legislature. If the same rule is applied to all railroads of the same class, there is no violation of the constitutional provision securing to all the equal protection of the laws." (p. 691.)

Again, in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, the court sustained the statute of that State, which, in providing for the number of men to be employed in the operation of freight trains, excluded from its application railroads less than fifty miles in length. The principles governing the decision of a question of this sort have been so frequently stated that repetition is unnecessary. Magoun v. Illinois T. & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 294; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 52-55; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U. S. 61, 78; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martel, 222 U. S. 225, 232; Chicago Dock v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680.

It is urged, however, that "control, management or operation" is made the basis of classification for rate purposes, so that, if a railroad under fifty miles in length be controlled by a railroad of greater length, it would be taken out of the exception although operated wholly independently and not in connection with the longer line. This contention is fully met by the construction which the state court has given to the statute. Upon this point that court said that the meaning of the words "under the control, management or operation" "is to be ascertained from the connection in which they are used, the act in which they are found, its context, and the mass of legislation of which they form a part. In form, the expressions are alternative, but, in meaning, they are appositive, signifying the same as the words 'part of.'

The suggestion that ownership or control of one railroad by another, when they are not connected and operated together, nor susceptible of such connection and operation, makes them one within the meaning of the act, is liks

wise contrary to the spirit and beyond the scope thereof. Such an interpretation is not within its reason or purpose, and, therefore, not within its meaning. The legislature must be regarded as having passed the act, in view of existing conditions and methods of railroad operation, and with the intent that it should operate in harmony with the spirit and general principles of existing railroad rate legislation, except in so far as the contrary is expressed in terms or by necessary implication. There is not a word here signifying any intent to depart from the general principle embodied in the act of 1873, concerning the entity of a railroad for the purposes of the act. It made into one only such railroads as were operated 'in connection' with one another. Intent to change this settled policy must rest upon something more, in an amendatory act, than mere inference, surmise or unnecessary implication." Coal & Coke Railway Co. v. Conley and Avis, 67 W. Va. 129, 177, 178, 179.

The exception of "electric lines and street railways" is also made the ground of criticism, but this classification rests upon reasonable and familiar distinctions, long recognized as proper in railroad legislation. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, ante, p. 324.

The final objection to the statute is that it constitutes an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. It must be regarded, however, as prescribing rates exclusively for intrastate traffic, and, as thus construed, it was within the power of the State to enact. The questions presented are substantially the same as those which were considered in the Minnesota Rate Cases, ante, p. 352. Judgment affirmed.

230 U. S.

Argument for Appellees.

OREGON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION COMPANY v. CAMPBELL, ET AL., CONSTITUTING THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF OREGON.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.

No. 159. Argued April 8, 9, 1912.—Decided June 16, 1913.

A state railroad commission has no power to fix interstate rates, and as in this case the state court has not construed an order of the state commission as relating to or affecting interstate rates this court does not so construe it.

Whether an order of the state commission governs particular shipments depends upon whether the traffic is interstate or intrastate, which must be determined by the facts in each case. The question can

not be determined in advance by general decree. Minnesota Rate Cases, ante, p. 352, followed to effect that an order of a state railroad commission relating wholly to rates on intrastate shipments is not an unconstitutional interference with interstate com

merce.

177 Fed. Rep. 318, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity and constitutionality of an order made by the Railroad Commission of Oregon on April 22, 1908, prescribing maximum freight rates on railroads, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Maxwell Erarts, with whom Mr. W. W. Cotton was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Joseph N. Teal, with whom Mr. A. M. Crawford, Attorney General of Oregon, and Mr. Clyde B. Aitchison were on the brief, for appellees:

The State has exclusive jurisdiction over its internal commerce. Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463; Milnor v. New Jersey Ry. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 412; Er parte

Argument for Appellees.

230 U. S.

Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 867; Allen v. O. R. & N. Co., 106 Fed. Rep. 265; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 168 Fed. Rep. 317; Woodside v. Tonopah & G. R. Co., 184 Fed. Rep. 358; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Siler, 186 Fed. Rep. 176; Arkansas Rate Cases, 187 Fed. Rep. 290; Sou. Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 189 Fed. Rep. 182; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 195; United States v. Chicago R. Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 486; Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 87; Sands v. Manistee Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288; Willamette Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1; Wabash, St. L. & P. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Luxton v. North Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 532; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 531; Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 247; Erie R. R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148; Atlantic Coast Line v. Nor. Car. Com., 206 U. S. 1; People v. Butler Street Foundry, 201 Illinois, 236, 250; Attorney General v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 160 Massachusetts, 62; Chicago Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 173 Indiana, 469; Central Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. Supp. 837; Larabee v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 74 Kansas, 808; State v. Jack, 69 Kansas, 387; Beardsley v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 15 App. Div. 251; Purdy v. Erie R. Co., 162 N. Y. 42; N. J. Fruit Exch. v. Railroad Co., 2 I. C. C. 84, 86; Hastings v. Railroad Co., 11 I. C. C. 675, 682; Farmers' Club v. Railroad Co., 12 I. C. C. 351.

Railroads are subject as to their state business to state regulation which may be exerted directly by the legislative authority or by administrative bodies, endowed with power to that end. Calvert, Regulation of Commerce, p. 75; Beale & Wyman, Railroad Rates, § 1307; Noyes, American Railroad Rates, 206; Cooke on Commerce Clause, § 23; Chicago R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174; C., M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204;

230 U.S.

Argument for Appellees.

Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 413; St. Louis v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Dinsmore v. Southern Exp. Co., 183 U. S. 115; McLean v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 49; Ware v. Mobile Co., 209 U. S. 405; Gulf, Col. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403; Atlantic Coast Line v. Nor. Car. Corp. Com., 206 U. S. 1, 19; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211; State v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Kansas, 467 (aff'd 216 U. S. 262); Southern Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 42 Ind. App. 90; Commissioner v. Wabash Ry. Co., 123 Michigan, 669 (aff'd 126 Michigan, 113); Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 393; Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321; McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543; Mo., K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 635; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Penna. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 394; Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 220 U. S. 277; Oklahoma v. Chicago & Rock Island Ry., 220 U. S. 302.

A state law regulating a subject of Federal jurisdiction would be void and a Federal law regulating a subject of state jurisdiction is also void. Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514; Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463.

The Federal Government has no authority over transportation which begins and ends in a particular State. Baer Bros. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 13 I. C. C. 329; Hussey v. C'., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 366; Haines v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 214; Chandler Cotton Co. v. Fort Smith Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 473; Morgan v. M., K. & T. Ry. ('o., 12 I. C. C. 525; Montgomery Freight Bureau v. Weslern Ry., 14 I. C. C. 150; Marshall Oil Co. v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 210; Lincoln Commercial Club v. C., R. I. & P. Co., 13 I. C. C. 319; Saunders & Co. v. Southern Exp. Co., 18 I. C. C. 415, 422; Gulf, Colo. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 525; Michigan