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of nations by which, if they are so minded, they can protect themselves against the recurrence of the disaster of such a war as that with which Europe has been devastated during the last four years. Experience under the League will doubtless suggest many improvements. But it is the first step that counts. Let us take it now when the whole world is yearning for it.

PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 1

Many misconceptions of the effect of the Covenant of Paris have been set afloat by broadside denunciations of the League based on loose constructions of it entirely unwarranted by the text. The attitude of those who favor the Covenant has been misconstrued, increasing the confusion in the mind of the public in respect to the inestimable value of the instrument as it is. Were the alternatives presented to me of adopting the Covenant exactly as it is, or of postponing the coming of peace and continuing the state of war until the conference could reconvene and make other provisions for peace, I should, without the slightest fear as to the complete safety of my country under its provisions, vote for it as the greatest step in recorded history in the betterment of international relations for the benefit of the people of the world and for the benefit of my country.

I was president of the League to Enforce Peace and continue to be. Our plan was somewhat more ambitious in the method of settling differences peaceably, in that fewer might escape a binding peaceful settlement. The proposed 1 Article in Public Ledger Mar. 16, 1919.

covenant, however, makes provision for peaceful settlement of most differences. Both plans include a definite obligation on the part of all members of the League to use economic power to suppress an outlaw nation by withering world ostracism. Ours also provided for definite contributions of force to an army to be called upon if the boycott failed to effect its purpose. The present covenant does not, in my judgment, impose such a definite obligation on the members of the League, but its theory, doubtless sound, is that their voluntary action in their own interest will lead to the raising of sufficient force without a covenant. The proposed league has real teeth and a bite to it. It furnishes real machinery to organize the power of the peaceful nations of the world and translate it into economic and military action. This, by its very existence and certainty, will keep nations from war, will force them to the acceptance of a peaceable settlement, and will dispense with the necessity for the exercise of economic pressure or force.

Why, then, it is asked, if this is my view, have I animadverted upon the language of the League Covenant and suggested changes? I have done this not because I wished to change the structure of the League, its plan of action or its real character. I have done it for the purpose of removing objections to it created in the minds of conscientious Americans. There are many such anxious for a league of nations, anxious to make this peace permanent, whose fears have been roused by suggested constructions of the Covenant which its language does not justify. These fears can, without any considerable change of language or additions, be removed.

The language of the Covenant is in diplomatic phrases, is verbose and not direct. When, however, we examine the

important treaties of history, including those negotiated by our own country, we find that this is characteristic of most of them. They are not drawn with the concise, direct words of a business contract, nor in the clear style of a domestic statute. When reduced to such a style, the Covenant becomes quite clear and presents to me no danger whatever of involving the United States in any obligation or burden which its people would not be, and ought not to be, glad to bear for the preservation of the peace of the world and their own.

Take, for instance, the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy of the United States which forbids any non-American nation, by external aggression, by purchase or by intrigue, to acquire the territory in whole or in part, or the governmental power in whole or in part, of any country or nation in this Western Hemisphere. So far as external aggression is concerned, the policy is fully covered by Article X of the Covenant, which would enable the United States to use the whole power of the League, in addition to its own, to preserve the doctrine. So far as the acquisition of such territory or power by purchase or intrigue is concerned, the United States could at once bring the matter before the Body of Delegates, which will include representatives of all the nations of North, South and Central America. Unless the whole Body of Delegates, so constituted, unanimously rejects the Monroe Doctrine, the United States is completely at liberty to proceed to enforce it. Can it be supposed, by the wildest flight of imagination, that such a unanimous report could be obtained from a body including representatives of seventeen or eighteen countries of this Western Hemisphere? Though I have this view, I am entirely will

ing to see, and will be glad to see, a reservation introduced into the Covenant which shall be more explicit and more satisfying to those whose fears are roused.

From the plan of the Covenant, from the language of Lord Robert Cecil, one of its chief draftsmen, and from the general rules of construction of international agreements, I think that the action of the executive council, unless otherwise expressly provided, must be unanimous. This would necessitate the concurrence of a representative of the United States in such recommendations and other actions as it may, in the course of its duties in the League, have to take. The same is true of the Body of Delegates. But I would be entirely willing to have the rule of unanimity stated expressly; it would clarify a matter which troubles many.

Doubt has been expressed as to the time during which this Covenant is to run. There is now no express limitation. I would be glad to have a definite time limitation, say of ten years, for the League as a whole, and perhaps of five years for the obligation to restrict armament within a limit agreed to by the Congress of the United States. This would relieve many who reasonably fear perpetual obligations. My own view is that, unless this be done, the nations composing the League will construe this to be a covenant from which any one of them may withdraw after reasonable notice. I think it is wiser to give it a definite term than to have it a covenant from which any member may withdraw at will.

I do not mean to say there may not be other changes of a similar character that would aid in relieving unfounded objections. But I am distinctly opposed to a revision of the form of the League so as to change its nature. This is the League which, as amended in the conference, must be

adopted unless we are to have an indefinite postponement

of peace.

The suggestions of the impossible and radically different leagues which have been put forward as a better solution than the present one will not be particularly relevant or helpful. To provide for amendments and reservations, that do not change the structure of the League and its essence and do satisfy doubting, conscientious Americans in respect to the safety of the United States in the obligations assumed, is a high and important duty of the representatives of the United States in this conference. If they perform it, they will help materially to secure the ratification of the treaty.

Of course the securing of amendments after fourteen nations have fought their way by earnest discussion to an agreement in committee is not free from difficulty. European nations, anxious to have us join the League, will consent to reservations and limitations as to strictly American questions and policies; but it is not the easiest task to draw these in such form as to prevent their having wider effect. The solution of this problem will be facilitated by a consideration and study of the criticisms which are constructively directed to rendering this league unobjectionable. I regret to say that many of the speeches are so far afield and so entirely unwarranted by the present language of the Covenant that they are not helpful.

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