purpose the principle is not limited in all respects to the domicile of origin or residence, and is applied in the following way:1

(a) A person domiciled in a neutral country, but having a house of trade in an enemy country, is deemed to acquire a commercial domicile in the enemy country in respect of transactions originating there; 2 but the other property of such an owner is not affected thereby.3

(b) A commercial domicile not being the domicile of nationality is terminated when actual steps are taken bona fide, to abandon such domicile for a different one sine animo revertendi.1

2. This principle applies equally to the cases of an individual, a partnership, or a corporation, residence in the two latter cases being understood to mean the place whence the business is controlled.5

3. In the case of a partnership where one or more of the partners is domiciled in enemy territory, property not liable to be seized as enemy property on other grounds is presumed to be divided proportionately between the partners, and the share attributed to a partner domiciled in enemy territory is deemed to be enemy property.

ITALY

(h) This question can be raised either as to the vessel or as to the goods.

1. As to the vessel there is some reason to consider how the principle according to which the neutral or enemy character of the vessel depends on the flag, conforms to the Italian law; and it is according to the law of the State to which this flag belongs that the right of the vessel legitimately to fly the flag in question must be determined.

2. According to the Italian public and private law the character of the goods must depend on the nationality and not the domicile of the owner; and in this sense the Italian legislator has incidentally decided

1 Postilion, Hay and Marriott, 245, 1 E. P. C. 20; Harmony, 2 C. Rob. 322, 1 E. P. C. 241; Aina, Spinks 8, 2 E. P. C. 247; Gerasimo, 11 Moore, P. C. 88, 2 E. P. C. 577, 582.

2 Dictum of Lord Stowell in Jonge Klassina, 5 C. Rob. 302, 1 E. P. C. 488; cases cited in Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob. 1, 1 E. P. C. 31.

3 Portland, 3 C. Rob. 43.

4 Indian Chief, 3 C. Rob. 11, 1 E. P. C. 251.

5 Cases cited in Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob. 1, 1 E. P. C. 31; see judgment of Lord Lindley in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Limited, Law Reports, 1902, Appeal Cases, p. 505.

6

• Citto, 3 C. Rob. 38; Harmony, 2 C. Rob. 322, 1 E. P. C. 241.

the question in hand as appears by the analogy of art. 42 of the code of merchant marine (see letter (g) above).

Indeed the Italian legislator, having to choose as the basis of all judicial reports, even those simply patrimonial, between nationality and domicile, has always preferred nationality. Moreover, from the point of view of the public law and according to considerations of a political order, the war being essentially a public and political condition, it appears that the quality of enemy can not logically be extended in principle and for all purposes beyond the individuals belonging to the one or the other belligerent communities. It appears, also, that the State can not accept a doctrine which would compel it to consider as enemies in some respects its own subjects, for the sole reason that they might have their domicile abroad while this circumstance would not be sufficient to exempt them from their military and political obligations to their native country.

I. Enemy goods are:

JAPAN

(a) Vessels in the service of the enemy State, voluntarily or by con

straint;

(b) Vessels navigating under an enemy flag or with an enemy

clearance;

(c) Vessels belonging in whole or in part to the enemy State or to

an enemy person;

(d) Vessels whose ownership has been transferred in the course of or in anticipation of hostilities by the enemy State or by an enemy person to another person having his domicile in the other belligerent State, or in an allied State, or in a neutral State, unless there is proof of a transfer complete and in good faith of the ownership. If the transfer of ownership is made while the vessel is making the voyage, it should not be considered as of good faith and complete until actual delivery. II. Enemy goods are:

(a) Goods belonging to the enemy State or to an enemy person. (b) Products of the soil of the enemy State belonging to the owner

of the ground.

(c) The cargo consigned to the enemy State or to an enemy person or agent, including the cargo loaded before but in anticipation of the opening of hostilities.

(d) The cargo consigned, in the course of or in anticipation of hostilities, by the enemy State or by an enemy person or agent to another person having his domicile in the other belligerent State or its ally or in a neutral State. However, if it is clearly established that the ownership of the said cargo belongs to the consignee it is exempt from confiscation.

The goods belonging to the enemy State or to an enemy person which are the object of a transfer in the course of a voyage are considered as enemy goods until the actual delivery.

III. Enemy persons are:

(a) Persons having their domicile in the enemy State or who are engaged in the service of the enemy State, whatever be their nationality.

(b) Persons engaged in business in the enemy State in what concerns this business.

NETHERLANDS

VIII. (1) The "enemy" or "neutral" character of the vessel is determined by its flag.

(2) The "enemy" or "neutral" character of the cargo depends on the domicile of the owner.

RUSSIA

VIII. The nationality of the vessel is determined by the flag which it has the right to carry.

The nationality of the cargo is determined by the nationality of its

owner.

OBSERVATIONS

Up to the present it is an acquired principle that private enemy property on the sea is liable to capture, but that neutral commerce with the enemy is free.

Every commercial transaction supposing, necessarily, two or more persons, it is only the commerce considered from the unilateral point of view of the enemy that the belligerent has the right to pursue.

To determine the enemy character of vessels or of goods the practice followed to this time takes into consideration either the nationality, the domicile, or the principal establishment of the owner.

So far as the vessels are specially concerned, however, most of the memoranda consider that the neutral or enemy character is deter

mined by the flag carried by the vessel in conformity to the laws which govern the flying of this flag.

Besides it seems, indeed, that it is a principle generally recognized that the vessel under an enemy flag is considered as an enemy vessel. But can every vessel under neutral flag be equally considered as neutral, setting aside the special case where the vessel by virtue of special penal law would incur a treatment analogous to that of an enemy vessel?

Basis for discussion

38. The neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined in the first place by the flag regularly carried.

OBSERVATIONS

As to the goods, can it at least be said, as a general rule, that it is the neutral or enemy character of the regular owner that is taken into consideration, whether one admits afterwards as a criterion in this respect, his nationality, his domicile, or his principal establishment?

Basis for discussion

39. The neutral or enemy character of the goods is determined by the neutral or enemy character of the one who is the regular owner of the goods.

Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War1

[Translation]

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias.

Having regard to the terms in which the British Government invited various Powers to meet in conference in order to arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recognized rules of international law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court; Recognizing all the advantages which an agreement as to the said rules would, in the unfortunate event of a naval war, present, both as regards peaceful commerce, and as regards the belligerents and their diplomatic relations with neutral Governments:

Having regard to the divergence often found in the methods by which it is sought to apply in practice the general principles of international law;

Animated by the desire to insure henceforward a greater measure of uniformity in this respect;

Hoping that a work so important to the common welfare will meet with general approval;

Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

1 Signed at London, February 26, 1909. Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States, April 24, 1912. Adversely acted on by the Parliament of Great Britain. The text of this Convention and the following report is taken from the copy printed for the use of the U. S. Senate, a reprint of which appears in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909, pp. 318, 304. For the original French text, see the British Parliamentary Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 5 (1909), pp. 381, 342 [Cd. 4555]; Naval War College, International Law Topics; The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909 (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1910), pp. 169, 12. For other translations of the Declaration and Report, see Naval War College, ibid., pp. 169 and 13; British Parliamentary Paper, Miscellaneous, No. 4 (1909), pp. 73 and 33. [Cd. 4554.]