but the very purpose for which it was enacted, compels the construction that it is intended to apply to all such busses operated in cities, without regard to whether they had or had not received a prior city license." 60

"The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and may be exercised so as to meet the ever-changing conditions and necessities of the public. Those who make investments for the purpose of using the public streets of a city for private business, under a license for that purpose, do so, and hold said property and the right to use it, subject to such other and different burdens as the Legislature may reasonably impose, for the safety, convenience, or welfare of the public." 61

A city may require that a city license number be displayed on each jitney although a state license is also required to be so displayed.62

So, jitneys operating under licenses issued under a prior ordinance may be subjected to the provisions of a more onerous ordinance, which makes provisions for issuing licenses thereunder to take the place of the unexpired terms of the old licenses. 63

The petitioner owned and operated a jitney bus in the city of Reno, Nevada, and had been issued a license under a statute entitled, "An act regulating automobiles or motor vehicles on public roads, highways, parks or parkways, streets and avenues, within the state of Nevada; providing a license for the operation thereof and prescribing penalties for its violation; designating the manner of handling the receipts therefrom and the purpose for which it may be expended and in what manner."

Section 14 of this act declared that the local authorities of cities and towns might regulate the speed of motor vehicles within the limits of such cities and towns; and, by section 15, that "this act shall in no wise affect any statute now existent or that may hereafter be enacted providing for a license on automobiles for hire."

In holding against petitioner's contention, that the city could not impose an additional tax on his vehicle, the court said: "It is clear from the whole scope and purpose of the act that it was not intended to deal with automobiles for hire as distinct from automobiles generally. The Legislature will be presumed to know that when it passed

reason why the municipal authorities should be denied the power to require the payment of a reasonable license fee for the privilege of conducting such a special business. This is a police regulation intended as a protection to the public, and those who enjoy the benefits should contribute to the cost of such protection."'

61 Nolen v. Riechman (D. C.), 225 Fed. 812 (1915).

62 Huston v. Des Moines, 176 Ia. 455, 156 N. W. 883 (1916).

63 Auto Transit Co. v. Ft. Worth, Tex. Civ. App. 182 S. W. 685 (1916).

the act, it could not limit the power of subsequent legislatures to enact a law imposing an additional license on automobiles used for hire. It is presumed, also, that the Legislature knew that there was no existing general statute imposing a license on automobiles used for hire. While the word 'statute' is generally used to refer to acts passed by a Legislature, the word is not always used with such a strict limitation. Applying, however, the strict definition of the word 'statute' to the section in question, nevertheless, we think the section will not warrant so narrow a construction as to place any limitations upon the power of the city council of the city of Reno to impose a license upon automobiles used for hire and coming within the definition of a 'jitney bus' as defined in the ordinance. The city charter of the city of Reno is a statute and this statute empowers the city council of the city of Reno to impose a license upon 'vehicles used for hire.' An automobile is a vehicle, and if it is used for hire, statutory power exists in the city council to impose a license thereon. The construction we have placed on section 15 makes it unnecessary to consider the contention made in reference to section 14." 64

§ 1672. Power of municipal corporations to regulate. Where a city has full control over its streets it may prohibit the prosecution of private business therein, and may regulate the business carried on by jitney busses, and exact indemnity bonds from the operators of such busses.65

The fact that statutes have been enacted regulating the operation of jitneys, does not render invalid municipal ordinances relating to the same subject which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the statutes.6 66

It has been held that such ordinances may be enacted under a general grant of police power.

Under a general grant of police power, and of power of control over streets, an ordinance regulating jitney busses, requiring a special license for their operation, and a bond to indemnify persons injured thereby, was upheld as valid.68

A city was held to have the power to enact an ordinance forbidding vehicles carrying passengers for hire from stopping on designated streets to receive or discharge passengers.69

Under a grant of authority to license and regulate, in addition to

64 Ex parte Counts, 39 Nev. 61, 153 Pac. 93 (1915).

65 Alabama: Giglio v. Barrett, 207 Ala. 278, 92 So. 668 (1922).

Pennsylvania: Jitney Bus Association v. Wilkes-Barre, 256 Pa. St. 462, 100 Atl. 954 (1917).

Rhode Island: Fritz v. Presbrey, R. I., 116 Atl. 419 (1922). Tennessee: Memphis v. State ex rel., 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L. R. A. 1916B 1151 (1915).

Texas: San Antonio v. Fetzer, Tex. Civ. App., 241 S. W. 1034 (1922); Greene v. San Antonio,

certain enumerated businesses and occupations, "all other businesses or occupations whatever, which in the opinion of the board of commissioners shall be the proper subject of police regulation," and "to regulate the use of automobiles, motor cars, motor-cycles, or any other motor vehicles," and to regulate the use of its streets, a municipality was held to be empowered to impose an annual license fee of $75 on every motor bus operated on the city streets for hire.70

Under power to "regulate, inspect and license all occupations when necessary or proper for the good order, public health, public safety or general regulation of the city, and charge license and inspection fees therefor, and such fees shall not be construed as occupation taxes," a city was authorized to license automobiles operated for hire, and to require a license fee therefor.71

Authority of a city to enact an ordinance imposing a license tax on jitney busses, regulating the operation thereof, requiring a liability bond to be given by the owner, and making it a misdemeanor to violate any of its terms, is included in the charter power "to fix, impose, and collect a license tax on and regulate hacks, hackney coaches, cabs, omnibuses, express wagons, drays, job wagons, and all other vehicles used for hire.” It was held that the fact that motor vehicles were unknown at the time of the granting of such charter power was of no consequence, and that such vehicles were ejusdem generis with those enumerated in the charter.

In part the court said: "The reasoning that a motor vehicle, because not in existence at the time of the passage of the act, ought not to be considered as of the same general character as hacks, cabs, and omnibuses because of a difference simply in the motive power, does not appeal strongly to us. It is a matter of public and general knowledge that these motor vehicles have very largely displaced hacks, cabs, and omnibuses propelled by horses, and that there is little or no distinction between the two classes of vehicles, other than in the motive power used. There is no distinction whatever in the purpose of use. 72

A grant of power to a municipal corporation to grant, refuse, and revoke licenses to the owners of vehicles kept for hire therein, and to subject them to such regulations as the interest and convenience of the inhabitants thereof, in the opinion of the municipal authorities, may require, delegates full legislative power over such vehicles. Under such grant, the city may prescribe the routes and hours of service of jitneys, and require indemnity bonds from their operators.73

Power to "license, regulate, and inspect all trades, professions, occupations, callings, and business carried on in said city," includes authority to regulate and license jitney busses.74

A municipal corporation was granted power to regulate "every description of carriages which may be kept for hire." A subsequent

statute provided that municipal corporations shall not have power to restrict the use or speed of motor vehicles, except as provided in the act, and further:

"That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to affect the power of municipal corporations to make and enforce ordinances, rules and regulations affecting motor vehicles which are used within their limit for public hire."

It was held that the municipality was authorized to regulate the operation of jitney busses, having been granted, in this respect, full power possessed by the state.75

If an ordinance regulating jitney busses is passed in virtue of express legislative power and substantially follows the powers granted, a court will sustain it regardless of its opinion as to its reasonableness. If passed in view of incidental or implied power granted by the Legislature, courts will review the question of reasonableness, and, if in excess of powers granted, may declare it invalid. But the unreasonable character of the ordinance must plainly appear.76

Where a statute prohibits the operation of jitneys in any city or town except under a license or permit from said city or town, issuing under an ordinance passed in conformity with said statute, jitneys cannot lawfully be operated on the streets of a city or town until an ordinance has been passed providing for licenses or permits, and such licenses or permits have been secured.77

Where jitneys are operated on the public streets unlawfully, that is, without right, they constitute a nuisance, which may be enjoined by a private individual who can show special damage resulting to him therefrom.78

A statute providing that no municipality shall make any ordinance respecting the speed of automobiles, or respecting their regulation, use, or equipment, rendered invalid an ordinance attempting to license automobiles and their drivers carrying passengers for fares of 20 cents or less, and in some respects regulating the use thereof, the number of passengers to be carried, etc.7

79

The charter of defendant city authorizes the council to regulate, clean, and keep in repair the streets and highways, to regulate the speed and running of motor, electric, or other cars through the city (subdivision 11), and to license and regulate all carriages and vehicles used for the transportation of passengers and goods and chattels of any kind, and the owners and drivers of vehicles and means of transportation, and to impose license fees for revenue, and to make and establish such other ordinances as they may deem necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties conferred on them and as they may deem proper for the good government, order, protection of persons and property, preservation of the public health, and prosperity of the city. A statute requires the owner of an auto bus to obtain the

75 Willis v. Ft. Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275 (1916).

76 Huston v. Des Moines, 176 Ia. 455, 156 N. W. 883 (1916); Fritz v. Presbrey, R. I. 116 Atl. 419 (1922).

77 Memphis St. R. Co. v. Rapid Tr.

Co., 133 Tenn. 99, 179 S. W. 635 (1915).

78 Memphis St. R. Co. v. Rapid Tr. Co., 133 Tenn. 99, 179 S. W. 635 (1915).

79 State v. Scheidler, 91 Conn. 234, 99 Atl. 492 (1916).

consent of the board having control of public streets for the operation of the auto bus and the use of the streets. It enacts that no such consent shall become effective and no such operation shall be permitted until the owner has filed with the chief fiscal officer of the city an insurance policy of a company duly licensed to transact business in the sum of $5,000 insuring against loss from liability imposed by law upon the owner of the auto bus for bodily injury or death as the result of accident occurring by reason of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the auto bus on the streets. The statute also requires that the owner shall execute a power of attorney to the fiscal officer of the city to acknowledge service of process. Section 3 requires the pay. ment to the city of 5 per cent of the gross receipts as a monthly franchise tax for revenue for the use of the city.

It was held that an ordinance following the statute and providing that the board of commissioners of the city may determine the reasonable seating capacity of an auto bus, the routes, hours of service, and terminal points, and making it unlawful to omit to operate an auto bus over the designated route during the hours prescribed in the consent of the city; to omit to display a sign to indicate that the consent has been granted; to operate an auto bus without displaying a sign showing the terminal and route, and the amount of fare when it exceeds five cents; to operate an auto bus with passengers riding outside the body of the bus, or with a greater number of passengers than the auto bus is entitled to carry; to drive rapidly past an auto bus, trolley car, or vehicle to obtain a passenger; to race with any other vehicle; to refuse to carry passengers unless the auto bus is loaded to its capacity; to permit an auto bus to stand in a street outside of the stand provided for a longer time than is necessary to take on or discharge passengers; to receive or discharge passengers except at the curb, or the regularly provided stand, and except at the nearest side of street intersections and on the right-hand side of the street; to place a sign on the windshield or where it might obscure the view of the driver, was a valid exercise of the city's power. 80

A city has been held to have the power to impose a license fee on jitneys, in addition to a fee for revenue purposes, to defray expense of supervision, and to make it payable directly to the supervising officer.81

A court cannot judicially know that a license fee of 25 cents per day for each jitney operated is unreasonable.82

§ 1673. Power to prohibit operation. Charter power to regulate the use of streets, does not confer power to prohibit use thereof.83 The charter power of a city "to license, control, tax and regulate traffic and sales upon the streets, sidewalks and public places within the city and to license and cause to be registered, and control, tax and regulate carriages, automobiles, motor busses, cars, wagons, drays, jitney busses and other vehicles," does not confer

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