385, rehearing denied 323 U. S. 809) (right of voter in a congressional election to have his vote honestly counted is violated by a conspiracy of election officials to stuff the ballot box, and is punishable under 18 U. S. C. 241, formerly 18 U. S. C. 51); Smith v. Allwright (321 U. S. 649), rehearing denied (322 U. S. 769) (right of a citizen to vote in primary for candidates for Congress is a right which may not be abridged by a State on account of race or color, and damages are recoverable for violation under 8 U. S. C. 43).

Section 204 amends 18 U. S. C. 1583, formerly 18 U. S. C. 443. This is a statute enacted under the plenary power of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, punishing the kidnaping or enticing of persons for purposes of subjecting them to slavery or involuntary servitude. The amendment purports to make clear that the holding in involuntary servitude is punishable. A discussion of the doubt and the causes thereof, with respect to the existing provision, is found in 29 Cornell Law Quarterly 203. The insertion of "other means of transportation" is simply to bring the statute up to date supplementing the word "vessel.”

Insertion of the words "within or beyond the United States" was to settle any question that an enticement on board a vessel, and so forth, with intent that one be made a slave or held in involuntary servitude, applies within as well as without the country.

PART 2. PROTECTION OF RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Section 211 is an amendment of section 1 of the present Hatch Act, formerly 18 U. S. C. 61, now 18 U. S. C. 594. This section of the Hatch Act presently makes punishable intimidation and coercion for the purpose of interfering with the right of another to vote as he chooses at elections for national office. The purpose of the amendment is to make the provisions applicable to primary and special elections as well as to general elections for Federal office. The existing language is "any election" (for the named offices). The amendment would make it "any general, special, or primary election" (for the named offices). The Hatch Act was enacted in 1939 at a time when, due to the decision in Newberry v. United States (256 U. S. 232), there was doubt in Congress as to the constitutionality of Federal regulation of nominating primaries. This doubt was resolved in 1941, in favor of Federal power, by United States v. Classic (317 U. S. 299, 324, fn. 8). Nevertheless, in view of the legislative history, companion sections to section 1 of the Hatch Act were construed, since the Classic case, not to include primary elections (United States v. Malphurs, 41 F. Supp. 817; vacated on other grounds 316 U. S. 1). Accordingly, the amendatory insertion, above, is necessary notwithstanding the generality of the existing language "any election," and so forth.

Section 212 is an amendment of one of the old existing civil rights' statutes, enacted as part of the act of May 31, 1870, and which became section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (8 U. S. C. 31). Section 2004 presently declares it to be the right of citizens to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, county, municipality, or other territorial subdivision without distinction as to race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

As originally drafted, it was the first section of the act of May 31, 1870, and depended upon remedies provided in other sections of that

act and later acts, parts of which were held unconstitutional or repealed. In order to avoid any question as to the kind of punishment or remedy which is available in vindication or protection of the stated right, the amendment inserts a specific reference to the two basic criminal and civil-remedy provisions directed at State officers, namely: 18 U. S. C. 242 and 8 U. S. C. 43. The letter, providing civil remedies, has already been successfully applied in the past to the present statute (8 U. S. C. 31) in a number of cases such as Nixon v. Herndon (273 U. S. 536), Nixon v. Condon (286 U. S. 73), Smith v. Allwright (321 U. S. 649), and Chapman v. King (154 F. (2d) 460; cert. denied, 327 U. S. 800). There appears to be no parallel history of applying the corresponding criminal sanctions of 18 U. S. C. 242 (formerly 18 U. S. C. 52) to 8 U. S. C. 31, although in United States v. Stone (188 Fed. 836), an indictment under section 20 of the Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. 52, now 18 U. S. C. 242), charging that State officials acting under color of State law deprived Negroes of their vote or made it difficult for them to vote their choice at a congressional election, was sustained against a demurrer. Indeed, it was not until the comparatively recent decision in Classic case ((1941) 313 U. S. 299), that the potentialities of 18 U. S. C. 242 in protecting voting rights became evident. That 8 U. S. C. 43 and 18 U. S. C. 242 (formerly 18 U. S. C. 42) are regarded in pari materia with respect to the nature of the offense charged, see Picking v. Pa. R. R. Co. (151 F. (2d) 240; rehearing denied, 152 F. (2d) 753).

The phrase "and other applicable provisions of law" is designed to preclude any implication that by specifying two statutory sections there is an exclusion of other sections of the criminal and civil statutes, which, by operation of law and construction, are part of the legal arsenal in the use of the specified sections. Thus, under existing law, the same offense under 18 U. S. C. 242 may, because of a conspiracy, give rise to an added count in the indictment for a violation of 18 U. S. C. 241 (formerly 18 U. S. C. 51), United States v. Classic (313 U. S. 299) (conspiracy of public officers); or a prosecution solely under 18 U. S. C. 241, United States v. Ellis (43 F. Supp. 321) (conspiracy of public officers and private individuals); or a prosecution under 18 U.S. C. 371 (formerly 18 U. S. C. 88) and 18 U. S. C. 242, United States v. Trierweiller (52 F. Supp. 4) (conspiracy of public officers and private individuals). It is intended that these and any other such remedies shall be available.

A number of changes in language have been made both in the interest of modernizing the old phraseology and closing certain obvious holes now open for construction. For example, insertion of the phrase "general, special, or primary" in describing "election by the people," is intended to avoid any handicaps of earlier legislative history noted supra in the common the similar problem in connection with amending the Hatch Act.

One change in verbiage deserves special comment. The present statute speaks only of distinctions of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The words "previous condition of servitude" have been dropped as unnecessary, since the slave-holding days are far removed. In their place has been substituted the words "religion or national origin" (consistent with other nondiscriminatory provisions of this bill).

28

It is clear that the existing guaranty against distinctions in voting based on race or color is expressly authorized by the fifteenth amendment (United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649), and is validly applicable in all sections whether Federal, State, or local (Chapman v. King, 154 F. (2d) 460; cert. denied, 327 U. S. 800). In addition the present statute has been sustained under the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73), which clause also is the source for the claim that distinctions in voting based on religious or national origin are arbitrary and unreasonable classifications both as they appear in State laws (cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Orama v. Califor nia, 332 U. S. 633), or in the administration of such laws (Yick Wa v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 35). See also Hirabayashi v. United States (320 U. S. 81, 100), wherein the Court recognized that, as a general rule, "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are -founded upon the doctrine of equality." Moreover, the instant statute deals with the right of citizens to vote, and it could easily be regarded as an infringement upon the exclusively Federal naturalization power for States to deny, or differently accord, to citizens voting rights based on the national origin of such citizens, wholly apart from the aspect of an unreasonable classification (Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42, where the Court took the view that for a State to deny or limit aliens in the right to work in private employment would interfere with the power of Congress to control immigration).

Section 213 is designed to supplement section 211 of this part by creating civil remedies for violations of that section, and to authorize for both sections 211 and 212 of this part the bringing of suits by the Attorney General in the district courts for preventive, declaratory, and other relief. The reason for this seemingly uneven application is that 18 U. S. C. 594, which section 211 amends, already contains criminal penalties but has no clear civil remedy. On the other hand section 212 has specifically rewritten 8 U. S. C. 31 to contain within itself references to both criminal penalties and civil remedies, since the existence of the former was not clear and the latter existed by construction. In addition, as to both sections, there is need for recognition of the right of public authority to take timely civil measures in heading off threatened denials of the right to vote.

With respect to the jurisdictional provisions, the precedents for State court jurisdiction are cited in the analysis of part 1, section 201, supra. The need for specifically excluding regard to the sum or value of the matter in controversy, so far as the United States district courts are concerned, is also explained in the analysis of part 1, section 201, supra. No similar reference is needed in the case of suits by the Attorney General since the Federal district courts obtain jurisdiction in a suit where the United States is a party plaintiff regardless of the amount at issue (28 U. S. C. 1345; United States v. Sayward, 160 U. S. 493; United States v. Conti, 27 F. Supp. 756; RFC v. Krauss, 12 F. Sup. 4).

PART 3. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION OR SEGREGATION IN INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

This part is needed to both implement and supplement existing Supreme Court decisions.

In Morgan v. Virginia (328 U. S. 373 (1946)) the Court held a State statute, which required segregation of the races in motor busses, unconstitutional in the case of an interstate passenger as a burden on interstate commerce. There is evidence that some State officers are continuing to enforce segregation laws against the interstate pas

sengers.

Moreover, the Morgan case dealt only with State law and not with the action of the interstate carriers themselves (Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 377, fn. 12), who may and do continue to segregate (Henderson v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 80 F. Supp. (Adv. Op.) 32 (1948), carefully differentiating the Morgan case at (80 F. Supp.) p. 38).

In cases involving the carriers and certain segregation practices and requirements, which the Court felt overstepped the bounds of existing law, the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that constitutional rights are personal and not racial (Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 96; McCabe v. A. T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 161) (see also the restrictive covenants case for enunciation of the same principle in another field, Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22). The action of the Congress is needed to give unequivocal effect to this. principle in interstate travel.

Section 221 (a) declares that all persons traveling within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to equal treatment in the enjoyment of the accommodations of any public conveyance or facility operated by a common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce without discrimination or segregation based on race, color, religion, or national origin.

Section 221 (b) makes punishable by fine, no imprisonment, and subject to civil suit, the conduct of anyone who denies or attempts to deny equal treatment to travelers of every race, color, religion, or national origin, in the use of the accommodations of a public conveyance or facility operated by a common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Civil suits may be brought in the State courts as well as the Federal district courts.

Section 222 makes it unlawful for the common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or any officer, agent, or employee thereof to segregate or otherwise discriminate against passengers using a public conveyance or facility of such carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce on account of the race, color, religion, or national origin of such passengers. Violations are subject to fine and civil suit, the latter being cognizable in State as well as Federal courts.

All right, Mr. Marshall.

83017-51- -3

STATEMENT OF THURGOOD MARSHALL, SPECIAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. MARSHALL. We have Mr. Wilkins and myself. Mr. Wilkins was to cover the general and I was to cover the specific, but, in view of the fact that Senator Wiley expects to leave, I can get to the speci fic, and then Mr. Wilkins, if it is agreeable with you, can come on. Senator MCGRATH. Very well. Please proceed."

Mr. MARSHALL. I will start off, and Mr. Wilkins will follow. The prepared statement will have to be changed, because of the first sentence.

I want to say first of all that I am here on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. I am, personally, and we are always happy to appear before committees, because I believe, so far as I am concerned, whenever I have an opportunity to appear in court, before a legislative committee, it gives a new faith in the way of life, or whatever you want to call it.

The statement itself I think if I read it, it is not too long, will cover it.

There can be no question that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif teenth amendments need implementation. This type of legislation meets that need. At the outset, it should be made clear that this bill does not in any form or fashion deprive any State or political subdivision thereof of its lawful rights. It is only aimed at prohibiting unlawful acts. It does not interfere with any Federal- or State-protected right.

Senator WILEY. You are not talking about the substantive law changes?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. It should also be pointed out that there is not a single provision, sentence, or word in this bill which is aimed at any particular section of the country. It will apply equally as well in Maine and Mississippi, California and Florida. No lawabiding citizen, whether he be a private individual or a governmental official, has any reason whatsoever to fear the enactment of this bill. On the other hand, the bill can have a deterring effect upon all private individuals and Government officials who have in the past or who contemplate in the future use of racial or religious prejudice as the basis for illegal action to deprive Americans of their federally protected rights.

Whatever progress has been made in recent years in the enforcement of federally protected rights has for the most part been brought about through the use of the Federal machinery. The progress that has been made in criminal actions to protect civil rights of Americans has been made by the United States Department of Justice in actions brought in the Federal courts. Progress in civil actions to protect and enforce civil rights has been made for the most part by private actions in Federal courts. Advances have resulted from interpretations by Federal judges, prominent among whom have been members of the bench from the South. Further progress has been halted by the limitations of the existing Federal statutes.

This bill does not propose any basic change in either the letter or spirit of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the