gress steps in promptly with a law of this sort which will adequately prevent the mob violence which might result from open clashes between the Legion and the Klan, I think many people, white and Negro are going to be hung. I think this dispatch adequately answers the question of Senator Eastland to Mr. Maslow a few moments ago as to what instances of terror there have been in recent times. Section 202 of the bill would amend the present section 242 of the Criminal Code to increase the punishment of one who deprives another under color of law of his rights or immunities, or subjects an inhabitant to different punishments because of his race, color, or being an alien, when such conduct results in death or maiming. A new section is provided by section 203 of the bill, which would define six of the rights, privileges, and immunities referred to in section 242, thus adding much clarity to the bill and helping the lower courts in its administration. There are other provisions in the bill-I do not think I need to go over them-dealing with involuntary servitude and strengthening Federal protection of the right to political participation. There was some discussion previously between Senator Eastland and Mr. Maslow about the right to vote being federally protected, and I think that, rather than give my own opinion of that right to vote being federally protected, I would like to cite two opinions of the United States Supreme Court in which they have clearly held that right is federally protected. Those cases are Ex Parte Yarborough (110 U. S. 651) and United States v. Klesicc (313 U. S. 292). Section 213 of the bill gives a right of civil action to one aggrieved by a violation of section 211 and provides that sections 211 and 212 shall also be enforceable by the Attorney General, thus giving two practical remedies for deprivations of these civil rights. The prohibited conduct will be much less likely to occur if these remedies, easily pursued, are added to the already existent but seldom enforced criminal penalties. Part 3 of title II prohibits discrimination of segregation in interstate transportation. While the Supreme Court has ruled that a State law imposing segregation is unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce-Morgan v. Virginia (328 U. S. 373)—it is not clear whether or not a self-imposed carrier regulation imposing segregation is unconstitutional. Mr. Maslow mentioned before that a case involving that very question is up before the United States Supreme Court, and I would like to add to his analysis of the Morgan case that it was not merely because of the inconvenience in shifting that the Court threw out the statute imposing segregation. There were three reasons which they considered to be a burden on interstaet commerce: Inconvenience in shifting, the difficulty of recognition in many cases between whites and Negroes, and the possible additional cost to the carriers. Those were the three reasons, and I think that Senator Eastland's hypothetical situation is well answered by the fact that all three reasons played the only part in the Court's decision. The States themselves, unfortunately, cannot outlaw these regulations even if they wanted to do so, because that would probably be an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held that in an old case in 1877. That was Hall v. DeCuir (95 U. S. 485). In this particular instance no cry can possibly be raised of States' rights for, as was said in the Hall case, "If the public good require such legislation, it must come from Congress and not from the States." There can be no doubt that the public good requires the end of segregation. This degrading process must be stopped not only to stop the inroads of Communist propaganda, but also to restore dignity to all men, be they white or black. Senator McGRATH. Thank you very much, sir. Are there any other witnesses who wish to speak before we recess? If not, we will recess until next Wednesday at 10 o'clock, at which time Senator Eastland has asked permission to have some attorneys general from his Southern States appear, presumably in opposition to the legislation. (Thereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 11 a. m. Wednesday, June 29, 1949.) CIVIL RIGHTS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1949 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, in room The subcommittee convened at 11 a. m., pursuant to recess, 424, Senate Office Building, Senator J. Howard McGrath, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators McGrath, Eastland, and Wiley. Also present: Senators Robertson, Stennis, and Kefauver. Senator MCGRATH. We will proceed, gentlemen, if you are ready. The committee will come to order. This is a continuation of hearings on S. 1725 and 1734, to provide means of further securing and protecting the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. I want to welcome to the greatest committee of the Senate two of our disinguished colleagues, and I am sure you join me in that, who are not members of our committee. STATEMENT OF HON. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA Senator ROBERTSON. I appreciate the welcome, and I am prepared to admit that any committee whose primary function is to safeguard the American Constitution can properly be called the greatest committee in the Senate, because without that Constitution, we could not preserve our democracy. I come today to discuss S. 1725. I did not know that the hearings would also include S. 1734. I merely read that bill, and I must frankly admit that I have not been able to give to S. 1725 the study that so vital a proposal merits. I have studied it enough, Mr. Chairman, to reach the conclusion that in my humble opinion it represents a dangerous trend in our National Government. It is the type of legislation which undermines the foundations of our Constitution and threatens to overturn the structure of government so carefully raised by our forefathers. It could lead to the exercise of local police powers by Federal officials. It would permit Federal interference with the conduct of elections. It would nullify sections of State constitutions and local statutes. It would strike at patterns of social behavior which the citizens of this country always have regarded as part of their inalienable right to choose their associates. 83017-51-5 In short, it would breach the wall separating the State and local powers from those delegated to the National Government in so many important places that this bill might appropriately be subtitled: "An Act to Repeal the Tenth Amendment." I have not had an opportunity, as I have already indicated, to prepare a complete analysis of the bill, and so today I shall merely touch on some of its features which I regard as most obviously objectionable. Senator WILEY. Did you say tenth amendment or Tenth Commandment? Senator ROBERTSON. The tenth amendment. It does not repeal all of the Ten Commandments. Senator EASTLAND. I wish you would specify which ones it misses. Senator ROBERTSON. Before this subcommittee takes final action, I hope I shall be given an opportunity to outline my reasons for opposition in more detail. To appreciate the significance of what this bill would do, if enacted into law, it is necessary for us to recall the history of FederalState relations and the attitude which has been assumed at various periods toward what are commonly referred to as "State's rights." In the period of the federation, before our present Constitution was adopted, State supremacy was unquestioned. Drawn together by the common danger of the war with Great Britain, the Colonies were in effect a league of sovereign states, operating jointly through a Congress that was more of a diplomatic assembly than a legislative body. Senator WILEY. May I interrupt there? Senator ROBERTSON. Yes. Senator WILEY. When I attended the first meeting here, this bill, as I understood it, was a bill to constitute a committee which would give due consideration and bring forth certain recommendations. In the hearing that Senator McGrath conducted here, at least, it seemed to my mind that the bill itself contained a lot of substantive changes or attempts to change substantive law, and probably even the Constitution. I felt at this time of the session that if we could create a committee, as I thought the bill originally meant, to constitute a committee, that would give time and consideration to this thing, and not throw these fundamental things in our lap for decision, that I would feel very pleased to support that. I must say Senator Eastland has said to me that a number of attorneys general of the Commonwealth of this country are concerned and want to be heard. I told Senator Eastland that I certainly felt that that should be done. But what particular part of this bill are you talking to now? I was in here, you know, at 11 o'clock, ready to participate, and then I got a lot of work on my hands so I went back, so I do not know just what particular portion of this bill you are talking to now. You say it violates the tenth amendment to the Constitution. What portion is it? Senator ROBERTSON. I feel that I could answer that question in the shortest period of time by proceeding with my prepared statement, because that is what it does. It will tell you what parts of this bill that I think are objectionable and that violate the tenth amendment. I believe I could present that in a more orderly way as I go along with my prepared statement, but I will be glad to yield at any time for any elaboration on any point that I discuss. I do not think that I am violating any confidences when I say that I discussed this bill yesterday with the Attorney General, and he told me that it did not change existing law, except with respect to conspiracy. He admitted that it did provide for Federal prosecution of one so-called conspirator, which is different from the existing law that one man under existing law cannot be guilty of a conspiracy. But I found out other things in here that I think change existing law with references, for instance, to segregation in railways stations and transportation, of that kind, that I think a portion of the bill that disturbs me the most is an effort to write out existing law concerning civil rights. There have been so many conflicting decisions of our courts on this subject of what is and what is not a civil right under the Constitution that I think when we try to write out a definition in law of civil rights, you have opened up the entire field for new Federal decisions that go far beyond anything we have ever had before on that subject. The full implications of the outline of civil rights I am not prepared to discuss. I have not had time enough to examine all of the decisions on that which would possibly be affected. Senator WILEY. Life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness defines civil rights, does it not? Senator ROBERTSON. I did not hear you. Senator WILEY. Life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Senator ROBERTSON. Well, that has been the fundamental description of civil rights in our Declaration of Independence, but there have been literally hundreds of decisions since that time in defining what that means, and what the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend ments mean. I shall discuss some of that later in my prepared statement, but I want to say this by way of explanation of my fears when the Attorney General told me that this bill did not change existing law, I frankly wondered whether or not he prepared the bill. If he prepared the bill and told me that I would feel like I would be justified in accepting his opinion on it, but if somebody else prepared it, it may be like that experience I had in 1935 on the wage-and-hour bill that was prepared by Messrs. Tommy Cochran and Ben Cohen. As that bill was originally prepared, its patron, Mrs. Norton, of New Jersey, got on the floor and said, "This bill does not in any way change the interstate commerce laws of our Constitution." I challenged that statement with the language that I found partly in the front part of the bill that related to away back in the back part of the bill, that cleariy showed a definition of what was interstate commerce, which had been so skillfully worded that it destroyed the decision of the Supreme Court in the New Orleans Railroad case, which had been the basis of the dividing line of the indirect effect on interstate commerce of a local action. That wiped out, in my opinion, the interstate section of the Constitution. She was flabbergasted when I called attention to those provisions. in the bill. She asked for the bill to be recommitted, and it was recommitted, and then those skillful architects of legislation went to work on the drafting of a new bill, and they put the same thing in it, but did that so skillfully that I could not catch it, and nobody else on the floor of Congress could catch it. When it got to the courts they ignored completely the statement that the Congress had not intended to wipe out all distinction between |