doubted whether that great end is ever effectually served by laws, which philosophy disavows, and experience condemns. Unless, therefore, Monopolies promote this interest, whether they be the gifts of a monarch or the fruits of a blind bargain with a republic; whether conceded to court favourites, or obtained by the management of intriguing demagogues; whether their object be the private emolu, ment of an iron crowned tyrant, or the gratification of a brawling tribune of the People: PUBLIC UTILITY is equally violated.*

But all discussion upon this point was idle and irrelevant. I had expressly admitted, in my Letter, that the Legislature could not, upon considerations of mere policy, "avoid or resume their own grants; that they alone had authority to judge of

"If the exclusive grant to Mr. Livingston be a Monopoly, "why then," it is demanded, " are not all Ferries, Banks, Toll"Bridges, and Turnpikes, Monopolies ?" To this I answer, that when altogether exclusive, they are. The right of Ferriage," or "that exclusive right of receiving certain rates for the carriage "by water of persons and goods, which is usually granted to the "owners of the adjacent land, in consideration of providing and "supporting, under established regulations, boats necessary for "the public accommodation," is undoubtedly a species of Monopoly, and a very useful and beneficial one to the public. The mere incorporation of a Banking Company, is not, I apprehend, the erection of a Monopoly; for the Legislature, when it grants a Bank Charter, does not preclude itself from incorporating other Banks, even in the same place to which they may have confined the operations of the first. The Banks, for the time being, however, virtually possess a Monopoly of the trade, from the effect of what is usually termed "the Restraining Act." A law, which prohibits persons "unauthorised by law," from banking within this state, with as much policy and justice, as there would be in prohibiting individuals, unless "authorised by law," from buying and

"the measure, and the public faith was bound by "their decision."* The material enquiry is, whether, when the claims of the State grantees are brought into direct conflict with rights acquired under the paramount authority of the Union, the Legislature can, with propriety, define the limits of its own jurisdiction, and declare that it never intended to transcend them.

selling on commission, in case the COMMISSION COMPANY should suggest that measure. But the bank restraining law has never been publicly defended, but upon the ground of its utility in preventing the evils app ehended to the community from leaving the trade of Banking free. Toll Bridges are, or are not, Monopolies, according to circumstances. They are generally the private property of Individuals, or of Corporations, who are authorised by law to erect them over public water courses, and to receive certain tolls from all who find it convenient to pass them. Sometimes the acts establishing them, contain a prohibitory clause, preventing the erection of any other Bridge, or of a Ferry, within a certain distance, and in these cases they are so far Monopolies, equally, if not, in general, more useful to the Public than Ferries. Turnpike Roads, are not, strictly speaking, Monopolies. Companies are incorporated for the purpose of opening and constructing Turnpike Roads for the Public convenience; and upon acquiring, by purchase, the right of property in the land over which the road passes, they have an exclusive right to erect gates and receive tolls from passengers. But the Legislature may, afterwards, incorporate other companies, to open other roads in the immediate vicinity; and the towns through which a turnpike road passes, may, and they sometimes do, establish public highways so near, as to divert the whole travelling from it. The "attempt, therefore, to enlist against" me "the prejudices connected with" Ferries, Banks, Toll-Bridges, and Turnpikes, "I can"not but think-a want of candour." Vide Colden's Vindication, p. 18.

* Vide Letter to Colden. p. 8, 9.

II. Your attempt to defend the grant to Mr. Livingston, upon the score of its " JUSTICE," might, for similar reasons, also have been spared.

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I had informed you, in my Letter, that the Committee refused to "recommend a legislative decision upon the objections which had been raised against "it, on account either of the prior subsisting grant to "John Fitch; the forfeiture of Fitch's right, without proof of the facts upon which such forfeiture was "declared to have arisen; the unfounded suggestions 66 upon which it was alleged Mr. Livingston had ob"tained a transfer of that right to himself; or the non"performance of the condition upon which his title "was to have taken its effect :-because these were "questions which the Courts of Law, in the ordinary "exercise of their powers, would be competent to "decide."* And I should not now have felt myself bound to follow you into this branch of the controversy, had you not rendered that large portion of your pamphlet, which you have devoted to its consideration, a vehicle for the most offensive imputations upon the Committee, and the most unjust recriminations upon me.

However wide apart we are, in sentiment, as to the legitimate source of legislative power on the subject, there is one point, Sir, in which, I think, we are agreed; and that is, in acknowledging "the efficacy of a positive statute," (admitting it to emanate from constitutional authority)" to secure an ex

clusive property in the fruits of intellectual la"bour." By what strange perversity of moral sense,

* Vide Letter to Colden, p. 27, 28.

or obliquity of understanding, do you, then, maintain, that it was right and just in the Legislature, to repeal the law securing to JOHN FITCH the sole right of employing his invention of the Steam-boat, whilst, in the same breath, you contend that it would be unrighteous and unjust to interfere with the act by which this grant to Fitch was abrogated and annulled, and his privileges transferred to Mr. Livingston.

You remark, in support of this position, that " Mr. "Fitch did not ask the interposition of the Legis"lature to enable him to pursue experiments," but that "he founded his claim to favour on his having ac

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tually established a beneficial mode of Steam Na"vigation ;" and you allege, that "the Legislature, "to reward his success, and to secure to itself benefit. from an invention of so much utility, gave himn an ex❝clusive right." You deem it, therefore, absurd to suppose, that he was to have the whole fourteen "years," for which his privilege was to endure," to "put his plan into operation;" you argue, from this absurdity, that his grant actually "was upon condi"tion implied, if not expressed, that he should avail "himself of it within some reasonable time :" and assuming this to have been actually a condition annexed to Fitch's law, you conclude that the State had a right, resting upon moral obligation, and moral duty, to repeal that grant, when they gave similar privileges to Chancellor Livingston.*

Unfortunately for your argument, the hypothesis upon which it rests, has no foundation in reality. A simple reference, Sir, to the act in favour of Fitch, will shew, that no condition whatever was attached

* Colden's Vindication, p. 25, 26.

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to it. The preamble avers it to have been passed, in order to promote and encourage so useful an

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improvement and discovery, and as a reward for "his ingenuity, application, and diligence."* And whatever may have been the just " expectations" of individual members of the Legislature, of which you speak so familiarly, Mr. Fitch's employment of his boat upon the waters of this State, was no " part of "the consideration" upon which his privileges were obtained. "The very nature of the grant," as you have yourself so well observed, "excludes the sup"position:" For if, as you say, he was to derive a benefit from it; that benefit could only result from his using it, previous to its expiration. Hence, it is evident, that the Legislature must have thought it unnecessary to insist upon that as a condition of their grant, which the stimulus of private interest would at all events have insured.

The act in favour of Fitch having been passed before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, was, as you have accurately described it, "in effect a "Patent granted for a discovery, which it was repre"sented, had not only been made, but had been ap

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plied to a boat, that was then already built."‡ But, when, Sir, let me ask, was it before pretended, that the grant of a Patent for a discovery or invention in any art or science, rendered it obligatory upon the Patentee to erect his machine, publish his work, or carry his improvement into actual operation? That you, Sir, should become the assertor of such a doctrine, does, I must confess, appear to me,

* Vide Letter to Colden, p. 88. + Colden's Vind. p. 26.

Colden's Vind. p. 54.