with as for contempt, is not unconstitutional as depriving corporations
of their property without due process of law, or as denying them the
equal protection of the laws, or as conferring judicial functions on non-
judicial bodies, or as taking private property for public use without
compensation, or as constituting unreasonable searches and seizures
or requiring corporations to incriminate themselves. Ib.
20. Due process and equal protection of laws; application of provisions to
action of state board of equalization.
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are not confined to the action
of the State through its legislative, cxccutive or judicial authority, but
relate to all instrumentalities through which the State acts; and so
held that the action of a state board of equalization, the decisions
whereof are conclusive, except as proceedings for relief may be taken in
the courts, is reviewable in the Federal courts at the instance of one
claiming to be thereby deprived of his property without due process of
law and denied the equal protection of the law. Raymond v. Chicago
Traction Co., 20.
21. Due process and equal protection of laws; action by state board of equaliza-
tion reviewable by Federal courts.
Action of a board of equalization resulting in illegal discrimination held
in this case not to be action forbidden by the state legislature and
therefore beyond review by the Federal courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Barney v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 430, distinguished.
22. Due process of law; what constitutes in taxation and assessment.
Due process of law requires that opportunity to be heard as to the validity
of the tax and the amount of the assessment be given to a taxpayer,
who, without fraudulent intent and in the honest belief that it is not
taxable, withholds property from tax returns; and this requirement is
not satisfied where the taxpayer is allowed to attack the assessment
only for fraud and corruption. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 127.
23. Due process of law not afforded by §§ 804, 879, Political Code of Georgia,
relative to taxation and assessment.
The system provided by the Political Code of Georgia, §§ 804, 879, as con-
strued by the highest court of that State, not allowing the taxpayer any
opportunity to be heard as to the valuation of property.not returned
by him and honestly withheld, except as to fraud and corruption, does
not afford due process of law, which adjudges upon notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard, within the meaning of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
24. Due process of law; duty of Supreme Court to determine that taxpayer has
been afforded.
The assessment of a tax is action judicial in its nature requiring for the legal
exertion of the power such opportunity to appear as the circumstances
of the case require, and this court, as the ultimate arbiter of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, is charged with the duty of deter-
mining whether the taxpayer has been afforded due process of law. Ib.
See Supra, 7-10;
Infra, 32, 33;
RAILROADS, 4.
25. Effect of possible construction of statute to render it unconstitutional.
Where it appears that a conviction under the New Jersey statute for the
protection of the oyster industry depended both in the charge and in
the testimony upon the actual illegal use of oyster dredges, and the
possible construction of the statute which made it a crime to merely
navigate interstate waters was not essential to the case, no valid con-
stitutional objection can be raised for want of power to pass or enforce
the statute. Lee v. State of New Jersey, 67.
26. Equal protection of laws; classification for governmental purposes.
There cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things in a
classification for governmental purposes, and a general classification.
otherwise proper, will not be rendered invalid because certain imaginary
and unforeseen cases have been overlooked. In such a case there is no
substantial denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County
Bank, 251.
27. Equal protection of laws; classification for governmental purposes.
State legislation which regulates business may well make distinctions de-
pend upon the degrees of evil without being arbitrary and unreasonable.
(See Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338.) Ib.
28. Equal protection of laws-Validity of Arkansas law relative to notes given
for payment of patented articles.
The purpose of the statute of Arkansas providing that all notes given for
payment of patented articles must show that they were so given, and
permitting defenses to be made to such notes in the hands of third par-
ties, is to create and enforce a police regulation, aimed principally at
itinerant vendors of patented articles, and the distinction in § 4 that it
shall not apply to merchants and dealers who sell patented articles in
the usual course of business is founded upon fair reasoning and is not
such a discrimination as violates the equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
29. Equal protection of laws—Validity of classification in respect of the pro-
duction of books and papers.
A state statute providing for the production of books and papers by cor-
porations does not deny to corporations the equal protection of the
laws; such a classification is a proper one. Consolidated Rendering Co.
v. Vermont, 541.
30. Equal protection of laws-Classification for regulation.
A state s'atute may, without violating the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, put into one class all engaged in business of a
special and public character, and require them to perform a duty which
they can do better and more quickly than others and impose a not
exorbitant penalty for the non-performance thereof. Seaboard Air
Line v. Seegers, 73.
31. Equal protection of laws-Validity of statute of South Carolina of 1903,
limiting time for adjustment of claims by carriers and imposing penalty.
The statute of South Carolina of 1903 imposing a penalty of fifty dollars on
all common carriers for failure to adjust damage claims within forty
days is not as to intrastate shipments unconstitutional as violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment, neither the classification, the amount of
the penalty nor the time of adjustment being beyond the power of the
State to determine. And so held in regard to a claim of $1.75, as small
shipments are the ones which especially need the protection of penal
statutes of this nature. Ib.
32. Equal protection and due process clauses; when state legislation repugnant
This court will not limit the power of the State by declaring that because the
judgment exercised by the legislature is unwise it amounts to a denial
of the equal protection of the laws or deprivation of property or liberty
without due process of law. Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 338.
33. Equal protection and due process of law-Validity of North Dakota mixed-
paint law.
The statute of North Dakota requiring the manufacturers and vendors of
mixed paints to label the ingredients composing them is not unconstitu-
tional as depriving such manufacturers of their property or liberty
without due process of law or as denying them the equal protection of
the law because the requirements of the statute may not apply to paste
paints. Ib.
34. Equal protection of laws-State regulation of business.
Legislation which regulates business may well make distinctions depend
upon the degrees of evil without being arbitrary, unreasonable, or in
conflict with the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. (See Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union
County Bank, 207 U. S. 251.) Ib.
See Supra, 19;
Infra, 50.
Extradition of fugitives from justice. See EXTRADITION.
35. Fifth Amendment; application of.
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not restrictive of state,
but only of national, action. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 161.
36. Full faith and credit clause-What amounts to assertion of right under
Constitution.
Where judicial proceedings in one State are relied upon as a defense to an
assessment by the authorities of another Staté a right under the Con-
stitution of the United States is specially set up and claimed though
it was not in terms stated to be such a right. Tilt v. Kelsey, 43.
37. Full faith and credit clause; conclusiveness of adjudication by probate
court as to domicil of decedent.
An adjudication by the probate court that a testator was a resident of
the State though essential to the assumption of jurisdiction to grant
letters testamentary is not necessarily conclusive on the question of
domicil nor even evidence of it in a collateral proceeding, and, under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, is not
binding upon the courts of another State. Ib.
38. Full faith and credit;.when decree of probate court entitled to.
Where the decree of the probate court is final and bars all persons having
claims against the estate, the courts of another State must, under the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, give similar force
and effect to such a decree, when rendered by a court having jurisdic-
tion to probate the will and administer the estate, and held that such
a final decree in New Jersey was a bar in the courts of another State
against the taxing authorities of the latter State attempting to enforce
a claim for inheritance tax on the ground that the testator was at the
time of his death domiciled therein. Ib.
39. Parliamentary privilege-Construction of words “treason, felony and breach
of the peace."
The words "treason, felony and breach of the peace" were used by the
framers of the Constitution in § 6, Art. I, and should be construed in
the same sense as those words were commonly used and understood in
England as applied to the parliamentary privilege, and as excluding
from the privilege all arrests and prosecutions for criminal offenses,
and confining the privilege alone to arrests in civil cases. Williamson
v. United States, 425.
40. Parliamentary privilege from arrest—Effect of expiration of term of office
on sentence illegally imposed.
If a sentence on a member of Congress is illegal when pronounced because
in conflict with his constitutional privilege it would not become valid
by the expiration of the term for which he was elected. Ib.
41. Privileges and immunities comprehended by § 2, Art. IV of Constitution;
right to sue and defend in state court.
The right to sue and defend in the courts of the States is one of the privileges
and immunities comprehended by § 2 of Art. IV of the Constitution
of the United States, and equality of treatment in regard thereto does
not depend upon comity between the States, but is granted and pro-
tected by that provision in the Constitution; subject, however. to the
restrictions of that instrument that the limitations imposed by a State
must operate in the same way on its own citizens and on those of other
States. The State's own policy may determine the jurisdiction of its
courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard
therein. Chambers v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 142.
42. Privileges and immunities; validity of Ohio law limiting right of action
for wrongful death.
The statute of Ohio of 1902 providing that no action can be maintained in
the courts of that State for wrongful death occurring in another State
except where the deceased was a citizen of Ohio, the restriction operat-
ing equally upon representatives of the deceased whether they are
citizens of Ohio or of other States, does not violate the privilege and
immunity provision of the Federal Constitution. Ib.
43. Property rights; taking private property without compensation; compensa-
tion to corporation for time, trouble and expense in producing books.
If the person producing the books and papers is entitled, under the general
law of the State, to compensation as a witness, the failure of the statute
requiring the production of the books and papers of corporations to
provide compensation to the corporation itself for the time, trouble
and expense of such production does not amount to taking private
property without compensation. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Ver-
mont, 541.
44. Searches and seizures; what constitutes unreasonable.
In this case, the notice, given under a state statute, to produce books and
papers did not amount to an unreasonable search or seizure. Adams
v. New York, 192 U. S. 585. Quare and not decided, whether the
Fourteenth Amendment has made the provisions of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments immunities and privileges of citizens of the United
States of which they cannot be deprived by state action. Ib.
45. Searches and seizures-Use in evidence of articles seized—Infringement of
rights under Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, fol-
lowed to effect that defendant's rights under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were not violated by the seizure of infringing copies
of copyrighted articles or by the use thereof as evidence. American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 284.
46. Self-incrimination; right of corporation to refuse to produce books on
ground of.
A corporation required to produce books and papers cannot refuse to pro-
duce any of them on the ground that they might incriminate it. It
is for the court, after an inspection, to determine the sufficiency of
the objection and what portion, if any, of the books and papers pro-
duced should be excluded. Consolidated Rendering Cɔ. v. Vermont,
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