years with regard to those absent, because this was con-. fined to possession "with good faith and proper title;" and Morales had neither, within the meaning of those terms as employed in the Code (Former Civil Code P. R., Arts. 1940, 1941, 1950, 1952, 1953, 1954; present Civil Code, §§ 1841, 1842, 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855). The entry of a possessory title in his name was in effect a judicial certificate declaring him to be entitled to the possession, but without prejudice to third parties, who might show a better right to it. It gave him no title as against them, but conferred a prima facie legitimacy upon his possession, being "provisional and presumptive evidence of ownership;" and it fixed a date from which his possession should be treated as originating; and so the entry amounted (for present purposes) to no more than public notice that from that time his possession was adverse to the true owners. Soto v. Registrar of Property, 15 P. R. Sup. Ct. 597, 600; Morales v. Landrau, 15 P. R. Sup. Ct. 761, 772; Pares v. J. Reynes & Co., 2 P. R. Fed. 402, 428.

But appellants rest their case upon the provisions of the Mortgage Law, as amended by the judicial order of General Henry. The Mortgage Law is a somewhat elaborate system of registration for instruments of conveyance that, having been long in force in the Peninsula, was extended to Porto Rico and the Philippines in or about the year 1893. It was designed to give to purchasers and mortgagees, acquiring interests in lands in reliance. upon recorded titles, protection against claims and interests of which no notice was conveyed by the records. Its provisions are to be read in connection with those of the Civil Code. By Art. 27, "Those who have not participated in the recorded instrument or contract" are considered as third persons. By Art. 33, "The record of instruments or contracts which are null in accordance with the law are not validated thereby." But, notwithstanding this, by Art. 34, "Instruments or contracts

executed or covenanted by a person who, according to the Registry, has a right thereto, shall not be invalidated with regard to third persons, after they have once been recorded, although later the right of the person executing them is annulled or determined by virtue of a prior deed not recorded, or for reasons which do not clearly appear from the Registry. Only by virtue of a recorded instrument may another later instrument, also recorded, be invalidated to the prejudice of third persons, [with exceptions not now material.] The provisions of this Article [34] may at no time be applied to the instrument recorded in accordance with the provisions of Article 390, unless the prescription has validated or secured the interest referred to therein." By Art. 36, "Suits for rescission or determination of title shall not be instituted against third persons who have recorded the instruments of their respective interests in conformity with the provisions of this law." But by Art. 37 exceptions are made to the rule thus declared, and one of them is-"Suits for rescission or determination of title which are due to the causes plainly expressed in the Registry."

Subsequent sections provide for the mortgaging of different interests in real property, and for various purposes, and declare the effect that shall be given to the mortgages, provide for the manner of keeping the registries, for making and correcting entries therein, and for proceedings for clearing the title of unrecorded mortgages and other charges and interests. Art. 389 prohibits the admission in the courts, etc., of unrecorded documents or instruments if presented for the purpose of enforcing, to the prejudice of third persons, interests which should have been recorded. Articles 390 to 395 inclusive contain provisions under which owners who lack a recorded title of ownership are permitted to record their interests by previously proving their possession before the Judge of First Instance, or the proper Municipal Judge, with

the consent of the Department of Public Prosecution and citation of the adjacent property owners, should they desire to record the absolute ownership of some estate, and with the citation of the owner or other participants in the ownership, should they desire to record some property right. Article 391 prescribes the form of the proceedings. Article 392 provides that the court, on approving the proceedings, shall "order that the record. requested be made in the Registry without prejudice to a third person having a better claim." Among the prerequisites for converting entries of possession into records of ownership under this procedure it was, by par. 6 of Art. 393, provided that twenty years must have elapsed since the date of entry of possession. By Art. 394-"If the twenty years calculated from the date of the entry [of possession] have not elapsed, or the requisites mentioned in Article 393 of this law have not been complied with, the entries of possession shall have the legal effect embraced in the provisions contained in the following paragraphs, [viz]. The period of possession which appears to have elapsed at the time said entries are made shall be computed for the prescription which does not require a just title, unless a person prejudiced thereby denies it, in which case said period of possession must be proved in accordance with the common law. Entries of possession shall prejudice or favor third persons from the date of their record, but only with regard to the effects which the laws attribute to mere possession. The entry of possession shall not prejudice the person who has a better right to the ownership of the realty, although his title has not been recorded, unless the prescription has confirmed and secured the claim recorded. Between the parties the possession shall be effectual from the date prescribed by the common law. The provisions contained in the preceding Articles, regarding the entries of possession, can not be applied to mortgage rights, which can

not be recorded unless an instrument in writing is presented."

Under the Mortgage Law, it seems to be settled that there proceedings for proving possession or ownership before the courts of first instance or municipal courts, although judicial in form, are intended merely as aids to the establishment of a system of authenticated instruments of title for purposes of the public records; that although under some circumstances it is required that notice be given to the owner or other persons interested adversely to the applicant, the proceedings are really ex parte, have not the effect of res judicata, and do not bind any one who does not appear. Gonzalez v. The People, 10 P. R. Sup. Ct. 458; Calderon v. Garcia, 14 P. R. Sup. Ct. 407, 416. And even with respect to a party who appears and opposes the entry of a possessory title or its conversion into a dominio title, his rights can not be adjudged or passed upon in these proceedings, but must be decided in an ordinary action of revindication; the court being limited, in the proceedings under the Mortgage Law for a conversion of a possessory to a dominio title, to saying whether petitioner has shown a right to the conversion asked for; but without passing upon the rights of others. Paris v. The People, 5 P. R. Sup. Ct. 29; Diaz v. Waymouth, 13 P. R. Sup. Ct. 317.

This is conceded by the appellants, who, indeed, base their argument upon it; contending, further, that, because of what has just been said, the rights of appellees in the land in question were not affected by the proceedings whereby Morales converted his possessory title into a title of ownership, and that the recording of this dominio title by him did not cut off any of their rights; that if such title was fraudulent it was liable to attack, even after registry, within any period short of thirty years after he had entered into possession of the land and while still recorded in his name, or in that of any other person

excepting an innocent purchaser without notice; or, in the language of the civil law, "a third party with good faith." Paris v. The People, 5 P. R. Sup. Ct. 29, 37; Gonzalez v. The People, 10 P. R. Sup. Ct. 458, 462; Abella v. Antunano, 14 P. R. Sup. Ct. 485, 494; Merchant v. Lafuente, 5 Phil. Rep. 638, 644.

Upon the strength of this, it is ingeniously argued that under the law of Porto Rico it was not the conversion of the apparent title of Morales from a possessory to a dominio title that cut off the rights of the appellees; but it was the fact that the appellants, in reliance upon that apparent title, and (as is said) without notice of the rights of the appellees, purchased the land from Morales, which by virtue of the Mortgage Law gave to them a better right than the appellees. And from this it is contended that the Judicial Order, in reducing from twenty years to six years the time that must elapse between the entry of a possessory title and its conversion into a dominio title, did not cut off any right of appellees, and therefore was not and is not inconsistent with "due process of law."

But it seems to us that there can be no difference in principle so far as concerns the question whether the property of the appellees was taken from them without due process-whether there were two steps or three steps in the course of procedure by which the end was accomplished. Whether the retroactive effect of the Judicial Order resulted in conferring upon Morales a title that he himself could maintain against the true owners, or whether it conferred upon him an apparent title that not he himself but his grantees could maintain, makes no difference in a controversy between his grantees and the truc

owners.

In short, the position of appellees is that by the fraudulent conduct of Morales, plus the Mortgage Law, plus the Judicial Order, plus the dominio title in Morales founded thereon, and the recording thereof, plus the