An owner may testify as to the value of his automobile." The owner of an automobile was held competent to testify as to its value before and after an accident, although his estimate of its value after the accident was based mainly on the amount which he had paid for repairs, and although he had never been in the automobile business.10 A farmer, owner of the damaged automobile, testified that he had owned other cars, described the car in question, testified that he had opportunity of seeing cars of a similar kind bought and sold, knew what they were being sold for on the market, not exactly but almost, and kept in touch with what they were selling for at the garages. Held, that he was competent to testify as to the value of the car.11 A plaintiff who had purchased the car for damages to which he sought recovery, who had some familiarity with the value of such a car before it was damaged, who stated that he knew its value after it was damaged, and who described the character of the injuries to the car, was properly permitted to testify to the value of the car before and after the accident.12 It has been held that the plaintiff cannot testify what, in his opinion, his damages were.13 It has been held that what the plaintiff, in an action to recover for injuries incurred in an automobile accident, said as to the damage 9 Klein v. St. Louis Motor Car Co., Mo. App., 237 S. W. 848 (1922); Midland Valley R. Co. v. Lawhorn, 81 Okl. 288, 198 Pac. 586 (1921); Wicklund v. Allraum, 122 Wash. 546, 211 Pac. 760 (1922). Owner may testify.-Where a person testifies that he has been familiar with automobiles for several years, that he purchased the car in controversy direct from the dealer when it was new, had driven it ever since he had so purchased it, held, that he is competent and qualified to testify as to its value. Further held, that it was not necessary to question such witness as to his technical knowledge of automobiles before he should be permitted to testify as to its value. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Lawhorn, 81 Okla. 288, 198 Pac. 586 (1921). "These authorities hold that a nonexpert witness, who is familiar with the property or the facts, may give his opinion although he may not be able to qualify as an expert. Foster v. Burgin, Tex. Civ. App. 244 S. W. 244 (1922). Mere ownership not sufficient to qualify one to testify as to value. Roy v. Clark, Mont. -,215 Pac. 232 (1923). 10 Egekvist v. Minnetonka & W. B. Nav. Co., 146 Minn. 474, 178 N. W. 238 (1920). 12 After it was wrecked, doubtless it had no market value, strictly speaking, so that the question is somewhat akin to cases where a man or his wife are permitted to testify to the value of clothing and household goods which have no market value. The character of the injuries to the machine was described. It is true that plaintiff as a witness said at first that he did not know the value of the machine in its wrecked condition, but afterwards said he did know. Witnesses become confused sometimes when asked if they know the value of such an article when asked in that way, instead of being asked if they are acquainted with values so as to have an opinion. It is a matter of opinion. Jurors are not required to take the estimate as to value of any of the witnesses but may use their own judgment. The weight of the evidence is for the jury. The rule as to competency of witnesses on questions of value is liberally construed.'' Monson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 181 Ia. 1354, 159 N. W. 679 (1916). 13 Henderson v. Northam, 176 Cal. 493, 168 Pac. 1044 (1917). he had done to defendant's automobile by the collision, could not be given in evidence; the fact, and not what plaintiff said, being material.14 Where the wife of the owner of a machine was driving the same when it was struck by another automobile, and none of the witnesses to the accident knew the wife by sight, or knew who owned the car she was driving, it was competent, in an action by her husband to recover for the damage to his car incurred in the collision, for her to testify that she was driving the automobile which was struck. This she may do under the common law, the rule being grounded on the necessity of the case. But in such action she could not testify as to an interview with a claim agent of the defendant, in the presence of her husband and another. So, too, under a statute providing that she may testify for her husband in matters of business transactions conducted by her as agent of the husband, she cannot testify in relation to any business transaction not had or conducted by her as agent for her husband. 15 A witness who testified that he was familiar with the value of carriages such as the one in question; that he understood their construction and cost; and that he was particularly familiar with the condition of this carriage both before and after the accident in which it was damaged, was properly allowed to testify as to its value after the accident.16 Witnesses who testified that they were familiar with the automobile in question, had spent time around garages, had seen automobiles bought and sold, and knew the reasonable value of the car in question, were held to be competent to testify as to the value of such car before and after the accident in which it was damaged.17 Dealers in secondhand automobiles, some of whom had negotiated for the purchase of plaintiff's car, were held competent to testify as to its value.18 One who had been in the automobile salvage business for a number of years, and another who had been in the automobile repair business for several years, both having examined the automobile in question, were qualified to testify as experts as to whether or not such automobile could be repaired so as to operate properly as an automobile.19 204 Mo. App. 491, 223 S. W. 810 (1920). "Our Supreme Court, in the case of McAnany v. Henrici, 238 Mo. loc. cit. 113, 141 S. W. 636, defines expert testimony as: "The opinion of a witness possessing peculiar knowledge, wisdom, skill or information regarding a subjectmatter under consideration, acquired by study, investigation, observation, practice or experience, and not likely to be possessed by the ordinary layman or an inexperienced person, and consequently who is incapable of understanding the subject under considera A retail dealer in a given kind of automobile is competent to testify as to the extent of the damages to that kind of machine at that place. 20 A witness engaged in the automobile business, and who was familiar with the car in question, could testify as to its value.21 Dealers in automobiles in the community, who had had many years experience in buying, selling and repairing automobiles, were competent to testify as to the value of an automobile damaged in a collision.22 One who was accustomed to handling cars of the kind damaged, had bought and sold several of them, and was fairly familiar with their value, is a competent witness to give an opinion as to the value of the damaged automobile.23 An automobile machinist with 13 years' experience, who was familiar with the cost and selling price of some of the cars he helped to construct, who had bought and sold two second-hand automobiles, and had advised persons as to the purchase of used cars at some of the places where he was employed, but who did not have any knowledge of motor car values generally, and had not had any experience in reference to the kind of motor car in question, nor that would enable him to estimate the value of a car of that type, was incompetent to express an opinion as to the value of such car.2 24 A witness who had driven automobiles for several years, and was familiar with them, was held competent to testify as to the value of a machine before and after it had been damaged.25 Cost of repairs must be shown to be reasonable, otherwise no issue is made for the jury.26 A statement by a witness that he did not know the cost of the repairs, but that $420 was paid out to fix the car up in running order, was not sufficient on which to form a basis for arriving at the damages sustained by the plaintiff.27 § 1090. Same-Repair bills. A receipted bill for repairs to the automobile in question is not competent evidence of damages. It neither proves the reasonable value of the repairs, their necessity, nor that the time consumed in making them was reasonable. This last mentioned item is material where the plaintiff is seeking to recover the usable value of his machine while it was being repaired.28 22 Barnes v. Elliott, Mo. App. 23 Barshfield v. Vucklich, 108 Kan. 761, 197 Pac. 205 (1921). 24 Rittenhouse-W. Auto Co. v. Kissner, 129 Md. 102, 98 Atl. 361 (1916). 25 Alabama Power Co. v. Armour & Co., 207 Ala. 15, 92 So. 111 (1921). 26 Robson v. Zumstein Taxicab Co., 248 S. W. 872 (1923). 27 Indianapolis & C. Tr. Co. V. Sherry, 65 Ind. App. 1, 116 N. E. 594 (1917), citing this work. Ky. — 28 Strom v, New York Rys. Co., 159 But receipted bills for repairs are admissible to prove that the plaintiff has paid for the repairs.29 § 1091. Liability of infant for damaging borrowed machine. An infant, to whom an owner lent his automobile, was held not to be liable to the owner for damage to the machine caused by his negligent driving. "The liability of infants for their torts and their immunity from liability for their contracts cancel each other in so far as the gravamen of the tort and the breach of the contract have a common basis of fact; the rule being that an infant cannot be held liable for a tort that would in effect be the enforcement of his liability on his contract. 80 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (1916); Conrad Co. v. St. Paul City R. Co., 130 Minn. 128, 153 N. W. 256 (1915); Galveston-H. El. R. Co. v. English, Tex. Civ. App. 178 S. W. 666 (1915). 29 Galveston-H. El. R. Co. v. English, Tex. Civ. App. —, 178 S. W. 666 (1915). 30 Bruenhoelzl v. Brandes, 90 N. J. L. 31, 100 Atl. 163 (1917). § 1099. Estimated from noise of automobile. § 1100. As determined by exhaust of engine. § 1101. Opinion based on marks made by wheels in stopping. § 1102. Distance traveled by automobile after accident. § 1103. Skidding of automobile after application of brakes. § 1104. General description of speed. 1105. Comparative speed. § 1106. Rate of speed such as to attract attention. § 1107. Rate of speed on other occasions or at other places. § 1108. Effects of collision. § 1109. Position and condition of automobile after accident.. § 1110. Bruises received by occupant in collision. § 1111. Testimony as to intoxication of driver. § 1112. Testimony of motorcycle officer based on speedometer. § 1113. Proof of reliability of speedom eter. § 1114. As shown by Photo-Speed-Recorder. § 1115. Res gestae. § 1116. Partiality of witness. STOPPING SPEED § 1092. Opinion evidence generally. The speed at which an automobile was being driven at a given time is a fact to be proved like any other fact. As a rule, the opinions of witnesses, where the facts desired to be established are not subject to expert testimony, are not admissible as evidence. But where the subject matter to which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or described to the jury as it appeared to the witness at the time, or the facts upon which the witness is called to express an opinion are such as men in general are capable of comprehending and understanding, the witness may give his opinion.1 1 Shimoda v. Bundy, 24 Cal. App. 675, 142 Pac. 109, 9 N. C. C. A. 834 (1914); Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122; Kendall Boot & Shoe Co. v. Bain, |