fome of the caufes which produce them are barely privations in fubjects, from whence our fenfes derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, confiders all as diftinct pofitive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them; which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things exifting without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be diftinguifhed; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the fuperficies, to make any object appear white or black.

§. 3. A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their causes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diftinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more diftinctly, than the philofopher, who hath bufied himself in confidering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its caufe pofitive or privative; and the idea of black is no lefs pofitive in his mind, than that of white, however the caufe of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.

§. 4. If it were the defign of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural caufes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reafon why a privative cause might, in fome cafes at leaft, produce a pofitive idea; viz. that all fenfation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal fpirits, varioufly agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion muft as neceffarily produce a new fenfation, as the variation or increafe of it and fo introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal fpirits in that

organ,

S. 5. But whether this be fo or no, I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the fhadow of a man, though it consists of nothing but the abfence of light (and the more the abfence of light is, the more difcernable is the fhadow) does not, when a man looks on it, caufe as clear and

pofitive

pofitive idea in his mind, as a man himself, though covered over with clear fun-fhine? and the picture of a fhadow is a pofitive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which ftand not directly for pofitive ideas, but for their abfence, fuch as infipid, filence, nihil, &c. which words denote pofitive ideas; v. g. tafte, found, being, with a fignification of their abfence.

Pofitive ideas

from priva

tive causes.

§. 6. And thus one may truly be faid to fee darkness. For fuppofing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may fee the figure of it, or it may be painted: or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a queftion. The privative caufes I have here affigned of pofitive ideas are according to the common opinion: but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any ideas from a privative caufe, till it be determined, whether reft be any more a privation than motion.

Ideas in the mind, qualities in bc

dies

§. 7. To difcover the nature of our ideas the better, and to difcourfe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diftinguifh them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that caufe fuch perceptions in us: that fo we. may not think (as perhaps ufually is done) that they are exactly the images and refemblances of fomething inherent in the fubject; most of thofe of fenfation being in the mind no more the likeness of fomething exifting without us, than the names that ftand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

§. 8. What foever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the fubject wherein that power is. Thus a fnow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce thofe ideas in us, as they are in the fnow-ball, I call qualities; and as they are fenfations or perceptions in our underftandings, I'call them ideas: which ideas, if I fpeak of fometimes, as in the

things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

lities.

§. 9. Qualities thus confidered in bodies Primary quan are, firft, fuch as are utterly infeparable from the body, in what estate foever it be; fuch as in all the alterations and changes it fuffers, allthe force can be ufed upon it, it conftantly keeps; and fuch as fenfe conftantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds infeparable from every particle of matter, though lefs than to make itfelf fingly be perceived by our fenfes, v. g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still folidity, extenfion, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains ftill the fame qualities; and fo divide it on till the parts become infenfible, they must retain ftill each of them all those qualities. For divifion (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to infenfible parts) can never take away either folidity, extenfion, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more diftinct feparate maffes of matter, of that which was but one before all which diftinct maffes, reckoned as fo many diftinct bodies, after divifion make a certain number. Thefe I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may obferve to produce fimple ideas in us, viz. folidity, extenfion, figure, motion or reft, and number.

Secondary

§. 10. Secondly, fuch qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, qualities. but powers to produce various fenfations in us by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their infenfible parts, as colours, founds, taftes, &c. thefe I call fecondary qualities. To these might be added a third fort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the fubject, as thofe which I, to comply with the common way of fpeaking, call qualities, but for diftinction, fecondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or confiftency, in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality' in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea

or

or fenfation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the fame primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its infenfible parts.

How prima

ry qualities produce their

ideas.

§. 11. The next thing to be confidered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifeftly by impulfe, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in. §. 12. If then external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in fuch of them as fingly fall under our fenfes, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal fpirits, by fome parts of our bodies, to the brain, or the feat of fenfation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And fince the extenfion, figure, number and motion of bodies, of an obfervable bignefs, may be perceived at a distance by the fight, it is evident fome fingly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain fome motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.

§. 13. After the fame manner that the How feconideas of thefe original qualities are pro- dary. duced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of fecondary qualities are alfo produced, viz. by the operations of infenfible particles on our fenfes. For it being manifeft that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are fo fmall, that we cannot, by any of our fenfes, difcover either their bulk, figure, or motion as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely fmaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are fmaller than pease or hail-ftones : let us fuppofe at prefent, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles, affecting the feveral organs of our fenfes, produce in us thofe different fenfations, which we have from the colours and fmells of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulse of such infenfible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the VOL. I.

I

idea

ideas of the blue colour and fweet fcent of that flower, to be produced in our minds; it being no more impoffible to conceive that God fhould annex fuch ideas to fuch motions, with which they have no fimilitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of ftecl dividing our flefh, with which that idea hath no refemblance.

§. 14. What I have faid concerning colours and fmells may be understood alfo of taftes and founds, and other the like fenfible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various fenfations in us, and depend on thofe primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of as I have faid.

Ideas of primary qualities are refemblances; of fecondary, not.

parts;

$. 15. From whence I think it easy to draw this obfervation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are refemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themfelves; but the ideas, pro

duced in us by these fecondary qualities, have no refemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas exifting in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce thofe fenfations in us and what is fweet, blue or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the infenfible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call fo.

§. 16. Flame is denominated hot and light; fnow, white and cold; and manna, white and fweet, from the ideas they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the fame in thofe bodies that thofe ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men be judged very extravagant, if one fhould fay otherwife. And yet he that will confider that the fame fire, that at one diftance produces in us the fenfation of warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different fenfation of pain, ought to bethink himfelf what reafon he has to fay, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in

the