(Indictments against election officers.) election, they did wilfully, fraudulently and unlawfully cause to be placed in the ballot-box provided at the election, a large number, to wit, one hundred and fifty tickets, as having been voted and received at such election, whereas, in truth and in fact, no such tickets were received from the voters at such election. 5. The fifth count charges that, being officers of said election, they did unlawfully, wilfully and designedly alter and change the lists of voters required to be kept at such election, and did interpolate therein, a large number, to wit, one hundred and fifty names of persons as having voted, whereas, in truth and in fact, no such persons voted at such election. 6. The sixth count charges that, being officers of said election, they did unlawfully, wilfully and designedly destroy the list of voters kept and made at such election, and did unlawfully substitute therefor, false and simulated lists of voters, purporting to have been made at such elec tion. To this indictment there is a general demurrer. The defendants object to this record, first, in detail, alleging that each count is defective and insufficient on which to found a judgment: it is then objected to in general; their counsel alleging that the joinder of all these defendants in one bill, cannot be sustained, under any rule which obtains in criminal pleading. I will consider these objections in their order. The first count in this bill charges that the defendants did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties at the election, without setting forth any facts which constitute the alleged fraud, or averring in what respect it was perpetrated, or any ground on which the accusation is made. The prosecution claims to sustain this indictment under § 102 of the election law of 1839, which declares that, "if any inspector, judge or clerk shall be convicted of any wilful fraud in the discharge of his duties, he shall undergo an imprisonment," &c.; and contends that (Indictments against election officers.) merely charging the crime in the language of the statute creating the offence, is sufficient. But it is objected by the defendants' counsel, that such a general charge in the bill, is not in accordance with the law relative to pleading in criminal cases, and that the want of specification as to any facts which indicate the fraud, renders this count bad; therefore, on that ground, the demurrer must be sustained. This is now the point for consideration. In order that the rules which apply to this subject may be clearly comprehended, we will first inquire, what statement of facts is required to be set forth in bills of indictment charging offences at common law, and what, under statutes which create or define offences not known to the common law. In the former, it is a familiar principle, that the indictment must state the facts which constitute the crime, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit; that the allegations in the bill ought to be certain to every intent, and without any intendment to the contrary. 1 Chit. C. L. 140-2; 2 T. R. 586. Hence, it is laid down as a general rule, that all indictments ought to charge a man with a particular specified offence, and not an offence in general; for no one can know what defence to make to a charge thus uncertain; it cannot be pleaded in bar or abatement of a subsequent prosecution, nor can it appear that the facts given in evidence against a defendant on such a general accusation, are the same of which the indictors have accused him; nor will it judicially appear to the court, what punishment is proper on conviction. 1 Chit. C. L. 188; 2 Hawk. P. C. 320. It is said by Hawkins, "that in the indictment, the special manner of the whole fact ought to be set forth with such certainty, that it may judicially appear to the court, that the indictors have not gone upon insufficient premises." Therefore, an indictment for burglary, which does not state the breaking to have been in the night-time, is bad; so, to state that one feloniously broke prison, without averring the cause of imprisonment, is insufficient; nor (Indictments against election officers.) could it be seriously contended for one moment, that an indictment charging one with stealing, without averring what was stolen, could be sustained; nor can any precedent be found for an indictment in a case of homicide, which does not show the means by which the offence was perpetrated. If, then, we were to apply the rule which almost invariably governs in cases of indictments for offences at common law, this first count will be found defective. But it was contended on the argument, that the same strictness in pleading, where the offence is created by statute, is not required; and therefore, if the indictment lay the crime in the words of the statute, it is sufficient, without averring the facts or circumstances attending the transaction, which made the acts, alleged to have been done, criminal. But upon a careful examination of the authorities, I think it will be found, that the rules in relation to indictments charging offences created by statute, are the same that govern in cases of crimes at common law, with, perhaps, one exception. Therefore, we find it asserted by most of the law writers, as an elementary rule, that the principles which govern in relation to indictments at common law, generally, apply to offences created by statute; whatever precision is required in the one, is also necessary in the other; and it is often insufficient, merely to pursue the description of the offence given in the statute. 1 Chit. C. L. 227; 2 Hawk. P. C. 254. Hence, it is said by Hawkins, "neither doth it seem always sufficient to pursue the very words of the statute, unless, by so doing, you fully, directly and expressly allege the fact, in the doing or not doing whereof, the offence consists, without the least uncertainty or ambiguity." We find that in an indictment for obtaining goods by false tokens, or under false pretences, the means by which the offence was accomplished, must appear on the face of the record; 1 Hale P. C. 517, 526; 2 Ibid. 170; for, it is not enough to allege, generally, that the cheat was effected by means of certain (Indictments against election officers.) false tokens or false pretences; and the reason given by Grose, J., in his opinion in Fuller's case, is, that there may be some false pretences not within the statute, and therefore, they must be set out, that the court may see what they were. 2 East P. C. 831; 11 Mass. 136; Mart. & Yerg. 137. Numerous other cases of statutory offences might be cited, to illustrate the application of the rule, many of which will be found collected in 2 Hawk. P. C. 321, 354-5. To the same point is Rex v. Mallinson, 2 Burr. 679; 2 Stra. 1127. Nor does this principle in relation to criminal pleading, in cases of offences created by statute, rest solely on English authority; such was held to be the law, by the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, in the case of United States v. Almeida, tried at February Term 1849; an able and well-written opinion was delivered by Judge Kane, and is to be found in a note to Wharton's Precedents § 1061. That was a case in which the prosecution charged the defendant with a revolt on board a ship, under an act of congress making it an offence for any one of the crew of any ship, upon the high seas, to be guilty of a revolt; the indictment charged the prisoner with a revolt, in the language of the law, without stating any of the facts or acts done by the prisoner, to show the revolt; on that ground, the court arrested the judgment, and held that merely charging an offence in the language of the statute, was not sufficient, as a general rule. The limitation in the application of the rule, which will be presently noticed, was recognised by that court. This case would seem to settle the question now under consideration; and when we reflect upon the high character of the court from which it emanates, perhaps, should be deemed conclusive upon the point. But the soundness of the doctrine does not rest on these authorities alone; the question has been definitively settled by our supreme court in the cases of Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 S. & R. 469; Stewart v. Commonwealth, 4 S. & R. 194; (Indictments against election officers.) and Dock v. Chief Burgess, 7 Watts 181. In this last case, the court say, "it is not sufficient in an indictment or popular action, to lay the offence in the very words of the statute, unless they expressly serve to allege the very fact, with all the necessary additions, and without a grain of uncertainty or ambiguity; the special circumstances necessary to individuate the offence must be stated." To the general rule we have stated, there are, undoubtedly, exceptions; but, in our opinion, this case does not come within any of them. The exceptions, or perhaps, limits to the application of this principle, arise from the peculiar character of the offence charged; thus, an indictment against a common barrator, or one for keeping a common gaming-house, is good, without a specification of the acts; for the essence of the offence, in these cases, consists in its habitual character, or arises from a series of transgressions; so, an indictment under our act of assembly, for selling vinous or spirituous liquors by a less measure than one quart, is good, without alleging to whom the sale is made, for the essential ingredient of the crime is the sale. But a conviction, under the statute of 43 Eliz. ch. 7, for cutting down divers lime-trees, was quashed for uncertainty. Regina v. Burnaby, 2 Ld. Raym. 900. This rule, which seems to be so well established, is not arbitrary in its nature, but is founded upon the plainest principles of reason and common sense. Nothing can be more reasonable, than that the prosecution, in a criminal case, should state the facts specifically which, it is supposed, constitute the offence, with as much certainty as the nature of the crime will admit. It should be done, in order that the court may see that the case comes within the statute; for there may be alleged frauds perpetrated, which would not always render those who are acting as officers of the election liable under the 102d section of the law already cited. There may be acts done by them as individuals, which had no connection with their official |