Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 390, followed in Bitterman v. Louisville
& Nashville R. R., 205.

Murphy v. Utter, 186 U. S. 95, followed in Vail v. Arizona, 201.

O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, followed in Paraiso v. United States, 368.
Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 251, followed in Heath &
Milligan Co. v. Worst, 338.

Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, followed in Same v.
Chicago Edison Co., 42.

St. Louis Hay Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159, followed in United States v.
Andrews, 229.

Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521, followed in Flemister v. United States,
372.

Utter v. Franklin, 172 U. S. 416, followed in Vail v. Arizona, 201.

Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358, followed in Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union
County Bank, 251.

Wright v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657, followed in Polk v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Asso., 310.

CITIZENSHIP.

See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
See ATTORNEYS, 1;
CONTRACTS, 1.

CLASSIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 26-30, 34.

COMITY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 41.

Interstate; power of Congress.

COMMERCE.

One engaging in interstate commerce does not thereby submit all his business
to the regulating power of Congress. Employers' Liability Cases, 463.

See CONGRESS, POWERS OF;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 144;
RAILROADS, 1, 5.

COMMON CARRIERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31.

RAILROADS.

CONFESSIONS.

See JURISDICTION, A 2,

CONGRESS.

I. ACTS OF.

See ACTS OF CONGRESS.

II. MEMBERS OF.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 39, 40;

JURISDICTION, A 9.

III. POWERS OF.

1. Power over District of Columbia and the Territories.

The legislative power of Congress over the District of Columbia and the
Territories is plenary and does not depend upon the special grants of
power, such as the commerce clause of the Constitution. Employers'
Liability Cases, 463.

2. Power over District of Columbia and the Territories as to regulation of
common carriers within.

To restrict a general act of Congress relating to common carriers, by inter-
pretation to interstate commerce so as to validate it as to the carriers in
the several States, would unduly restrict it as to carriers in the District
of Columbia and the Territories. Ib.

See COMMERCE;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 4.

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.
See CONTRACTS, 3.

CONSPIRACY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3, 4.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Commerce clause; repugnancy of state order as to stoppage of interstate trains.
Any exercise of state authority, whether made directly or through the in-

strumentality of a commission, which directly regulates interstate
commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution; and so held as to the stopping of.interstate trains at stations
within the State already adequately supplied with transportation
facilities. Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 328.

2. Commerce clause; power of Congress to regulate relations of master and

servant.

Under the grant given by the Constitution to regulate interstate com-

merce and the authority given to use all means appropriate to the
exercise of the powers conferred, Congress has power to regulate the
relation of master and servant to the extent that such regulations are
confined solely to interstate commerce. Employers' Liability Cases.
463.

3. Commerce clause; power of Congress to impose liability upon common
carriers in favor of their employés.

An act addressed to all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce,
and imposing a liability upon them in favor of any of their employés,
without qualification or restriction as to the nature of the business
at the time of the injury, of necessity includes subjects wholly outside
of the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion. Ib.

4. Commerce clause-Validity of Employers' Liability Act of June 11, 1906.
While the act of Congress of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, known as the
Employers' Liability Act, embraces subjects within the authority of
Congress to regulate commerce, it also includes subjects not within
its constitutional power, and the two are so interblended in the statute
that they are incapable of separation and the statute is therefore
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and non-enforci-
ble. Ib.

5. Contract impairment clause; what amounts to contract within.

A state statute confirming a grant of the former sovereign and specifying
the area and providing for a survey to ascertain metes and bounds
and for filing the field notes does not amount to a contract within the
impairment clause of the Constitution that the State will abide by the
survey even though it includes more than the original grant. Sullivan
v. Texas, 416.

6. Contract impairment clause; what constitutes contract within.
There is no contract, within the meaning of the contract clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution, between a municipality and its citizens and tax-
payers that the latter shall be taxed only for the uses of that corpora-
tion and not for the uses of any like corporation with which it may be
consolidated. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 161.

7. Contract impairment clause; charters of municipal corporations not con-
tracts with State.

Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created by it
and at all times wholly under its legislative control; their charters, and
the laws conferring powers on them, do not constitute contracts with
the State within the contract clause of the Federal Constitution; nor
are a municipality and its citizens or taxpayers deprived of its or their
property without due process of law, nor is such property taken with-
out compensation, by reason of any legislative action of the State in
regard to the property held by such municipality for governmental
purposes, or as to the territorial area of such municipality, or the con-
solidation thereof with another city, or the repeal or alteration of its
charter. Ib.

8. Contract impairment; due process of law; taking property without just com-
pensation; validity of Pennsylvania statute of 1906 for union of Pittsburgh
and Allegheny.

The act of February 7, 1906, of Pennsylvania, providing for the union of

contiguous municipalities, under which the cities of Pittsburgh and
Allegheny were consolidated, is not unconstitutional as depriving the
City of Allegheny or the citizens and taxpayers thereof of their prop-
erty without due process of law, or because it takes property without
compensation or because it impairs any contract between the City of
Allegheny and the State or the City of Allegheny and its citizens and
taxpayers. Ib.

9. Contract impairment by exercise of reserved legislative power to alter, amend
or repeal charters—Due process of law.
Where there is a reserved power in the legislature to alter, amend or repeal
charters, a law permitting mutual life associations to reincorporate
as regular life insurance companies is not unconstitutional as impair-
ing the obligation of the contracts existing between such associations
and their policyholders, or as depriving such policyholders of their
property without due process of law. (Wright v. Minnesota Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 193 U. S. 657.) Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Asso.,
310.

10. Contract impairment-Due process of law-Validity of ch. 722, Laws of
1901 of New York.

Under the power to alter, amend and repeal charters reserved in the con-
stitution of 1846 of New York, Chapter 722 of the Laws of 1901 does
not impair the obligation of contracts existing between mutual life
associations and their policyholders, nor in this case did the reincorpo-
ration of such an association as a regular life insurance company de-
prive its policyholders of their property without due process of law. Ib.

11. Contract impairment-Texas act of 1852, confirming Mexican grants,
not a contract impaired by the act of September 3, 1901.
The act of February 10, 1852, of Texas, confirming Mexican grants, did not
amount to a legislative contract to abide by the surveys to be made
of such grants; nor is the act of September 3, 1901, directing actions
to be brought to recover land wrongfully in possession of grantees in
excess of the amount of the original Mexican grant, but included in
the survey made under the act of 1852, unconstitutional as impairing
the obligation of a contract. Sullivan v. Texas, 416.

12. Double jeopardy; effect of act of March 2, 1907, allowing to United
States writ of error in criminal case.

Under the act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1246, the United States can be
allowed a writ of error to the District Court quashing an indictment in
a criminal case. The act is directed to judgments rendered before the
moment of jeopardy is reached and is not violative of the double
jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Taylor v. United States, 120.

13. Double jeopardy; effect of trial under fatally defective indictment.
One is not put in jeopardy if the indictment under which he is tried is so
radically defective that it would not support a judgment of conviction,

and a judgment thereon would be arrested on motion. Shoener v.
Pennsylvania, 188.

14. Double jeopardy; effect of trial under fatally defective indictment.
Where a conviction for embezzlement has been reversed on the ground that
the money had not and could not be rightfully demanded when the
indictment was found the accused is not put in second jeopardy by the
trial on another indictment for embezzlement after demand rightfully
made. Ib.

15. Double jeopardy; effect of trial under fatally defective indictment.
Where the defense is that the accused is put in jeopardy for the same offense
by his trial under a former indictment, if it appears from the record of
that trial that the accused had not then or previously commited, and
could not possibly have committed, any such crime as the one c "ged,
and therefore that the court was without jurisdiction to have
any valid judgment against him—the accused is not, by such t..
in second jeopardy for the offense specified in the last or new indictment.
Ib.

ered

put

16. Double jeopardy; what constitutes under Philippine bill of rights.
One is not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the Philippine
bill of rights by being tried for an assault on an officer because he has
already been convicted for a breach of the peace and assault upon an-
other person at the same time and place, and where it appears that the
assault on the officer was not relied on or proved as part of the offense
for which he was first convicted. Flemister v. United States, 372.

17. Due process of law; what constitutes, in proceeding to enforce production
of books and papers.

So long as an opportunity to be heard is given to the party objecting to a
notice to produce books and papers, before the proceeding to enforce
such production is closed, due process of law is afforded, and if the state
court has construed the statute providing for such production to the
effect that objections raised before a grand jury must be reported to
the court for action, there is opportunity to be heard. Consolidated
Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 541.

18. Due process of law; compelling corporation to produce books and papers
which are without the State not a denial of.

It is within the power of the State, and due process of law is not denied
thereby, to require a corporation doing business in the State to produce
before tribunals of the State books and papers kept by it in the State,
although at the time the books may be outside of the State. Ib.

19. Due process of law, etc.-Validity of statute of Vermont providing for the
production of books and papers by corporations.

The statute of Vermont of October 9, 1906, providing for the production
of their books and papers by corporations before courts, grand juries
and other tribunals. and punishing corporations failing to comply there-