(Division of election district.) asks that we shall make such order as to us shall seem proper. On the argument, however, the wishes of the petitioners were expressed in a more definite form; they were, that the court should appoint judges and inspectors of the presidential election to be held to-morrow in this district. We possess no authority to appoint election officers of this or any other district, unless such power be given by law; if such a power be so given, it is our plain duty to execute it; if no such power be given, it is equally our duty to refuse to act. The character and importance of the election should only make us more cautious of interfering in its organization in this district, unless we have the clear right to do so. What is, then, the power invoked? and, under what circumstances, is its exercise asked? All our authority over the subject is found in the 21st section of the "act regulating election districts," passed the 7th April 1848; it is brief, being contained in these words: "that from and after the passage of this act, in all cases where the citizens of the district of Penn shall fail to elect judges and inspectors of elections, or the same shall be set aside, from informality or otherwise, the judges of the court of quarter sessions shall fill all vacancies so occurring." P. L. 367. This law is remarkable for its clearness and precision; two perfectly-defined cases of vacancies in the election officers are provided for; one, where the citizens have failed to elect, the other, where they have held an election which has been set aside for informality or otherwise; all other vacancies, not embraced in these two classes, are to be supplied under the general laws governing the other election districts of the commonwealth. This question might be elaborated, but could not be made clearer; the enactment is one that he who runs may read. When our authority, under this act, is invoked, one of two things must be shown to us, either that the people of the district have failed to hold an election for the choice of their own election officers, or, that having held such election, the same (Division of election district.) has been set aside by the judicial act of this court, after a full trial and hearing, prosecuted in the manner pointed out by law for contesting township elections; for supplying any other class of vacancies, the general laws must be looked to. So far as respects myself, there is no novelty in this construction; it was given by me, in April last, when applied to by the inhabitants of this township to select judges for a special election to be held for commissioners; I refused, because the applicants did not exhibit one of the cases provided for by the act of 1848. At the time of this refusal, I was most anxious to exercise the authority invoked, because a local dispute running very high in the district, made such a choice of election officers by the court, most desirable; but I felt I could not do so, with a proper deference to the plain letter of the law, which too clearly expressed its own purposes, to leave any room for doubt. The law under which we are called to act being thus ascertained, what are the facts to which we are asked to apply it? They are few and simple. On the 17th of March last, the district of Penn composed one election district; on that day, being the day fixed by law for holding township elections, the citizens of the district assembled at the place of holding them; very soon a dispute arose in regard to the choice of officers of the election, each party claiming to have chosen them; the two constables of the district opened separate election polls, the elections were held, and two sets of returns of these elections were filed in the clerk's office, where they have both remained since, the question of their regularity never having been submitted to the court of quarter sessions, in the form of a contest of the election. So stood matters until the 10th of April 1848, when an act of assembly was passed, dividing the Penn district into two election districts, making the centre of Broad street the line between them, and designating places in each of the new divisions, where all general and special elections should thereafter be held, by the citizens residing (Division of election district.) within the respective precincts. The act then declares "that the officers elected on the 17th of March last (namely, Thomas T. Davis, Conrad Carpenter and William Wentzell), for conducting the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of October next ensuing, shall act as officers and conduct the election in the west precinct, at the new election poll created by this act, to wit, at the house of Jacob Peters, Jr., at the southwest corner of Ridge road and Girard avenue; and the judge of the said election shall appoint a judge of election of the east precinct; and each of the inspectors of said election shall appoint an inspector for the east precinct; the said judge and inspectors so appointed to hold and conduct the election at the new election poll created by this act, to wit, at the house now used as the commissioners' hall, at the northeast corner of Tenth and Thompson streets." P. L. 461. In pursuance of this act, Davis, Carpenter and Wentzell appointed a judge and inspectors for the eastern precinct, and they and their nominees conducted the recent general election in the new precincts. One of the doubts entertained by the petitioners is, as to the powers of these designated officers to hold the presidential election, considering their authority confined to the holding of the October election. Previously to expressing our opinion on this branch of the case, we deem it important to consider, what was the legal effect of the division of the district into two precincts, by the act of April 1848, on the elections held on the 17th of March 1848, even admitting those elections, as regards judge and inspectors, to have been perfectly regular. These elections were held for judge and inspectors of the whole and undivided district of Penn, then composing a single election district; when, however, the legislature thought fit to divide this district territorially, into two new subdivisions, for election purposes; to create two separate and distinct election polls, requiring separate and distinct officers, and a separate organization, the single election district of Penn went out of existence, its place being supplied by the new precincts. It was not the case where a given (Division of election district.) part of an old district was formed into a new one, and where provision was only made for the new district; the whole district was cut into two parts, two new election districts formed from it, and the old district thus wiped out of existence as a separate election district. On what principle could the election officers of the repealed election district have acted in the new ones? They could not have done so in both, that is quite certain; could they have made choice of either? if so, what would have become of the other district? suppose their residence had been in different precincts, how could either of them act as the officer of an election where he had no right to vote? All these difficulties are solved by the application of a perfectly familiar principle, viz: that the official functions of local officers fall, with the political annihilation of the locality for which they were chosen or appointed. In the leading case on this subject, Respublica v. McClean, 4 Yeates 399, the supreme court ruled that, where new counties are formed out of parts of old ones, the commissions of justices of the peace, who had been commissioned for the old counties, but who, by the subdivision, were thrown into the new ones, were thereby vacated: "his commission," says Chief Justice Tilghman, speaking of the justice in that case, "necessarily became void by the political annihilation of that part of the county for which he was commissioned, and where he resides." It was on this principle, that this court held, last term, that the office of settler of the township accounts of Passyunk township became vacant, from the fact that the officer elect had been thrown into Moyamensing, by the annexation of that part of the territory of Passyunk in which he lived into Moyamensing.* * See North Whitehall v. South Whitehall, 3 S. & R. 121, where it was said by Gibson, J., that "on the breaking up of a township, by forming it into new ones, there is an end of its overseers, and consequently, of all corporate powers." It is not, however, in the power of the legislature to abolish a judicial district, and thus vacate the commissions of the judges; they are protected by the constitution. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 2 Legal Gaz. 20. (Division of election district.) The legislature, in acting on these subjects, seem to have been regulated by the same principle. By an act passed the 4th of February 1846, Cedar ward, in the city of Philadelphia, was divided into three wards, viz: Spruce, Cedar and Lombard; the 5th section of this act authorized the judge and inspectors of old Cedar ward to appoint judges and inspectors for Spruce and Cedar wards, and authorized the original Cedar ward officers to act in Lombard. P. L. 25. By the act regulating election districts, passed the 16th of March 1847, John O'Brien, Phillip Duffy and Henry Funk were, by name, appointed inspectors of the Richmond district election, and by a special clause, the authority of the judge and inspectors of the unincorporated district of the Northern Liberties, of which it seems Richmond formed a part, was confirmed. P. L. 424. These precedents might be increased; but enough have been cited, to show that, when the legislature have heretofore created new wards or districts, they have never supposed that the old election officers possessed any power in the new ones formed out of them; nor do they seem to have entertained a doubt as to their right to name the election officers of the new districts, or, what is the same thing, to authorize other designated individuals to name them. The necessary result seems, therefore, to be, either that the officers named in the act of 1848, and their nominees, are to hold the presidential election; or, if their granted power be not large enough for that purpose, a case has arisen not provided for by law; a case, however, in which the court have no power to appoint, because it neither arises from failure to elect, nor from an election set aside by judicial process. The remaining question, then, for consideration is, whether the legislative nominees were judges for the single election in October last, or whether they have had imparted to them all the powers and authorities with which they would have been invested had they been duly elected in March last? If they have such powers given to them, |