LII. CHAP. and his despatches sent to Santa Anna. From these the Mexican chief learned the plan for invading his country. 1847. He promptly decided upon his course of action-a judicious one. Trusting that the strength of Vera Cruz, and of the Castle San Juan d'Ulloa, would long resist the enemy, and even if they both should be captured, that the fortified places along the road would still retard the advance of the Americans upon the capital, he determined to direct all his force against Taylor, who was now weakened by the loss of the greater part of his army. Jan. 26. Santa Anna's difficulties were almost insurmountable. The city of Mexico was in confusion, torn by factions. He took most extraordinary and illegal measures to enlist men and obtain the means for their support; raised money by forced loans; made the church property contribute its share of the public expense; the Priests protested and appealed to the superstitions of the people; he immediately seized one of their number, the most factious, and threw him into prison, and the rest were intimidated. Thus, for nearly four months, he exercised an arbitrary, energetic, and iron rule. With a well-organized army of twentythree thousand men, and twenty pieces of artillery, he commenced his march for San Luis Potosi in the direction of Saltillo, and within sixty miles south of that place he halted and prepared for battle. Rumors reached General Wool that Santa Anna was approaching Saltillo. Major Borland was sent with thirty dragoons to reconnoitre; he was joined on his way by Major Gaines and Captain Cassius M. Clay, with another company of thirty-five men. No enemy appeared, and they pushed on during the day, and carelessly encamped for the night, but, in the morning, found themselves surrounded by one thousand horsemen under the Mexican General Minon. They were taken prisoners, and Santa Anna sent them, as the first fruits of the campaign, to be paraded through the streets of the city of Mexico. TAYLOR AT SALTILLO-M'CULLOCK'S ADVenture. 715 LII. General Taylor now advanced from Monterey, and CHAP. established his head-quarters at Saltillo. Leaving there his stores, he made a rapid march to Agua Nueva, eighteen 1847 miles in advance, on the road to San Luis Potosi, thus to secure the southern extremity of the defile through the Sierra Nevada, rather than the northern one at Monterey. Feb. At the former point the Mexicans must fight or starve, because of the barrenness of the country in their rear; while, had he remained at Monterey, Santa Anna could have had his head-quarters at Saltillo, and drawn his supplies from that comparatively fertile district. Scouts reported that General Minon with a large body of cavalry was to the left of Agua Nueva, and that the American position could be turned. Companies of dragoons from time to time were sent in different directions to reconnoitre. They at length learned from a " Mexican, dressed as a peon," that Santa Anna had arrived in the neighborhood with twenty thousand men, and that he intended to attack the Americans the next morning. The clouds of dust toward the east, and the signal fires that blazed upon the tops of the distant hills, seemed to confirm the report. But that daring Texan ranger, Major McCulloch, was not satisfied; and, accompanied by some dozen volunteers, he determined to ascertain the truth of the "peon's" story. They pushed on across a desert of thirty-six miles to Encarnacion, where they arrived at midnight, and found the enemy in force. Sending back all his men, save one, McCulloch entered their lines, and, undetected, went from point to point, obtained more correct information of their numbers, then passed out, and escaped to Agua Nueva. On the reception of this intelligence, Taylor, leaving a small guard as an outpost, retired up the valley in expectation that Santa Anna in hot haste would pursue him, while he himself should await his approach at a point, which, in passing, he had already noticed. The conjecture was correct. 4. CHAP. Santa Anna knew well the position of the Americans. He thought they would not retreat, and he resolved to 1847. surprise them. But between him and Agua Neuva there intervened fifty miles, the last thirty-six of which were across a desert. His soldiers were each supplied with water and provisions; in the morning the march commenced, and at noon they entered the desert; in the night they halted for a while to refresh, and at dawn they were to attack the unsuspecting foe. The march was rapid and secret; the silence of the desert was not disturbed-not a signal was used, not a drum beat. After so much toil he was sadly disappointed; his enemy had disappeared. He firmly believed the Americans were in full flight, in order to avoid a battle. Some days before he had sent General Minon with his cavalry across the mountains, to their rear, and he now hoped that Minon would be able to hold the fugitives in check until he himself could come up with his full force. He halted only to refresh his wearied soldiers, and then pursued with all his vigor. The ground chosen by General Taylor on which to make a stand, was the pass-since so famous-known among the Mexicans as La Angosturas, or the Narrows. It was at the north end of a valley, about twelve miles long, and formed by mountains on either side. Here an ascent rises to a plateau, a little more than a mile wide, on each side of which rugged mountains, inaccessible to artillery or cavalry, rise from two to three thousand feet. Numerous ravines or deep gullies, formed by the torrents rushing from the mountains during the rainy season, rendered the surface in front and on the sides very uneven. Neither flank could be turned except by light troops clambering up the mountains. The plateau was somewhat rough, with here and there open and smooth places, as well as clumps of thorny chaparral. The road through CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AMERICANS. LII. 717 the defile passes much nearer to the west than to the CHAP. east side of the Narrows. On this plateau, one mile south of the hacienda or plantation known as Buena Vista, 1847. the American army awaited the approach of the Mexicans. Early the following morning clouds of dust, extending far down the valley to the south, made known that the Mexican army was near and in motion. Soon after, its cavalry came in sight and halted for the infantry and artillery to come up. 22. The long roll of the drum called the Americans to arms; they obeyed the call with hearty cheers. It was the anniversary of the birth of Washington, and on the Feb. impulse his name was adopted as their watchword. They were placed under peculiar circumstances. A few months before, they were quietly engaged in the avocations of civil life; enthusiasm had induced them to volunteer, and now they were on foreign soil, far from their homes. With the exception of a few hundreds, they were all for the first time going into battle, with the prospect that to them defeat would be certain ruin; they were about to meet an army, in its numbers nearly five to one of their own. In the unequal contest, their only hope was in their own bravery, and in the skill of their commander. The cautious Taylor had gone to Saltillo, six miles distant, to superintend in person the defences designed to secure the stores from capture. General Wool was left in temporary command at the Narrows, and he directed the arrangements of the troops. Captain Washington's battery was placed to command the road or pass, the key to the position of the army. Colonel Hardin's First Illinois regiment was on a ridge to the left of the pass, and Colonel McKee's Second Kentucky on another ridge in their rear. To the left beyond these was posted the Second Illinois, under Colonel Bissell, while still further in the same direction, under the mountain, were stationed Colonels Yell and Humphrey LII. CHAP. Marshall, with the Arkansas and Kentucky volunteers. The remainder of the army, including Lane's Indiana 1847. brigade; the Mississippi riflemen, Colonel Jefferson Davis; two squadrons of dragoons, and Sherman and Bragg's batteries of flying artillery, were placed in reserve on the rear of the plateau. During the morning, and beyond the range of the American artillery, the main body of the Mexicans was also arranged in order of battle. Their right, a battery of sixteen-pounders, rested on the base of the mountains. These guns were manned by the San Patricio regiment, composed of Irish and German deserters from the American army. Two divisions, Pacheco's and Lombardini's, extended in the rear of this battery; guns, twelve and eight-pounders, were posted to the left, and a battalion occupied a hill in advance of the main line, directly opposite the pass. Their cavalry was stationed in the rear of either flank, and to be unencumbered, the baggage of the whole army was left many miles in the rear. About noon a Mexican officer brought a note to General Taylor. In pompous terms Santa Anna summoned him to surrender at discretion, and trust himself to be treated "with the consideration belonging to the Mexican character." In a brief and courteous note the American commander declined the proposal. Santa Anna noticed that the mountains to the east, beyond the American left, were unguarded, and he sent General Ampudia, with light troops, around a spur to ascend them from the south side. The movement was observed, and Colonel Marshall dismounted his own riflemen and those of the Indiana battalion, and commenced to ascend to the crest of the ridge. As the lines gradually approached each other, skirmishing began. The Mexicans kept up a continuous roar of musketry, while the Ameri |