show that when the truck reached a little beyond the center of the block, and while defendant was traveling near to the right-hand curb, and too near the curb for the plaintiff to pass on that side, and while the plaintiff was a short distance in the rear of the same, the truck suddenly and unexpectedly, and while running at least 10 miles an hour, was negligently turned by the defendant to the left without any signal, and ran in a short half circle across Broadway directly in the path the plaintiff was traveling; that plaintiff turned his motorcycle to the left in an effort to avoid the truck but was unable to do so, but, when the truck had turned so it was facing in a northeasterly or northerly direction, plaintiff's motorcycle collided therewith, throwing him to the ground, and injuring him.

On the other hand, there was testimony for the defendant that he was driving southerly at a rate of speed not exceeding 4 or 5 miles an hour close to the west curb; that he looked back to the right and saw and heard nothing, and proceeded to turn his truck to cross Broadway, and that, when the front wheels of his truck were at the east rail of the west street car track, there was a collision with the plaintiff's motorcycle, but that he heard or saw nothing of the plaintiff up to that time; that the plaintiff was riding his motorcycle at a high rate of speed and could have avoided the collision if he had been paying attention to his business, and running his motorcycle at a moderate rate of speed; that there was plenty of room for plaintiff to have gone by on either side of said truck; that the defendant was completely across the west car track before plaintiff's motorcycle reached the last intersecting street, and that plaintiff saw defendant, but sounded no alarm; that one of the men on the truck held up his hand to give a signal, but plaintiff ran into the left front wheel of defendant's truck, causing the injury which plaintiff complains of; and that in making the turn defendant was not traveling to exceed three miles an hour.

It was held that the questions of negligence and contributory negli gence were for the jury, and judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.49 A statute providing that, "The person in charge of any vehicle in or upon any public highway, before turning, stopping, or changing the course of such vehicle shall see first that there is sufficient space for such movement to be made in safety, and if the movement or operation of other vehicles may reasonably be affected by such turning, stopping or changing of course, shall give plainly visible signal. to the persons operating, driving or in charge of such vehicles of his intention so to turn, stop, or change his course, either by the use of his hand or arm, or by the use of an approved mechanical or electrical device," was held not to require the driver of a vehicle. upon every deviation from a direct course ahead to look back to ascertain the condition of traffic behind him.50

§ 879. Turning abruptly after signaling. A truck driver who signaled his intention to turn to the left, could still be found to be

49 Greenleaf v. Lambert, 192 Mich. 411, 158 N. W. 868 (1916).

50 Noce v. United Railroads, 53 Cal. App. 512, 200 Pac. 819 (1921).

negligent in turning suddenly without knowledge that a motorcyclist, who had sounded his horn, was passing on the left of the truck.51

§ 880. Front car turning into intersecting way. In an action to recover for damage to an automobile, resulting from a collision between the plaintiff's and defendant's machines, there was evidence that both vehicles were being driven westerly along a public avenue, about 35 feet wide between curbs, with plaintiff's machine running ahead; that as the plaintiff's machine was being turned from the avenue into a private road leading from the south side of the avenue, the defendant's car overtook it from the rear and collided with it; that the plaintiff's machine was moving about 8 miles an hour along the right of the center of the avenue, when it turned a little to the right and started to turn to the left, in order to enter the road; that when it had reached a point nearly opposite the road, and before it turned to the right the driver gave the customary signal (holding out his left hand), so that it could plainly be seen by any driver behind that he was going to turn to the left; that he had gone about 6 or 7 feet to the left, when the driver saw the car back of him, and then the collision occurred; that no warning was given to the approach of defendant's car, which was moving at the unlawful rate of 45 miles an hour.

Held, that the unlawful rate of speed at which the defendant's automobile was traveling was evidence of negligence, sufficient to put him on his defense, and that the case was for the jury. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the court declared that, "Independently of any statute, the driving of any vehicle on a public highway at a rate of speed that is inconsistent with such control of the vehicle as is necessary to avoid running down other vehicles going in the same direction is some proof of negligence." 52

§ 881. Requirement to look to rear before turning Occupant looking. An ordinance requiring every person using any vehicle on the street, before turning around to look to the rear, was held to be sufficiently complied with where one seated in an automobile with the operator looked to the rear just before the operator started to turn, and told him to go ahead, as the way was clear.5

51"Even if a signal was given, and there is evidence that it was by a witness other than the truck driver, the sudden swerve of the car to the left into the other vehicle abreast of it, which the truck driver admits he had not observed, would be sufficient, if found by the jury, to establish a negligent operation of the truck under the circumstances. What was said by Mr. Justice Frazer in Piper v. Adams Express Co., 270 Pa. 54, 60, 113 Atl. 562, 565, is apposite here:

"Conceding his right to use any portion of the highway open to him and which circumstances, or his desires, may prompt him to use, his rights were necessarily subject to equal rights

53

on the part of other users of the highway, and in passing from one side to the other he was bound to do so with proper regard to the rights and safety of others. Whether defendant's driver performed his duty in this respect was necessarily for the jury. Both vehicles were lawfully using the street and each was bound to do so with due consideration for the rights of the other.' Nold v. Higgins Lbr. Co., 276 Pa. St. 195, 119 Atl. 919 (1923). 52 Meyer v. Creighton, 83 N. J. L. 749, 85 Atl. 344 (1912).

53 Armstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542, 9 N. C. C. A. 828, L. R. A. 1915D 628 (1915).

§ 882. Attempting to pass in front of turning car. The plaintiff's car was standing on the right side of a street facing east, and at the time of starting or soon thereafter he commenced to turn in order to go west. The street was 48 feet wide and he required 45 feet in which to make the turn. Defendant, driving his automobile at about 13 miles an hour, was coming from the rear, and saw plaintiff start to turn when he was 40 feet away. Defendant could have avoided a collision by stopping his car, but instead of doing so he speeded his car to 25 miles an hour and made an attempt to pass in front of plaintiff's car before it should reach the left curb in the course of its turn. He did not quite succeed; the rear wheel of his car colliding with the right front fork of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff had recently purchased his car, and had taken but three lessons in operating it. He was then operating it under the direction of the salesman from whom he bought it, but there was evidence that he was operating it with reasonable care and skill. There was an ordinance requiring every person using any vehicle on the street, before turning around, to look to the rear. It was shown that the salesman looked to the rear just before plaintiff started to turn and told plaintiff to go ahead. At that time defendant's automobile was not in sight. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed, it being held that the ordinance in question was sufficiently complied with. It was further held in this case that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering for his injury by the fact that he was operating his automobile in violation of a statute prohibiting its operation on the public highways unless it was registered. "There was no relation of cause and effect between the unlawful act and the collision. The registration of plaintiff's automobile was of no consequence to defendant. The law providing for such registration was not for the prevention of collisions and had no tendency to prevent collisions." 54

§ 883. Driver's failure to comply with own signals as contributory negligence. The plaintiff's son was proceeding southerly along a street in plaintiff's automobile, and when about 100 feet north of an intersecting street, into which he testified that he intended to turn, and while driving about 25 feet from the curb, where it would have been in violation of an ordinance to stop, he put up his hand in signal that he intended to stop. At this time defendant's machine was about 150 feet in the rear of plaintiff's car, proceeding in the same direction. Plaintiff's son did not stop, but proceeded to the street intersection, when he put up his hand again indicating that he intended to stop. He then stopped, after seeing defendant's automobile about 15 feet behind him. Defendant's car collided with and damaged the other. It was held that plaintiff's son was contributorily negligent in acting so irrationally, which barred recovery from the defendant.55

§ 884. Automobile struck by street car causing it to collide with another machine. A petition alleging that, as plaintiff was alight

54 Armstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542, 9 N. C. C. A. 828, L. R. A. 1915D 628 (1915).

55 Russell v. Kemp, 95 Misc. 582, 159 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1916).

ing from her automobile, defendant's automobile collided with it injuring plaintiff, and that defendant neglected to keep a proper lookout for a street car which struck his automobile and caused the collision, and negligently drove his automobile in the way of such street car, was held to state a cause of action.56

§ 885. Driving out of driveway. It is the duty of one driving out of a private driveway, before entering the highway, to look for approaching vehicles, and not proceed into the highway if he sees one coming, unless, as a reasonably prudent person, he believes, and has the right to believe, that he can pass in front of such vehicle in safety. The duty to look implies the duty to see what is in plain sight, unless some reasonable explanation is shown.57

§ 886. Backing out of driveway. Defendant's driver was backing a truck out of a shed into a public street. He could not see either direction in the street, and relied on a fellow employee, who had gone into the street, to direct him. He was moving slowly, perhaps a mile an hour, when he was signaled to stop by the other employee. Instead of stopping at once, he permitted the truck to move some four feet farther, when it collided with plaintiff's car proceeding along the street. It was held that this was negligence, and a verdict for plaintiff was sustained. On the question of the care required of each driver, the court said: "Defendant's servant was guilty of negligence. He neither gave a signal nor lookout out onto the highway before entering thereon. As he relied on Collins to discharge the duty of looking before entry was made on the highway, his failure to stop immediately when he received the signal to do so from Collins in the circumstances was negligence. Instead of stopping at once as he could have done and thus have remained in a place of safety, he continued to run his car backward a distance of four feet, which placed the rear end of the truck on the street and apparently made the collision inevitable.

"The plaintiff had knowledge of the existence and the use of the entrance to the lumber shed. Although he was not required to use the same amount of care in approaching this entrance that he should use in approaching an intersecting street, or even a public way opening into the street on which he was traveling, nevertheless, in the exercise of proper and due care, plaintiff was under the obligation to consider the possibility of meeting some vehicle at the point of exit from the shed, and to regulate his conduct accordingly. But the plaintiff was not bound to anticipate negligence. He could properly base his conduct on the assumption that any one driving out of the lumber shed would exercise due care."' 58

§ 887. Backing automobile causing other car to go over embankment. The evidence tended to show that the injury to the plaintiff

56 Belle Isle v. Kindig, 25 Ga. App.

293, 103 S. E. 269 (1920).

57 Kemmish v. McCoid,

185 N. W. 628 (1921).

Ia.

58 Woodward v. O'Driscoll,
118 Atl. 869 (1922).

R. I.

occurred on a street in the northern part of the incorporated village of Springfield, Vt., at a point just north of where the entrance to the "Fellows Gear Shaper shop bridge," so called, connects with that street. The plaintiff at the time of the injury was riding with her daughter and granddaughter in an automobile owned and driven by Peets, her son-in-law. As the party approached the entrance to the bridge, and when at a distance of 300 feet or more from it, they observed an automobile parked on the right hand side of the street, opposite the entrance of the bridge. The street on which Peets'. car was moving ran practically north and south, and the party with whom the plaintiff was riding was going north at the time of the accident. When Peets first saw the defendant's car, it was standing still, and there was nothing about it indicating that it was to be moved, and when within about 100 feet of it Peets sounded his horn, and, noticing no movement of the car, he soon thereafter turned his car to the left for the purpose of passing the defendant's car, and proceeded on the left side of the road until he was within about 10 feet of the defendant's car, when the defendant of a sudden, and without warning, started to back his car towards Peets' car at a rapid rate of speed. Peets, in attempting to avoid a collision, at once applied the foot brake, and turned his car further to the left, and by so doing barely escaped a direct collision with the defendant's car; but before he could turn his car back into the road he came in contact with the railing on the northerly side of the entrance of the bridge, and went over the embankment on the left side of the street, causing the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Held, that the evidence tended to show negligence on the part of defendant, and that it was error to direct a verdict in his favor.59

§ 888. Backing automobile causing motorcycle to collide with another machine. The plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along South street, in the city of Morristown, going toward Madison, on June 25, 1915. In front of him, traveling in the same direction, was an automobile. The plaintiff passed this automobile, going to the left, as the law required. Just as he was passing it, or just after he had passed it, the defendant's car, which was standing alongside the righthand curb, backed out into the middle of the street. It was about 10 or 12 feet away when he first saw it. The plaintiff attempted to go around behind it, which brought him within 3 or 4 feet of his left curb line. As he was doing this, the way was obstructed by a wagon on his left hand, coming toward him, and also by another automobile on his right, operated by G. The plaintiff undertook to pass between these two vehicles which were parallel with one another, but was unsuccessful and collided with the G. machine. He was thrown from his motorcycle, receiving the injuries. for which he sues.

A statute provided that, "No vehicle shall back or make a turn in any street if by so doing it interferes with other vehicles, but shall go

59 Lee v. Donnelly, 95 Vt. 121, 113

Atl. 542 (1921).