a motor vehicle on a public highway "at a greater rate of speed than ten miles an hour where the operator's or chauffeur's view of the road traffic is obstructed either upon approaching an intersecting way, or in traversing a crossing or intersection of ways," was construed by the court as follows: "The purpose of this limitation of speed at intersections is obviously to avoid danger from the traffic crossing on the transverse street. Under the rules regulating such traffic, no danger arises until the passing vehicles reach the territory common to both streets at or within the lines of intersection. If then the speed has been reduced to 10 miles an hour at the point of intersection, the purpose of the limitation has been met." 57 An ordinance prohibiting speed in excess of nine miles an hour "when going across the through thoroughfare or cross-section streets" was held to apply although the street in question ended at the point of intersection.58 § 207. Restricting traffic space by parking automobiles. The petition showed that the accident happened in the afternoon of June 18, 1918, while the son of plaintiffs, 11 years old, was proceeding on a bicycle between two rows of vehicles, parked by defendant company on either side of Frenchmen street, which is alleged to be "a narrow thoroughfare, barely sufficient space for the passage of ordinary traffie"; said vehicles extending a distance of about half of a block along said street. It was charged in plaintiffs' petition that the Oster Bros. Carriage & Wagon Manufacturing Company was guilty of negligence and liable in damages to plaintiffs because of their congregating these vehicles upon this public thoroughfare in such manner and number "as to render said street confined and dangerous," as it was charged that the truck of defendant John V. Harris approached "without signal, at a high rate of speed, and was operated recklessly between these rows of vehicles, by an incompetent and unskillful driver, who had defective vision in one of his eyes. It was alleged therefore that the lad, while between these rows of vehicles, in a street naturally insufficient for ordinary traffic, and, on the occasion of this accident, rendered more confined and dangerous because of the parking of these vehicles, was run over by his truck, driven in a reckless manner, and was killed. Held, to sufficiently allege negligence in parking the automobiles so as to create a dangerous condition.59 § 208. May assume others will exercise due care. A person operating an automobile in a public highway, exercising reasonable care, may assume that others using the highway will also act with reasonable care; and he is not negligent in acting accordingly. Others may assume the same of him.60 He has a right to assume that the drivers of other vehicles will observe the law of the road, and he is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting upon such assumption, unless he has knowledge to the contrary.61 He may also act upon the assumption that other travelers will exercise the high degree of care required in turning a street corner where pedestrians and persons in vehicles are passing and the liability of collision is great.62 It was ruled that, where a street car conductor made use of the street in going from the front to the rear of his car, he had a right to rely upon the exercise of reasonable care by drivers of vehicles to avoid injuring him, and when he was injured on account of the negligence of an automobile operator he was not guilty of contributory negligence in not anticipating such negligence.63 He may also assume that others will not negligently expose themselves to danger, but will attempt to avoid it.64 However, if a traveler sees, or by the use of ordinary care should see, that another is not in the exercise of ordinary care, he is no longer entitled to this assumption, and he must take such reasonable measures as he can in the circumstances, to prevent injury. 65 The mere fact that some one fails in his duty towards another does not justify that other in proceeding and asserting his rights, and if he does so and is injured he cannot recover therefor.66 Boyce (Del.) 302, 92 Atl. 855 (1914); Campbell v. Walker, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41, 78 Atl. 601 (1910). Indiana: Elgin Dairy Co. v. Shepherd, 183 Ind. 466, 108 N. E. 234 (1915), citing this work; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Ludorff, 61 Ind. App. 119, 111 N. E. 447 (1916). Iowa: Pilgrim v. Brown, 168 Ia. 177, 150 N. W. 1, 10 N. C. C. A. 823n (1914). Maine: Towle v. Morse, 103 Me. 250, 68 Atl. 1044. Massachusetts: Hennessey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583, 76 N. E. 224, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 345. Minnesota: Liebrecht v. Crandall, 110 Minn. 454, 126 N. W. 69 (1910). Nebraska: Smith v. Coon, 89 Neb. 776, 132 N. W. 535 (1911), quoting from this work. New York: Thies v. Thomas, 77 N. Y. Supp. 276, 280. Pennsylvania: Spangler v. Markley, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 351 (1909). Washington: Hiscock v. Phinney, 81 Wash. 117, 142 Pac. 461 (1914). Wisconsin: Becker v. West Side Dye Wks., 172 Wis. 1, 177 N. W. 907 (1920). One is not required to presume that another will be negligent. Taylor v. Philadelphia R. T. Co., 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 607 (1914). "The driver of an automobile has the right to assume that the driver of another automobile, with which it collides, will obey an ordinance prohibiting any vehicle from being driven onto any boulevard without first bringing such vehicle to a full stop, and he is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting upon such assumption." Kilroy v. Justrite Mfg. Co., 209 Ill. App. 499 (1918). 61 Indiana: Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hoffman, 40 Ind. App. 508, 510, 82 N. E. 543. Michigan: Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 36. New York: Schimpf v. Sliter, 64 Hun 463, 464. Rhode Island: Angell v. Lewis, 20 R. I. 391. One has a right to assume that the operator of an automobile will slacken speed in turning a street corner. Buscher v. New York Transp. Co., 106 App. Div. 493, 94 N. Y. Supp. 796. 62 Weber v. Swallow, 136 Wis. 40, 116 N. W. 844. 63 Caesar v. Fifth Ave. Coach Co., 45 Misc. 331, 90 N. Y. Supp. 359, 361. 64 Travers V. Hartman, 5 Boyce (Del.) 302, 92 Atl. 855 (1914). 65 Elgin Dairy Co. v. Shepherd, 183 Ind. 466, 108 N. E. 234 (1915). 66 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co., 72 Ill. 34, 36; McCarragher v. Proal, 114 App. It has been held that this rule cannot always be invoked, especially in automobile cases, and that operators are held to anticipate, not according to the "legal," but the "usual" experience of mankind in running automobiles on the public highways, which is, "that automobiles are more often driven without any reference to legal speed than in observance of it." 67 § 209. Violation of statute or ordinance as negligence. The violation of a statute or ordinance regulating the use of automobiles on the public highways, in the interest of the safety of all users of the highways, is held, in some states, to constitute negligence per se,68 Div. 470, 478, 100 N. Y. Supp. 208; Taylor v. Union Traction Co., 184 Pa. St. 465. 67 Bragdon v. Kellogg, 118 Me. 42, 105 Atl. 433 (1919). 68 Alabama: Watts v. Montgomery Tr. Co., 175 Ala. 102, 57 So. 471 (1912); Dowdell v. Beasley, 17 Ala. App. 100, 82 So. 40 (1919). Arizona: Young v. Campbell, 20 Ariz. 71, 177 Pac. 19 (1918). California: Fenn v. Clark, 11 Cal. App. 79, 104 Pac. 632 (1909); Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919); Opitz v. Schenck, 178 Cal. 636, 174 Pac. 40 (1918); Mathes v. Ag-. geler & M. S. Co., 179 Cal. 697, 178 Pac. 713 (1919). Colorado: Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Mills, 21 Colo. App. 582, 122 Pac. 798; Hedges v. Mitchell, 69 Colo. 285, 194 Pac. 620 (1920). Connecticut: Lukosevicia v. Bartow, Conn. 122 Atl. 709 (1923). Delaware: Grier v. Samuel, 4 Boyce (27 Del.) 106, 86 Atl. 209 (1913); Trimble v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 4 Boyce (27 Del.) 519, 89 Atl. 370 (1913); Travers v. Hartman, 5 Boyce (Del.) 302, 92 Atl. 855 (1914); Lemmon v. Broadwater, 7 Boyce 472, 108 Atl. 273 (1919). Georgia: Sheppard v. Johnson, 11 Ga. App. 280, 75 S. E. 348 (1912); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stafford, 146 Ga. 206, 91 S. E. 29 (1916); Ware v. Lamar, 18 Ga. App. 673, 90 S. E. 364 (1916); Wilkinson v. Bray, 27 Ga. App. 277, 108 S. E. 133 (1921). Illinois: Latham v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 179 Ill. App. 324 (1913); Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App. 532 (1910). Indiana: Carter v. Caldwell, 183 Ind. 434, 109 N. E. 355 (1915); Fox v. Barekman, 178 Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989 (1912); Hamilton, H. & Co. v. Larrimer, 183 Ind. 429, 105 N. E. 43 (1914); Mayer v. Mellette, 65 Ind. App. 54, 114 N. E. 241 (1916); Central Ind. R. Co. v. Wishard, 186 Ind. 262, 114 N. E. 970 (1917). Iowa: Ford v. Des Moines I. & C. S. Co., 187 Ia. 729, 174 N. W. 486 (1919). Kentucky: Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15, 131 S. W. 1049 (1910); National Casket Co. v. Powar, 137 Ky. 156, 125 S. W. 279 (1910). Michigan: Marsh v. Burnham, 211 Mich. 675, 179 N. W. 300 (1920). Minnesota: Hillstrom v. Mannheimer Bros., 146 Minn. 202, 178 N. W. 881 (1920); Unmacht V. Whitney, 146 Minn. 327, 178 N. W. 886 (1920); Riser v. Smith, 136 Minn. 417, 162 N. W. 520 (1917). Missouri: Howard & Brown R. Co. v. Berman, 212 Mo. App. 401, 245 S. W. 606 (1922); Cabanne v. St. Louis Car Co., 178 Mo. App. 718, 161 S. W. 597 (1913); Pannell v. Allen, 160 Mo. App. 714, 142 S. W. 482 (1912); Barton v. Faeth, 193 Mo. App. 402, 186 S. W. 52 (1916). North Carolina: Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916); Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125, 81 S. E. 1066 (1914). Ohio: Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio 282, 128 N. E. 94 (1920); Weimer v. Rosen, 100 Ohio 361, 126 N. E. 307 (1919); Schell v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio 93, 113 N. E. 664 (1916). South Carolina: McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S. C. 523, 74 S. E. 386 (1912); Whaley v. Ostendorff, 90 S. C. 281, 73 S. E. 186 (1911). Texas: Moss v. Koetter, Tex. Civ. App., 249 S. W. 259 (1923); Flores v. Garcia, Tex. Civ. App. 226 S. W. 743 (1920); Houston Belt & Ter. R. Co. v. Rucker, Tex. Civ. App. 167 S. W. 301 (1914); while in others it is held to be only prima facie evidence of negligence.69 App., 136 S. W. 850 (1911); Ward v. Cathey, Tex. Civ. App. —, 210 S. W. 289 (1919); Zucht v. Brooks, Tex. Civ. App., 216 S. W. 684 (1919); Schoellkopf Saddlery Co. v. Crawley, Tex. Civ. App. 203 S. W. 1172 (1918). Washington: Snyder v. Smith, 124 Wash. 21, 213 Pac. 682 (1923); Twedt v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 121 Wash. 562, 210 Pac. 20 (1922); Anderson v. Kinnear, 80 Wash. 638, 141 Pac. 1151 (1914); Hillebrant v. Manz, 71 Wash. 250, 128 Pac. 892 (1912); Stubbs v. Molberget, 108 Wash. 89, 182 Pac. 936, 6 A. L. R. 318 (1919). Wisconsin: Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, 152 N. W. 190, L. R. A. 1915D 968 (1915); Riggles v. Priest, 163 Wis. 199, 157 N. W. 755 (1916). Federal: Harmon v. Barber, 247 Fed. 1, 159 C. C. A. 219. Particularly is this true of an ordinance regulating the speed of vehicles. Weimer v. Rosen, 100 Ohio 361, 126 N. E. 307 (1919). The violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se, and a person proximately injured thereby may recover for such injuries against the violator of the law. Hill v. Condon, 14 Ala. App. 332, 70 So. 208 (1915). The violation of a speed ordinance is simple negligence only. Yarbrough v. Carter, 179 Ala. 356, 60 So. 833 (1913). 69 Arkansas: Ward v. Ft. Smith L. & T. Co., 123 Ark. 548, 185 S. W. 1085 (1916). California: Stohlman v. Martin, 28 Cal. App. 338, 152 Pac. 319 (1915). Iowa: Herdman v. Zwart, 167 Ia. 500, 149 N. W. 631 (1914); Schultz v. Starr, 180 Ia. 1319, 164 N. W. 163 (1917). Massachusetts: Lounsbury v. MeCormick, 237 Mass. 328, 129 N. E. 598 (1921); Hartnett v. Tripp, 231 Mass. 382, 121 N. E. 17 (1918). Michigan: Scott v. Dow, 162 Mich. 636, 127 N. W. 712 (1910); Rotter v. Detroit U. R. Co., 205 Mich. 212, 171 N. W. 514 (1919); Patterson v. Wagner, 204 Mich. 593, 171 N. W. 356 (1919); Weber v. Beeson, 197 Mich. 607, 164 N. W. 255 (1917). Minnesota: Day v. Duluth St. R. Co., 121 Minn. 445, 141 N. W. 795 (1913). Nebraska: Taylor v. Koukal, 107 Neb. 409, 186 N. W. 339 (1922); Lady v. Douglass, 105 Neb. 489, 181 N. W. 173 (1920); Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N. W. 87 (1920); Dorrance v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co., 105 Neb. 196, 180 N. W. 90 (1920). New Jersey: Baker v. Fogg & Hires Co., 95 N. J. L. 230, 112 Atl. 406 (1920); Meyer v. Creighton, 83 N. J. L. 749, 85 Atl. 344 (1912). New York: McCarragher v. Proal, 114 App. Div. 470, 477, 100 N. Y. Supp. 208; Beisegel v. New York Central R. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 29, 34. Virginia: Roanoke R. & El. Co. v. Loving, Va., 119 S. E. 82 (1923). It is not negligence per se. Temple v. Walker, 127 Ark. 279, 192 S. W. 200 (1917). "The mere fact that a motor truck is driven by defendant's employees at a greater speed than that prescribed by statute, or that the plaintiff in turning into another street to the left did not turn around the center of the intersection of the two streets, does not . establish either negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law; but the violation of the statute and of the ordinance may be considered by the jury as evidence of negligence. Rule v. Claar Tr. & S. Co., 102 Neb. 4, 165 N. W. 883 (1917). This rule is the same in case of a child 10 years old as in case of an adult. Kolankiewiz v. Burke, 91 N. J. L. 567, 103 Atl. 249 (1918). The rule is the same in this respect, both as to statutes and valid ordinances. Dorrance v. Omaha & C. B. R. Co., 105 Neb. 196, 180 N. W. 90 (1920). Exceeding speed limit presumptive evidence of want of due care. Powell v. Alitz, 191 Ia. 233, 182 N. W. 236 (1921). After stating to a jury that violations of the Motor Vehicle Act and Traffic Act do not of themselves constitute negligence, it was not error to charge the jury that "these acts, these statutes, constitute warnings to people operating motor vehicles that it is dangerous to act other than in accordance to those statutes, those rules, which the Legislature has laid down for the guidance of the drivers of motor vehieles, and danger reasonably to be foreseen is a test of negligence." Doyon In Michigan it is held that the violation of a statute is negligence per se, but that the violation of an ordinance is merely evidence of negligence,70 and to be considered in determining the question of negligence.71 "While it is undoubtedly correct to say that the act of driving a vehicle over a street or public highway beyond the speed limit established by a municipal ordinance or a statute merely constitutes evidence of negligence in cases where damage has followed the infraction of such an ordinance or law, the rule in this state is, however, that it is conclusive evidence of negligence." 72 It has been held to be negligence on the part of the operator of an automobile, to drive an automobile at night without lights; 73 to drive v. Massoline Motor Car Co., N. J. L. 120 Atl. 204 (1923). Reading ordinance to jury.—"No error was committed in permitting counsel to read the city traffic ordinance to the jury. The declaration alleged that the movements of defendant were in violation thereof. Neither was error committed by the court in his charge in referring to the state automobile law, as it bore on one of the grounds of negligence, namely, the failure of defendant to sound his horn when approaching one walking in the highway. Van Goosen v. Barlum, 214 Mich. 595, 183 N. W. 8 (1921). In Winch v. Johnson, 92 N. J. L. 219, 104 Atl. 81, the court held: "Where an automobile at an intersecting street, collided with a motorcycle, coming in an opposite direction, the fact that the automobile failed to observe the provisions of the Traffic Act does not per se present the basis for the direction of a verdiet, against the defendant, such fact being but one factor in the situation, which, considered as a whole, presents a jury question, as to the defendant's negligence under all the circumstances." * * "If a driver of a motor vehicle runs it at a rate of speed 'forbidden by ordinances enacted for the safety of the general public, and injuries result, these facts afford reasonable grounds for inferring negligence prejudicial to the rights of those in whose interests and for whose protection such municipal regulations were adopted.' Omaha Street R. Co. v. Duvall, 40 Neb. 29." Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. N. W. 87; Lady v. Douglass, 105 Neb. 489, 181 N. W. 173 (1920). 180 Instruction on contributory negli gence of driver of vehicle in violating ordinance as to turning corners to left held erroneous as an assumption that the violation of the ordinance was conclusive of the fact that driver was negligent, instead of being at most, mere prima facie evidence thereof. Culver v. Harris, 211 Ill. App. 474 (1918). Instruction held erroneous.-In an action to recover for injuries sustained by collision with an automobile, an instruction which erroneously states the speed limit authorized by law for a motor vehicle upon approaching another vehicle, and states that the law requires lights to be exhibited on motor vehicles in use during the period from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, and, without qualification, informs the jury that the failure of any person operating an automobile upon a public highway to comply with any of such provisions, in itself, constitutes negligence, is erroneous. Taylor v. Koukal, 107 Neb. 409, 189 N. W. 339 (1922). 70 Hutton v. Michigan R. Co., 220 Mich. 1, 189 N. W. 884 (1922); Gates v. Landon, 216 Mich. 417, 185 N. W. 723 (1921); Westover v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 180 Mich. 373, 147 N. W. 630 (1914). 71 Darish v. Scott, 212 Mich. 139, 180 N. W. 435 (1920). 72 Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 140 Pac. 706 (1914). 73 Alabama: Stewart v. Smith, 16 Ala. App. 461, 78 So. 724 (1918). California: Garns v. Halpern, Cal., 223 Pac. 545 (1924); Fenn v. Clark, 11 Cal. App. 79, 104 Pac. 632 (1909). Connecticut: Murphy v. Adams, Conn., 122 Atl. 398 (1923). Illinois: Kehr v. Snow & Palmer Co., 225 Ill. App. 403 (1922). Kentucky: Buford v. Hopewell, 140 Ky. 666, 131 S. W. 502 (1910). Michigan: Zoltovski v. Gzella, 159 |