not because the party had been convicted of bribery or a conspiracy to bribe, that he was rendered infamous, and therefore, incompetent to give evidence; but because he had become so, on account of the object that was intended to be effected by means of the bribery, which was that of obstructing and perverting the administration of public justice. (Disqualifications for office.) But corrupt and illegal practices in giving rewards or making promises, in order to procure votes in the elections of members to serve in parliament, although in a more extended sense denominated bribery, and punishable at common law (Rex v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1335, per Lord Mansfield), have never been held to render persons convicted thereof, infamous, or incapable of giving evidence, or serving as jurors. Indeed, I think I may say, it has never occurred to any one, to make the objection as founded upon the principles of the common law; which, of itself alone, is very powerful, if not conclusive evidence, to show that such corrupt and illegal practices were never considered infamous crimes. Statutes, however, have been passed in England, as also in some of the United States, rendering persons convicted of bribery at elections, incapable of holding thereafter any office or franchise, or of voting at the same. See 1 Russell on Crimes 156 and note a. The passage of these statutes also furnishes strong evidence that a conviction at common law did not work any disqualification to hold office or give evidence; otherwise, the passage of them would have been unnecessary. But it has been said by the counsel for the commonwealth, that it properly belongs to the governor to settle and decide the question that is presented here; that he has already determined that the defendant, by reason of his conviction, is no longer entitled to hold the office of sheriff; and that the decision of the governor, thus made, is binding and conclusive upon this court. It would seem, that the governor did entertain the opinion that the defendant had become incapable of holding the office; but whether for the same cause that is now assigned on the part of the commonwealth, may be questionable, because we have before us a copy of what is called a supersedeas, issued by him, bearing date the 18th April 1842, directed to the defendant, wherein, after reciting that the defendant had been duly commissioned sheriff of the county of Huntingdon, and that he afterwards had been convicted, at (Disqualifications for office.) January sessions 1842 of the court of quarter sessions of said county, of a misdemeanor, and sentenced by the said court, on the 16th April 1842, only two days anterior to the issuing of the supersedeas, to pay a fine of $100, and to undergo an imprisonment for one month in the jail of said county, the governor declares, that for the cause thus stated, it fully appears to him, that the defendant had not behaved himself well in the said office, and therefore, ought not any longer to exercise the said office of sheriff conferred upon him; and then he, the governor, thereby revokes, annuls and supersedes the defendant's commission of sheriffalty. Now, it is very apparent, from the face of the supersedeas, that the governor had been given to understand, in some way or other, that the defendant had been convicted of misbehavior in office; for he says expressly, that it appeared fully to him, from the conviction, which he recites as being of a misdemeanor, that the defendant had not behaved himself well in his said office of sheriff; whereas, it appears plainly, from the exemplification of the record, produced here, of the only conviction that is alleged to have taken place against the defendant, that it was not for misbehavior in office, or anything of the sort, but for bribing an elector to vote for him as a candidate for the sheriff's office, before he obtained it. Hence, I am inclined to believe, that the governor could not have derived his information of the conviction upon which he acted from a regularly certified copy of the record thereof, which ought to have been furnished to him, or otherwise he would not have fallen into such an error, it being one of fact simply, which required no legal knowledge or acumen in order to guard against it. Then, supposing it was a matter upon which he was authorized to pass conclusively, it would appear that he decided upon a case altogether different from that which is presented to us; and it would seem to have been one, too, which never existed; and therefore, cannot be considered as having any effect upon the present. (Disqualifications for office.) But the governor's action in this case cannot be said to partake, properly speaking, of a judicial character; for, it was ex parte, without any previous notice whatever to the defendant; and it would, therefore, be unreasonable in the extreme, to regard it as conclusively binding upon the rights of the defendant. Besides, I am not satisfied, that the governor has any power to issue any other species of supersedeas, when a vacancy takes place in the sheriff's office, than that of a new commission to fill it until the next general election, which he is authorized to do by the first section of the sixth article of the constitution; this, at least, I think, may be considered as the only supersedeas which he is expressly authorized to issue by the constitution. The argument that the defendant's confinement, under the sentence of the court, rendered it impracticable for him to execute the duties of his office in person, and therefore, he ought to be considered as virtually removed from it, does not seem to merit notice; for, as well might the same effect be said to have been produced, if his confinement had been caused by sickness; in either case, all the duties that could not be performed by him personally, he would have discharged by his deputy. Nor is the argument that the defendant could not have the charge of the jail of the county, while he himself was a prisoner in it, seeing this would have been leaving it to his own will to have his sentence carried into effect, or not, as he pleased, entitled to any greater respect; because it was altogether feasible for the coroner, who had the defendant in charge, to have an exclusive control over part of the jail, for that purpose; or, if the building used as a jail, in the county, would not admit of that, he could, as it would have been his duty, have procured an apartment in another building, or the whole of another building, if requisite, for the purpose of confining the defendant in it; for, the jail in a county, does not, of necessity, consist of one entire building alone; two or more may be obtained and occupied for |