as a noun and a verb, which, however applicable to the cases in which they were used, would be, we think, extended too far

in them that would damage or spoil the beer, if they were not pasteurized. This pasteurizing also destroyed the yeast that might have been in the beer.

If the corks had but little or no elasticity, and did not fit the bottles perfectly, the gas would escape while the beer was yet in the brewery, or in transportation, or in the place of market, and the beer would be flat, stale, worthless and unmarketable.

When the corks had been dried, they were soft, elastic and pliable, free from all foreign substances and germs, perfectly airtight, and fitted for use in bottling beer for export. They were next taken to the building in claimant's brewery which was used for bottling purposes, where they were again soaked or wetted by steaming them for a short time, so they would fit snugly and easily in the bottles.

The bathing, or treatment by the bath, and the washing and steaming of the corks were all done by skilled labor.

After the beer had been put in the bottles and they had been corked, the filled bottles were put in a large vat, where they were pasteurized by heating to the right temperature for a sufficient length of time and cooled again. If the corks had not been treated as above described, the carbonic-acid gas would have escaped in the heating or pasteurizing process, because there was a powerful gas pressure toward the cork during all that process. If that gas had escaped, the beer would have become flat.

The corks, so treated by this process and put in the bottles of beer, could only be removed therefrom by means of a corkscrew or other instrument of force, which removal would damage or destroy the cork so it could not be used afterwards for the same purpose.

The hand-cut corks which come from Spain have all been cut out of the wood without steaming it beforehand. The corks that are cut in the United States are cut from the wood that has been steamed first, thus depriving them of much of their elasticity. Because the Spanish hand-cut corks are cut without having been steamed in the first instance, they are far safer and better corks to be made for and used in bottling export beer than corks cut in the United States after being steamed.

Without the careful selection and thorough treatment of corks, beer cannot with safety be exported from the United States to foreign countries. When the corkwood reaches the United States it is steamed in order to get an increased volume out of it. The steaming of the corkwood makes it open something like a sponge. The steaming swells the cork, and those who do the steaming get more corks out of it, but how much more does not appear. But the steaming takes away its elasticity, and the cork cut after steaming is not so good or so perfect as one cut from the dry wood in the first place.

Corks cut after steaming will shrink, and that fact makes them inferior VOL. CCVII-36

if made to cover the treatment detailed in finding III or to the corks after the treatment. The words of the statute are indeed so familiar in use and of meaning that they are confused by attempts at definition. Their first sense as used is fabrication or composition-a new article is produced of which the imported material constitutes an ingredient or part. When we go further than this in explanation we are involved in refinements, and in impracticable niceties. Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labor and manipulation. But something more is necessary, as set forth and illustrated in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609. There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, "having a distinctive name, character or use." This cannot be said of the corks in question. A cork put through the claimant's process is still a cork. The process is the preparation of the encasement of the beer, and assimilates this case to Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. United States, 181 U. S. 584. There it was contended that bottles and corks in which beer is bottled and exported were "imported materials used in the manucorks. Cork dealers in the United States also put it through various treatments, such as polishing it and using chemicals to make it look bright and have a good color. They do not attempt to close up the pores in the cork, nor run it through machinery to shake or wash the dust or impurities out of it. They put the cork on the market as the machine cuts it after it has been steamed. Corks so cut and treated in the United States would not be fit for use in the exportation of beer, for they would damage the beer through contact, and much stale beer would result from the escape of the carbonic-acid gas by reason of the imperfect corking, and the beer would not be marketable.

In the manufacture of beer for export to other countries it was necessary to destroy the yeast in the beer to prevent second fermentation and the consequent ruin of the beer. In order to destroy the germs of yeast the finished beer was steamed to the degree necessary to destroy the germs, and for that purpose the beer was inclosed securely in a vessel to prevent the escape of the carbonic-acid gas, and of all such vessels a bottle made of glass was and is the one best adapted to the purpose aforesaid. And such steaming was also necessary to the perfect manufacture of beer for bottling, and to the perfect corking thereof it was essential and necessary that the cork as treated should be used as herein described.

facture" of such beer, within the meaning of § 25. And it was pointed out-found by the Court of Claims-that the process of manufacturing beer for exportation was different from the process of manufacturing beer for domestic use and the materials were selected with greater care, in order that the bottled product might preserve purity under the conditions of transportation and change of climate. The process was detailed at length. It was decided, however, that such special process and treatment did not make the bottles and corks component parts of the beer when exported, as it was insisted they were. It is true, that it was not contended in that case, as is in this, that the corks or the bottles were articles manufactured in the United States of imported materials by reason of the special treatment to which they had been subjected, making them better or necessary for their purpose. That such a contention was possible under the statute did not occur to the brewing company. It does not appear in the statement of the case that the corks were subjected to any treatment, and appellant denies the application of the case by saying that "The corks were not put through any process of manufacture whatever." And yet it must have been necessary then, as the Court of Claims has found it to be, that "without the careful selection and thorough treatment of corks beer cannot with safety be exported from the United States to foreign countries." Of course the views of a litigant of his rights under a statute are not an absolute test of the views of a litigant in another case, but the Schlitz Brewing case was one which may be supposed to have brought to consideration every practicable and legal problem under the statute, and if a cork by special treatment ceases to be a cork and becomes an article manufactured of cork, the change and the legal effect of it would have thrust themselves upon the notice of somebody. But passing this, there is force in the contention of the United States that the exportations were not of corks or bottles, but of beer, and therefore not articles, exported within the meaning of § 25, entitled to a drawback. This phase of the case-indeed all

phases of it-are ably dealt with in the opinion of the Court of Claims, and it would be unnecessary repetition to go over the argument or to review the cases.

Judgment affirmed.

WINTERS v. THE UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 158. Argued October 24, 1907.-Decided January 6, 1908.

The rule that all the parties must join in an appeal or writ of error unless properly detached from the right so to do applies only to joint judgments and decrees. This court has jurisdiction of an appeal taken or writ of error sued out by one of several defendants if his interest is separate from that of the other defendants.

In a suit against several defendants as trespassers in which some of them defaulted and others answered, held, that each defendant was a separate trespasser and that while those who defaulted were precluded from questioning the correctness of the decree entered against them, the answering defendants had nothing in common with the others and could maintain an appeal without them.

In a conflict of implications, the instruments must be construed according to the implication having the greater force; and, in the interpretation of agreements and treaties with Indians, ambiguities should be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.

In view of all the circumstances of the transaction this court holds that there was an implied reservation in the agreement of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 124, with the Gros Ventre and other Indians establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation, of a sufficient amount of water from the Milk River for irrigation purposes, which was not affected by the subsequent act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, admitting Montana to the Union, and that the water of that river cannot be diverted, so as to prejudice this right of the Indians, by settlers on the public lands or those claiming riparian rights on that river.

The Government of the United States has the power to reserve waters of a river flowing through a Territory and exempt them from appropriation under the laws of the State which that Territory afterwards becomes. 148 Fed. Rep. 684, affirmed.

THIS suit was brought by the United States to restrain appellants and others from constructing or maintaining dams or reservoirs on the Milk River in the State of Montana, or in any manner preventing the water of the river or its tributaries from flowing to the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.

An interlocutory order was granted, enjoining the defendants in the suit from interfering in any manner with the use by the reservation of 5,000 inches of the water of the river. The order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 143 Fed. Rep. 740. Upon the return of the case to the Circuit Court, an order was taken pro confesso against five of the defendants. The appellants filed a joint and several answer, upon which and the bill a decree was entered making the preliminary injunction permanent. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 148 Fed. Rep. 684.

The allegations of the bill, so far as necessary to state them, are as follows: On the first day of May, 1888, a tract of land, the property of the United States, was reserved and set apart "as an Indian reservation as and for a permanent home and abiding place of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine bands or tribes of Indians in the State (then Territory) of Montana, designated and known as the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation." The tract has ever since been used as an Indian reservation and as the home and abiding place of the Indians. Its boundaries were fixed and defined as follows (25 Stat. 124):

"Beginning at a point in the middle of the main channel of Milk River, opposite the mouth of Snake Creek; thence due south to a point due west of the western extremity of the Little Rocky Mountains; thence due east to the crest of said mountains at their western extremity, and thence following the southern crest of said mountains to the eastern extremity thereof; thence in a northerly direction in a direct line to a point in the middle of the main channel of Milk River opposite the mouth of People's Creek; thence up Milk River, in the middle of the main channel thereof, to the place of beginning."

Milk River, designated as the northern boundary of the