number of years as he established himself more firmly in power and sought to completely consolidate his position. He urged summit meetings and the breaking down of tourist barriers, the exchange of official and unofficial delegations of all kinds, etc. The natural result of these developments-despite the horrible example of Hungary in 1956-was a softening of resistance to communism and a lessening of anti-Communist sentiment within the United States. There were also developments within this country which brought about a change in climate and made it possible for the Communists to come increasingly out into the open. A series of Supreme Court decisions which threw out the Smith Act convictions of many party leaders and upset long-standing antiCommunist legislation caused widespread resentment among the citizens of this country-but had other effects as well. Psychologically, these decisions were a blow to the anti-Communist people of this country, undermining their morale, at the same time that they were a shot in the arm to the Communist Party-an indication that the Government's drive to destroy the party's effectiveness through Smith Act convictions of its leadership and other legally based moves against the conspiracy were coming to an end, or at least a temporary halt. These decisions also provided extensive ammunition for the ultraliberals and leftists who had been consistently promoting the line that anti-Communist activity and prosecution is somewhat anti-American, a violation of civil liberties and constitutional rights, and punishment of "mere dissent." The Fund for the Republic and some other groups in this country spent huge sums of money during the mid and late fifties, turning out pamphlets, books, and brochures and reprinting articles which supported this line. During the same period, it became popular in certain circles to promote the line that the Communist Party was no longer a danger to the United States. It had lost so many members and was so torn by internal dissent, it was said, that it had become completely ineffective. The Communist Party, during this period, also worked intensely to create a climate conducive to more open activity on its part. Individual party members were ordered to infiltrate community and national level organizations-PTA's and civic, church, women's, and similar groups-and promote the peaceful coexistence and "anti-communism is un-American" line. To a certain extent, the party was also aided by the foreign policies adopted by the United States. The natural effect of summit meetings, increased trade, exchanges, and tourism between the United States and the Soviet Union was to promote a certain tolerance of communism and to undermine vigorous opposition to it. Psychologically, these policies were a definite assist to the party in emerging from the underground and, as it would say, "resuming its place in the mainstream of American life.” As previously pointed out, the party's main concern during the 1950's was to achieve respectability. This was also one of Krushchev's main desires. For this reason, there were no mob riots nor any other instances of violence staged by the Communist Party in the United States during this period. The tactical situation was such, from the Communists' point of view, that use of force and violence as a weapon during this period would have been bad, both for the party and for Khrushchev, who was doing all in his power to lull the West into a false sense of security. 1959 and 1960 The last year and a half has seen a great change in Communist tactics. Khrushchev still talks of banning the bomb and of disarmament, summit meetings and peaceful coexistence, but numerous statements made by him and other Communist leaders in the recent past indicate that he does not believe in peaceful coexistence in all implications of the phrase nor as non-Communists generally interpret it. The whole world-the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa-as noted earlier in this report, has been torn by greatly increased Communistfomented violence and rioting and also by revolutions and civil wars. As noted in this committee's Annual Report for 1959, Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated in December of last year that while Khrushchev was continuing to talk peaceful coexistence in all his communications with the West, he had secretly told Communist parties everywhere that, ideologically, there never was-and never can be-peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism. As indicated in earlier sections of this chapter, Soviet and U.S. Communist publications during 1960 have stressed the same themepeaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the class struggle; collaboration of classes is not the way to Communist victory, even though avoidance of all-out war may be. This line has been stressed in articles and speeches published during the past year in international Communist agitation and propaganda organs such as "International Affairs" and the "World Marxist Review," which are distributed throughout the world in over a score of different language editions. A significant development which has generally been neglected by information media in the United States during the last few years has been the increasingly open ties between the U.S. Communist Party and the Kremlin. Not only has a considerable number of U.S. party officials and functionaries traveled to the Soviet Union and Iron Curtain countries since the Supreme Court's 1958 decision eliminating any passport restrictions based on Communist affiliations, but U.S. party officials have been contributing articles to international Communist propaganda and theoretical organs. The U.S. party is making less and less effort to conceal its ties with the international Communist apparatus. One of the most recent examples of this type of activity was provided by Gus Hall, the present leader of the U.S. Communist Party, who contributed an article to the September 1960 issue of the "World Marxist Review." In this article, Hall emphasized a theme that Soviet theoreticians have been stressing lately-obviously on Moscow's orders. Hall stated in his article that the major question facing the world Communist movement is this is it possible to force U.S. imperialism to retreat while at By forcing "U.S. imperialism to retreat," Hall, like all Communists, means bringing about the elimination of U.S. military defense bases in foreign countries, the withdrawal of all American troops from foreign soil, and numerous related developments that would finally result in the isolation of this country in a hostile world and thus its eventual capitulation to communism. Hall, in his article, gave Communists in all parts of the world his answer to the question he had raised. It was "Yes." Conditions are such today, he wrote, and Communist power has grown so that they can now defeat the United States, bring about its surrender, without a world war. How can this be done? Hall answered the outlook for a retreat by U.S. imperialism is a realistic ** * To view the new possibilities of halting war as a gift of some abstract objective development * would lead to passivity and inaction. Hall stated that, in considering the possibilities of Communist success in forcing U.S. imperialism to retreat, the recent "heroic" mob violence in Japan (which toppled the Kishi regime and forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit) was "a good example to study." He hailed recent developments in South Korea, Turkey, Cuba, and the Congo-all characterized by large-scale violence and some by revolution-as steps in the retreat of U.S. imperialism. Hall's statement that the U.S. cannot be defeated "without mass actions" and his specific reference to mob violence in Japan and armed uprisings in other countries provide an answer to the question of Communist-inspired mob violence and rioting in this country in the immediate future. Hall, the U.S. party boss, said that they are essential to the defeat of the United States. In so stating, he told U.S. Communists and party members everywhere that the Communist violence that has racked the world for the last year must be continued and stepped up in tempo. Basically, there was nothing new in what Hall wrote in his article. The Soviet theoreticians Konstantinov and Momdzhan said it earlier in somewhat differently couched terms in the previously quoted Pravda article reprinted in Political Affairs. James S. Allen said basically the same thing in his remarks to the Communist Party National Committee meeting last March. This is now a basic theme in all major Communist directives, both U.S. and international. The "mass actions" Hall has in mind, as clearly indicated by his references to recent developments in certain countries, are demonstrations, peace marches, strikes, student riots, and mob violence in varied forms-all the "class-struggle tactics" the Communists have used extensively in certain parts of the world during the last year, particularly the more violent forms. Hall, in his article, also reiterates a doctrine stressed in previously quoted Communist propaganda statements. He wrote that the recent trend of increasing Communist power and stepped-up military, economic, and political difficulties for the United States "has greatly sharpened up class antagonism and has stepped up the mood of struggle *** in all sections of the population. Within the United States, there is already evidence that the Communist Party is adopting a much more aggressive attitude. The riots in San Francisco last May 13 and the Communist-inspired domonstrations against this committee the day before and the day following the riots are not the only such developments to take place in this country during the past year. Last February the committee held hearings in Washington on Communist activities among youth groups and the Communist-staged World Youth Festival held in Vienna in the summer of 1959. As a result of Communist planning and agitation, several busloads of young people, primarily college students from Philadelphia and New York, numbering perhaps 200, attended these hearings with the obvious intent of creating an incident. They jeered anti-Communist witnesses and wildly applauded and cheered the Communist Party members as they loudly, and with strong expressions of contempt, declaimed against the committee while on the witness stand. The disorder was such that, on several occasions, the chairman found it necessary to threaten to clear the hearing room if it did not stop. At the committee's hearings in Washington on Communist infiltration among seamen's groups and on waterfront facilities-which followed the San Francisco hearings and the Woodstock Hotel meeting of the Youth Against the House Un-American Activities Committeethe party employed the same tactics. A contingent of young Communists, fellow travelers, and dupes from New York was in attendance in the hearing room. No incident developed-but only because the Capitol police had been alerted to the possibility of trouble and ejected several ringleaders from the audience when they disobeyed the subcommittee chairman's order (given after several pro-Communist outbursts) that there be no demonstrations for or against any witness. Why the Shift in Communist Tactics? There can be little doubt that Khrushchev and the U.S. Communist Party were profiting by the soft tactics they were using up to a year or so ago. Without question, the U.S. Communist Party had made very real gains in the years 1955-59 in acceptability, in breaking down barriers to Communist infiltration in a number of important fields, and in developing wider acceptance for its line on a number of vital issues. Without question, the same applied to the Soviet Union. When sweetness and light-peaceful coexistence, exchanges, summit meetings, and so forth-were achieving so much for world communism, why did it suddenly desert these tactics? A certain answer to this question is impossible without information from the inner circles of the Kremlin itself. There are a number of factors, however, which would make this shift logical from the Communist view of sound strategy and tactics. Some students of mass psychology have advanced an interesting theory-and one that seems to have considerable validity-in answer to this question. They point out that in time of war or near war, in periods of bitter political, economic, and propaganda enmity (such as the cold war), there tends to be a polarization of people toward their own governments and against the enemy. Everything their govern ment does is right; everything the enemy does is wrong. Their country is good; the opposite side is evil. An end to war or relaxation of tensions, however, breaks up this polarization. People begin to see evil, imperfections, or wrong in their own government and some good, "humanity," and decency in the enemy. The early 1950's, with a Communist-Free World war being fought in Korea, was a period of intense polarization in the United States and, it is reasonable to believe, within the Soviet Union as well. But depolarization set in as the war ended and as Khrushchev, rising to power, brought about something of a thaw in the cold war and also on his home front because the Soviet Union was weak in an internal political sense. This had immediate benefits for him and the international Communist movement. Cold analysis indicates that, since the end of World War II, as far as Western-U.S.S.R. relations are concerned, the basic policy of the West has been one of coexistence with communism, rather than aggressive effort to bring about its downfall. For this reason, the West grabbed at the opportunity to talk over "differences" with the Soviet Union, to break down barriers by "letting people get to know and understand one another" through exchanges and tourism, thus theoretically easing tensions and the danger of war. This provided Khrushchev with a breathing spell and gave him the opportunity to consolidate his power within the Soviet Union, while lulling and disarming the West politically and psychologically, if not militarily. His brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution was no more than a brief setback to him in this endeavor. Despite the revolting nature of his actions at the time, the West proved itself eager to forget the whole thing and to go about getting along with Khrushchev's professed desire for "peace." The rape of Tibet, carried out by Khrushchev's Chinese henchmen, scarcely ruffled the surface of the increasingly "good relations" between Moscow and the West, which appeared to be becoming increasingly conditioned to the acceptance of Communist atrocities. A short while later, Khrushchev was invited to tour the United States-and did so, though a few years earlier a storm of public protest had forced the cancellation of a visit by Tito. Apparently, in the view of the students of mass psychology, there were also other-and very different-results of Khrushchev's soft policy that he did not foresee. The depolarization that took place in the United States and in the West in general also took place within the Soviet Union and, because the government there has no popular base, was more widespread and deeper than in the free world. It became a real threat to Khrushchev, to the Soviet Government, and to the aims of the world Communist movement. American tourists, exchange delegations, and other cracks in the Iron Curtain that developed as a result of Khrushchev's policies had the effect of convincing the people behind the Iron Curtain-who tend to doubt Communist propaganda anyway-that the United States was not so warlike, that it sincerely desired peace, and that it was not the great threat to their very existence that their leaders claimed. There has been extensive evidence of unrest and dissent within the Soviet Union in recent years which, it is reasonable to assume, developed, to a considerable extent at least, because of this depolarization. There is also evidence of continuing conflict in the higher Soviet party elements, something of a split in the military, and economic |