showed that his motorcycle was equipped with two lamps, as required by statute.32

It is also held that whether the driving of an automobile at night without sufficient lights is negligence, is usually a question for the jury 33

Leaving an automobile unattended in a highway at night without lights, in violation of a statute, constitutes negligence. This is true, although the lights will burn only when the engine is running.34

A passenger on a motorcycle which was being operated without a headlight in violation of law, was not a violator of the law.35

The rule that it is not negligence to drive horses on a highway on a dark night, is not applicable to automobiles.36

§ 186. To create civil liability absence of lights must proximately cause injury. It is essential, in order to impose civil liability upon the owner of an automobile for operating the same on the public highways without displaying lights, that the absence of lights was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of.37 The absence of lights from an automobile when it should be lighted is immaterial in a personal injury action, unless their absence sustained some relation to the injury, as cause to effect.38

Hence, in an action to recover on account of injuries resulting from collision with an automobile in the nighttime, an instruction allowing plaintiff to recover because of a violation of a statute requiring motor vehicles to carry sufficient lights, without submitting the question whether failure to comply with the statute caused or

34 Hatch v. Daniels, Vt. Atl. 105 (1922).

,

117

Standing automobile.-The following instruction was approved: "The jury is instructed that under the law applicable to this case a vehicle at rest on the streets of the city of Baltimore during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise should display at least one white light, so placed as to be clearly visible both from the front and rear for a distance of at least 200 feet, provided that a vehicle might display, at the option of the owner or user, one white light visible from the front and one red light visible from the rear for the distance aforesaid; and if the jury find that the defendant violated this law, and that the violation of the law caused the accident, then they may consider this law in making up their verdict. The jury is instructed that it was lawful for a vehicle lighted as above to

36 Lauson v. Fond du Lac, 141. Wis. 57, 123 N. W. 629, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30 (1909).

37 Arkansas: Pugsley v. Tyler, 130 Ark. 491, 197 S. W. 1177 (1917).

California: Fenn v. Clark, 11 Cal. App. 79, 104 Pac. 632 (1909).

Michigan: Beebe v. Hannett, Mich. 194 N. W. 542 (1923); Hanser v. Youngs, 212 Mich, 508, 180 N. W. 409 (1920).

Minnesota: Thomas V. Stevenson, 146 Minn. 272, 178 N. W. 1021 (1920). Pennsylvania: Hardie V. Barrett, 257 Pa. St. 42, 101 Atl. 75 (1917).

38 Turner v. Bennett, 161 Ia. 379, 142 N. W. 999 (1913); Roper v. Greenspon, Mo. App. 192 S. W. 149 (1917).

contributed to the injuries, or whether defendant operated his automobile in a negligent manner, constituted reversible error.39

The mere fact that one who was injured in a collision of vehicles was riding in a vehicle at night without a light attached thereto as required by law, did not render him guilty of contributory negligence which would bar his cause of action, unless the omission of such light in some way approximately contributed to the accident in which he was injured.40

If a street is so lighted that a vehicle having no light on it can be plainly seen, the fact that such vehicle carried no light, in violation of the law, is of no consequence on the question of negligence arising out of a collision between such vehicle and an automobile.11

Absence of lights is not the proximate cause of a collision with a pedestrian who saw the automobile approaching.42

So, recovery may be had for injuries received in a collision when plaintiff was driving without a light half an hour after sunset, contrary to statute, if he could have been seen by the defendant in the exercise of due care; his unlawful act in such circumstances not contributing to the accident.43

The fact that a taxicab was not lighted as required by law will not justify an automobile driver in colliding with it; it appearing that it was lighted so as to be visible a block away. In such case

the violation of the law was not the proximate cause of the collision.44

§ 187. Dimming lights. A driver may be negligent in failing to dim his lights a sufficient distance from another automobile approaching in the opposite direction.45

A statutory provision that a person in charge of a motor vehicle equipped with electric headlights shall dim or extinguish them on meeting another vehicle, will not authorize the driver to extinguish all his lights at a considerable distance from an approaching vehicle and then proceed at full speed in the dark.46

The provisions of a statute that every motor vehicle, when upon a highway at night, must carry two white lights visible at least 200 feet and that a vehicle equipped with electric headlights must dim or extinguish them when within 250 feet of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, must be construed together, and, after the extinguishment of its headlights, a car can only proceed upon its way when it has two other lights visible at least 200 feet.47

§ 188. Lights required on automobiles "operated or driven." An ordinance requiring every motor vehicle "operated or driven" on the public streets, between certain hours, to display certain lighted lamps thereon, the one in the rear to be visible for at least 50 feet "in the direction from which the motor vehicle is proceeding," and the front ones to be visible at least 500 feet "in the direction in which the motor vehicle is proceeding," has no application to a standing automobile, as it is not, in the ordinary sense being "operated or driven," nor "proceeding" in any direction. The distinction between rear and front lights is also suggestive of a moving vehicle. Then, there is no more reason why a standing motor vehicle should display lights than that any other vehicle should do so. And if it was necessary that standing vehicles should display lights, there is no reason for requiring stronger lights in front than on the rear.48

An automobile standing with machinery dead next to a curb in a public highway is not being "operated," within a statute requiring lights during certain hours on an automobile "operated" on the public highways.49

Practically the contrary has been held in Massachusetts. There a statute which prohibited the operation of automobiles between certain hours without certain lights, was held to be violated by one who left his automobile standing in a street without lights, during such time, and with the engine stopped. Said the court: "It is obvious that an automobile standing upon a highway under such conditions may be fully as great a menace to the safety of travelers as if running upon the way without lights, and that the danger of serious injury to travelers by coming in contact with such an automobile would be very great.

"The word 'operated' is not, as the defendant contends, limited to a state of motion produced by the mechanism of the car, but includes at least ordinary stops upon the highway, and such stops are to be regarded as fairly incidental to its operation. It does not appear from the agreed facts how long the automobile had been left upon the street or for what purpose the defendant went into the building. Certainly there is nothing to show that he had left it for an unreasonable time, or that the stop was not for a proper purpose; nor is there any evidence that the car had been abandoned, although we do not mean to intimate that if it had been the statute would not have been violated.'' 50

48 Harlan v. Kraschel, 164 Ia. 667, 146 N. W. 463 (1914).

49 State v. Bixby, 91 Vt. 287, 100 Atl. 42 (1917).

50"The statute must be read with reference to its manifest intent and spirit and cannot be limited to the literal meaning of a single word. It must be construed as a whole and interpreted according to the sense in which the words are employed, regard being had to the plain intention of the legislature. So considered, we cannot doubt that the statute is broad enough

Under a statute requiring certain lights to be fixed on every automobile "driven" on the highways during the hours of darkness, it has been held that an automobile standing in a highway was required to be so lighted. In this case the court said: "An automobile does not cease to be 'driven' when stopped or left standing on a public highway during the hours of darkness. It cannot be said that the driver of such a machine must carry lights while it is moving, but that he may stop it during the hours of darkness in the roadway, turn off the lights, and leave it standing, without violating the law. The statute must be read with reference to its plain spirit and intent Its spirit may not be destroyed by narrowing it to the literal meaning of a single word. Public highways are designed for travel in all lawful ways, by both pedestrians and those driving vehicles, and the driver of a vehicle does not cease to be a driver or traveler when he 151 stops his machine in the street.

§ 189. Lights to show in direction in which vehicle is proceeding-Standing automobile. A statute requiring motor vehicles to show lights from an hour after sunset until an hour before sunrise in the direction in which "the vehicle is proceeding," was held not to apply to a motor vehicle standing on the side of a public highway.

"It is quite clear that the section contemplates a moving motorvehicle. This is indicated by the language which is used. The legis lative thought evidently was that of a motor-vehicle being operated on, or proceeding on, a public highway. If it was of a wider range, apt words could have been readily used to express it. The manifest purpose of the requirement was to secure the safety of public travel, in view of the speed at which motor-vehicles can be operated and the distance they can cover in a short time. By observing the statutory mandate, the operator of a motor-vehicle proceeding on the public. highway would give timely notice of his presence to other vehicles in front of him and would be able to warn them of his approach, thus avoiding a collision. If the motor-vehicle is not proceeding, the danger to be anticipated from it would be no greater than that to be anticipated from any less modern conveyance.

52

$ 190. Lights required on "front" of automobile. A statute providing that every motor vehicle, operated and driven upon the public highways shall, during the period of one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, display at least two lighted lamps on the "front," which shall be visible at least 500 feet in the direction in

"Thus it will be seen that both the words 'operated' and 'driven,' when used in a statute of this character, have had judicial interpretation. We are constrained to adopt the more liberal construction and to hold that the statute applies even though the automobile is temporarily standing in the traveled portion of the highway and not under motion." Hanser v. Youngs, 212 Mich. 508, 180 N. W. 409 (1920).

51 Jaquith v. Worden, 73 Wash. 349,

132 Pac. 33, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 827 (1913).

"In order to be a traveler it is not necessary that one should be constantly moving, if he is a pedestrian, or that the vehicle he drives, or that in which he is conveying goods, if he is using one, shall be continuously in motion." Smethurst v. Barton Square Church, 148 Mass. 261, 2 L. R. A. 695.

52 Com. v. Keister, 26 Pa. Dist. 922 (1917)..

which the motor vehicle is proceeding, intends that such lamps shall be attached to that portion of the vehicle in front of the driver or operator of the car, and at such a point in front of the operator as will make the lights visible, in the direction in which the car is proceeding, for at least 500 feet.

It appeared that the defendants had two lighted lamps fastened to the top, and to each side of the dashboard, and in front of the dashboard, facing to the front, that the lamps were lighted and were visible to persons approaching the automobile, from the front, at a distance of more than 500 feet; that the seats were behind these lighted lamps; that there was nothing in front of the lamps to obstruct a view of the light; that each of the lamps had a metal substance in the rear part and behind the light for the purpose of projecting and throwing the light forward as a reflector. that the lamps were in compliance with the terms of the statute; that they were not only within the spirit of the law, but within its letter.

Held,

In regard to the meaning of the word "front," the court said: "Webster defines the word 'front' as follows: 'At that part or surface of anything which seems to look out, or be directed forward; the fore or forward part; opposed to the back or rear.' Thus applying this definition, we speak of the front yard, or the back yard, thereby meaning that which is in front or the rear of the house. It does not necessarily mean the very foremost part of the front yard, but that which is in front of something else." 53

$191. Lights that will make objects visible-Colliding with pile of débris. A statute of Connecticut requires that the forward lights which a motor vehicle is required to display shall throw sufficient light ahead to show any substantial object, etc., for a distance of 150 feet. The plaintiff collided with a pile of refuse in a city street, and the injuries complained of resulted. "The defendant claims that under this statute an automobile driver who in the nighttime collides with a substantial object on a straight highway, in the absence of any intervening vehicles or objects which obscure or prevent a view ahead, should be presumed either to have seen the object or to have failed to see the object because he did not have the forward lights required by statute, and that he was therefore guilty of contributory negli

gence.

"The defendant claims that under the evidence Main street was a straight highway, and the frozen accumulation of mud and débris which the plaintiff claimed to have proved to exist upon the highway on the night in question was a substantial object straight ahead of the plaintiff as he drove northerly on Main street, and that under the evidence there were no intervening vehicles or other objects to prevent or obscure the plaintiff's view ahead, and therefore the plaintiff failed to see a substantial object straight ahead of him made clearly visible by his lights, or he did not have lights of the illuminating power required by statute, and hence failed to see the object and was