§. 1. "AL CHAP. III. Of General Terms. The greateft part of words general. LL things that exift being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, fhould be fo too; I mean in their fignification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and neceffity. For every particular thing to have a name is impoffible. §. 2. First, It is impoffible that every particular thing fhould have a diftinct peculiar name. For the fignification and ufe of words, depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the founds it ufes as figns of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things that the mind. fhould have diftinct ideas of the things, and retain alfo the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain diftinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beaft men faw, every tree and plant that affected the fenfes, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an inftance of a prodigious memory, that fome generals. have been able to call every foldier in their army by his proper. name, we may eafily find a reafon, why men have never attempted to give names to each fheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much lefs to call every leaf of plants, or grain of fand that came in their way, by a peculiar name. And useless. §. 3. Secondly, If it were poffible, it would yet be useless; because it would not ferve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not Ff2 ferve Men serve them to communicate their thoughts. learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when by use or confent the found I make by the organs of fpeech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I fpeak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be fignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thofe very particular things which had fallen under my notice. §. 4. Thirdly, But yet granting this alfo feasible (which I think is not) yet a diftinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great ufe for the improvement of knowledge: which though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into forts under general names, are properly fubfervient. Thefe, with the names belonging to them, come within fome compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or ufe requires: and therefore, in these, men have for the most part ftopped; but yet not fo as to hinder themselves from diftinguishing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own fpecies, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occafion to mention particular perfons, they make ufe of proper names; and there diftinct individuals have diftinct denominations. What things have proper names. $.5. Befides perfons, countries alfo, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like diftinctions of place, have ufually found peculiar names, and that for the fame reafon; they being fuch as men have often an occafion to mark particularly, and as it were fet before others in their difcourfes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reafon to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we fhould have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other; and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use, as Alexander. Alexander. And therefore we fee that, amongst jockeys, horfes have their proper names to be known and diftinguished by, as commonly as their fervants; because, amongst them, there is often occafion to mention this or that particular horfe, when he is out of fight. How general words are made. $. 6. The next thing to be confidered, is, how general words come to be made, For fince all things that exift are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are fupposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the figns of general ideas; and ideas become general, by feparating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular exiftence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of reprefenting more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that fort. §. 7. But to deduce this a little more diftinctly, it will not perhaps be amifs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obferve by what degrees we proceed, and by what fteps we enlarge our ideas from our firft infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the perfons children converse with (to inftance in them alone) are like the perfons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse, and the mother, are well framed in their minds and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to thefe individuals; and the names of nurse and mamma the child ufes, determine themselves to thofe perfons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them obferve, that there are a great many other things in the world that in some common agreements of fhape, and feveral other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and thofe perfons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man for exFf3 ample. ample. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to .them all. §. 8. By the fame way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they eafily advance to more general names and notions. For obferving that feveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only thofe qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenfive extenfion: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the fhape, and fome other properties fignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal. General natures are no thing but abftract ideas. §. 9. That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is fo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the confidering of a man's felf, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing elfe but fuch abftract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at firft from particular exiftences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out fomething that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining fo much of thofe particular complex ideas of feveral particular exiftences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas fignified by the names man and horse, leaving out but thofe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thofe wherein they agree, and of those making a new diftinct complex idea, and giving the name animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man feveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, sense and fpontaneous motion; and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenfive term vivens. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, fo evident in itfelf, by the fame way the mind proceeds to body, subftance, and at laft to being, thing, and fuch univerfal terms, which ftand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mystery of genera and fpecies, which make fuch a noife in the fchools, and are with juftice fo little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or lefs comprehenfive, with names annexed to them. In all which this is constant and unvariable, that every more general term stands for fuch an idea, and is but a part of any of those contained under it. Why the genus is ordinarily made ufe of in de finitions. §. 10. This may show us the reason, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their fignifications, we make ufe of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceffity, but only to fave the labour of enumerating the feveral fimple ideas, which the next general word or genus ftands for; or, perhaps, fometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, fince they moft properly fuit thofe notions they are applied to) I fay, though defining by the genus be the shortest way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beft. This I am fure, it is not the only, and fo not abfolutely neceffary. For definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for, a definition is beft made by enumerating those fimple ideas that are combined in the fignification of the term defined: and if inftead of fuch an enumeration, men have accustomed themfelves to use the next general term; it has not been out of neceffity, or for Ff4 greater |