 | 1984 - 1014 str.
...when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad. Let me now share them with you: (1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that... | |
 | Harry G. Summers - 1995 - 280 str.
...major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad. . . . ( 1 ) FIRST, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . . (2) SECOND, If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should... | |
 | Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke - 1996 - 400 str.
...$22.3 (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1991 ; Kosiak 1993). 3. The Weinberger tests are: (1) The United States should not commit forces to combat...particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to American national interest or that of her allies. (2) If the United States decides it is necessary... | |
 | 210 str.
...developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad. • The United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 2000 - 512 str.
...with ill-defined objectives. These six principles are time-honored and relevant to all warfare. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly... | |
 | Bill McCloud - 1989 - 184 str.
...developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950. that... | |
 | Michael G. MacKinnon - 2000 - 232 str.
...when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad. Let me now share them with you: (1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that... | |
 | Eliot A. Cohen - 2002 - 312 str.
...establishment; they embodied, for a generation of officers, the "normal" theory of civil-military relations. (1) The United States should not commit forces to combat...occasion is deemed vital to our national interest. (2) If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly... | |
 | Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, James D. Morrow - 2005 - 556 str.
...speech on November 28, 1984, Caspar Weinberger articulated the Weinberger Doctrine. He indicated: First, the United States should not commit forces to combat...vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that... | |
 | Seyom Brown - 2004 - 220 str.
...in 1984 by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger ruling out the use of US forces in combat abroad "unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest and that of our allies." 24 The Clinton administration's criteria for employing US forces were also... | |
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First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. 
