made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaft particle of new matter, or deftroying one atom of what is already in being. The fame inability will every one find in himself, who fhall go about to fashion in his understanding and fimple idea, not received in by his fenfes from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste, which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never fmelt: and when he can do this, will alfo conclude that a blind man hath ideas. of colours, and a deaf man true diftinct notions of founds.

§. 3. This

This, and the like, faid in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of fenfation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and confequently of all our knowledge: I have fet down thefe particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better fee what in it is liable to your lordfhip's reprehenfion. For that your lordship is not very well fatisfied with it, appears not only by the words under confideration, but by these alfo: "But we are ftill told, that our understanding can have no other ideas, but either from fenfation or reflection."

Your lordship's argument, in the paffage we are upon, stands thus: If the general idea of fubftance be grounded upon plain and evident reafon, then we must allow an idea of fubftance, which comes not in by fenfation or reflection. This is a confequence which, with fubmiffion, I think will not hold, viz. That reafon and ideas are inconfiftent; for if that fuppofition be not true, then the general idea of fubftance may be grounded on plain and evident reafon; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from ideas which come in by fenfation or reflection, and fo cannot be faid to come in by fenfation or reflection.

To explain myfelf, and clear my meaning in this matter. All the ideas of all the fenfible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by sensation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reafoning, knowing, &c. come into my mind by reflection. The ideas of thefe qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind, to be by themselves inconfiftent with existence; or, as your lordship well expreffes it, we find that we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a fubftratum, or fubject, wherein they are, i. e. That they cannot exist or fubfift of themfelves. Hence the mind perceives their neceffary connexion with inherence or being fupported; which being a relative idea, fuperadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a fupport. For I never denied, that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have showed the guite contrary in my chapters about relation. But because a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing

here

§. 3. This is the reafon why, though we cannot believe it impoffible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than thofe five, as they are ufually counted, which he has given to man: yet I think, it is not poffible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howfoever conftituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, befides founds, taftes, fmells, vifible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four fenfes, the qualities then, which are the object of the fifth fenfe, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a fixth, feventh, or eighth sense, can

here related as a fupporter, or a fupport, is not reprefented to the mind, by any clear and diftinct idea; therefore the obfcure and indiftinct, vague idea of thing, or fomething, is all that is left to be the pofitive idea, which has the relation of a fupport, or fubftratum, to modes or accidents; and that general, indetermined idea of fomething is, by the abstraction of the mind, derived alfo from the fimple ideas of fenfation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the pofitive, fimple ideas got by fenfation and reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of fubitance, which, without thefe pofitive, fimple ideas, it would never have.

This your lordship (without giving by detail all the particular steps of the mind in this bufinefs) has well expreffed in this more familiar way: "We find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a fubftratum, or fubject, wherein they are; fince it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or accidents fhould fubfift by themselves."

Hence your lordship calls it the rational idea of substance and fays, "I grant that by fenfation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reafon is fatisfied that there must be fomething beyond thefe, because it is impoffible that they should fubfift by themfelves;" fo that if this be that which your lordship means by the rational idea of fubftance, I fee nothing there is in it against what I have faid, that it is founded on fimple ideas of fenfation or reflection, and that it is a very obfcure idea.

"

Your lordship's conclufion from your foregoing words is," and fo we may be certain of fome things which we have not by thofe ideas;" which is a propofition, whofe precife meaning, your lordship will forgive me, if I profefs, as it ftands there, I do not understand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship means, we may certainly know the existence of fomething, which we have not by thofe ideas; or certainly know the diftinct properties of fomething, which we have not by thofe ideas or certainly know the truth of fome propofition, which we have not by thofe ideas: for to be certain of fomething may fignify either of thefe. But in which foever of thefe it be meant, I do not fee how I am concerned in it.

poffi→

poffibly be which, whether yet fome other creatures, in fome other parts of this vaft and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a greater prefumption to deny. He that will not fet himself proudly at the top of all things, but will confider the immenfity of this fabrick, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconfiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other manfions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whofe faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehenfion, as a worm fhut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the fenses or underftanding of a man: fuch variety and excellency being fuitable to the wisdom and power of the maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five fenfes; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more: but either fuppofition ferves equally to my present purpose.

§. I. THE

СНАР. III.

Of Ideas of one Senfe.

Divifion of fimple ideas.

HE better to conceive the ideas we receive from fenfation, it may not be amifs for us to confider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First, Then, there are fome which come into our minds by one fense only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themselves into the mind by more senses than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only. Fourthly, There are fome that make themselves way, and are fuggefted to the mind by all the ways of fenfa tion and reflection.

We shall confider them apart under their several heads.

VOL. I.

Ideas of one

fense, as colours, of fee

ing; found, of hearing;

&c.

Firft, There are fome ideas which have admittance only through one fenfe, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their feveral degrees or fhades and mixtures, as green, fcarlet, purple, fea-green, and the reft, come in only by the eyes: all kinds of noifes, founds, and tones, only by the ears: the feveral tastes and fmells, by the nofe and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves, which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's prefence-room (as I may fo call it) are any of them fo difordered, as not to perform their functions, they have no poftern to be admitted by ; no other way to bring themfelves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

The most confiderable of thofe belonging to the touch are heat and cold, and folidity: all the reft, confifting almoft wholly in the fenfible configuration, as fmooth and rough, or elfe more or lefs firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and foft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

Few fimple

§. 2. I think, it will be needless to enuideas have merate all the particular fimple ideas, benames. longing to each fenfe. Nor indeed is it poffible, if we would; there being a great many, more of them belonging to most of the fenfes, than we have names for. The variety of fmells, which are as many almoft, if not more, than fpecies of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and ftinking commonly ferve our turn for thefe ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleafing or difpleating; though the fmell of a rofe and violet, both fweet, are certainly very diftinct ideas. Nor are the different taftes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, four, harfh, and falt, are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relifhes, which are to be found diftinct, not only in almost every fort of creatures, but in the different parts of the fame plant, fruit, or animal. The fame may be faid of colours and founds. I fhall therefore, in the account of

fimple

fimple ideas I am here giving, content myfelf to fet down only fuch, as are moft material to our present purpose, or are in themselves lefs apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongft which, I think, I may well account folidity; which therefore I fhall treat of in the next chapter.

§. 1.

TH

CHA P. IV.

Of Solidity.

We receive this idea from

touch.

HE idea of folidity we receive by our touch; and it arifes from the refiftance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it poffeffes, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more conftantly from fenfation, than folidity. Whether we move or reft, in what pofture foever we are, we always feel fomething under us that fupports us, and hinders our farther finking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive, that, whilst they remain between them, they do by an infurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that prefs them. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved one towards another, I call folidity. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the word folid be nearer to its original fignification, than that which mathematicians use it in: it fuffices, that I think the common notion of solidity will allow, if not juftify, this use of it; but, if any one think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my confent. Only I have, thought the term folidity the more proper to express this idea, not only because of its vulgar ufe in that fenfe, but also because it carries fomething more of pofitive in it than impenetrability, which is negative, and is perhaps more a confequence. of folidity, than folidity itself. This, of all other, H 2

feems