tions known before these
univerfal maxims.

20. One and one equal to two,

&c. not general, nor useful,

answered.

21. Thefe maxims not being

known fometimes till pro-

posed, proves them not in-

nate.

22. Implicitly known before

propofing,fignifies, that the

mind is capable of under-

ftanding them, or elfe fig-

nifies nothing.

23. The argument of affenting

on first hearing, is upon a

falfe fuppofition of no pre-

cedent teaching.

24. Not innate, because not

univerfally affented to.

25. These maxims not the first

known.

26. And so not innate.

27. Not innate, because they

appear leaft, where what

is innate, fhows itself

clearest.

28. Recapitulation.

CHA P. IV.

Other confiderations about innate
principles, both fpeculative and

practical.

SECT.

8-11. Idea of God, not innate.
12. Suitable to God's good-

nefs, that all men should

have an idea of him,

therefore paturally im-
printed by him; an-
fwered.

13-16. Ideas of God, various in

different men.

17. If

CHAP. I.

Of ideas in general.

SECT.

without knowing it, the

fleeping and waking man

are two perfons.

13. Impoffible to convince
thofe that fleep without
dreaming, that they think.
14. That men dream without
remembering it, in vain
urged.

15. Upon this hypothefis, the
thoughts of a fleeping man
ought to be most rational.
16. On this hypothesis the foul
must have ideas not de-
rived from fenfation or
reflection, of which there
is no appearance.
17. If I think when I know
it not, no body else can
know it.

18. How knows any one that
the foul always thinks?
For if it be not a felf-evi-
dent propofition, it needs
pooof.

19. That a man fhould be bufy
in thinking, and yet not
retain it the next mo-
ment, very improbable,

20-23. No ideas but from fenfa-
tion, or reflection, evi-
dent, if we observe chil-

dren.

24. The

24. The original of all our

knowledge.

CHAP. VII.

ideas the understanding is

most of all paffive.

and reflection.

1-6. Pleasure and pain.

7. Existence and unity.

8. Power.

9. Succeffion.

10. Simple ideas, the mate-

rials of all our know

ledge.

CHAP. VIII.

Other confiderations concerning

fimple ideas.

SECT.

1-6. Pofitive ideas from priva-

tive causes.

7, 8. Ideas in the mind, quali-

ties in bodies.

9, 19. Primary and fecondary

qualities.

11, 12. How primary qualities

produce their ideas.

13, 14. How fecondary.

15-23. Ideas of primary quali

ties, are refemblances; of

fecondary, not.

24, 25. Reafon of our mistake in

this.

26. Secondary qualities two-

fold; firft, immediately

perceivable; fecondly,

mediately perceivable.

CHA P. XIV.

Of duration and its fimple modes, SECT.

1. Duration is fleeting extenfion. 2-4. Its idea from reflection

on the train of our ideas. 5. The idea of duration applicable to things whiift we fleep.

6-8. The idea of fucceffion not from motion.

9-11. The train of ideas has a certain degree of quick'nefs..

12. This train, the measure of other fucceffions.

13-15. The mind cannot fix long
on one invariable idea.
16, Ideas, however made, in-
clude no fense of mo-
tion.

17. Time is duration fet out
by measures.
18. A good measure of time
mult divide its whole du-
ration into equal periods.
19. The revolutions of the fun
and moon, the propereft
measures of time.
20. But not by their motion,
but periodical appear-

CHAP. XV.

Of duration and expanfion con fidered together.

SECT.

3. Nor duration by motion. 4. Why men more easily admit infinite duration, than infinite expanfion. 5. Time to duration, is as place to expanfion.. 6. Time and place are taken for fo much of either as are fet out by the exiftence and motion of bodies.

7. Sometimes for fo much of either as we design by measure taken from the bulk or motion of bodies.

8. They belong to all beings.

9. All the parts of extenfion,

are extenfion; and all the parts of duration are duration.

10. Their parts infeparable. 11. Duration is as a line, expanfion as a folid. 12. Duration has never two parts together, expanfion all together,