lawful merchandise but must accept them and name to the shipper
the rate of transportation. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 340.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
El Paso &c. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, distinguished in Butts
v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 126.
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, distinguished in Owensboro v.
Cumberland Telephone Co., 58.
St. Clair Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63, distinguished in Owens-
boro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 58.
Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Commission, 206 U. S. 1, followed
in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 340.
Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 225, followed in Jackson v. United
States, 1.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, followed in Butts v. Merchants' & Miners'
Transportation Co., 126.
Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, followed in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co. v. Conley, 513.
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, followed in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Tucker, 340.
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, followed in Arizona
Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 46.
Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, followed in Hughes v. United
States, 24.
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, followed in Missouri Rate Cases,
474; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 513; Oregon R. R. & N.
Co. v. Campbell, 525; Allen v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 553.
Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 474, followed in Knott v. St. Louis, K. C.
& C. R. R. Co., 512.
Omaha & Council Bluffs Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 230 U. S.
324, followed in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 513.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, followed
in Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 247.
Rosaly v. Graham, 227 U. S. 584, followed in Ochoa v. Hernandez, 139.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, followed in Minnesota Rate Cases, 352.
Southern Pacific Railroad v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, followed in
Nalle v. Oyster, 165.
Southern Railway v. Tift, 206 U. S. 434, followed in Morrisdale Coat Co,
v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 304.
Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, followed in Butts v. Merchants' &
Miners' Transportation Co., 126.
White v. Nichols, 3 How. 266, followed in Nulle v. Oyster, 165.
CIRCUIT COURTS.
See JURISDICTION, C.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
See JURISDICTION, A 3, B.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.
1. Intent of Congress as to uniform operation.
This court holds that it was the evident intent of Congress in enacting
the Civil Rights Act to provide for its uniform operation in all
places in the States as well as the Territories within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, and that it was not the intent of Congress
that the provisions of the statute should be applicable only to such
places as are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Gov-
ernment. Butts v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 126.
2. Separableness of provisions; operation in places under exclusive juris-
diction of National Government.
The provisions of the Civil Rights Act having been declared uncon-
stitutional as to their operation within the States, Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3, they are not separable as to their operation in
such places as are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Government and the statute is therefore unconstitutional in its
cntirety. (The Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82). Ib.
3. Enforcement in one jurisdiction although invalid in another; remedial
statutes distinguished.
The enforcement of a remedial statute, such as the Employers' Liability
Act, in Territories of the United States, although unconstitutional
as to the States, is distinguishable from the similar enforcement of
a highly penal statute such as the Civil Rights Act. El Paso &c.
Railway Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, distinguished. Ib.
CLASSIFICATION FOR REGULATION.
See RATE REGULATION, 24, 25, 26.
The commerce that is confined within one State, and does not affect
other States, is reserved to the State. This reservation is only of
that power which is consistent with the grant to Congress. The
Minnesota Rate Cases, 352.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
RATE REGULATION.
COMMON CARRIERS.
See CARRIERS;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
RATE REGULATION.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
See QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
CONFISCATION.
See RATE REGULATION.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See CONGRESS, Powers of;
STATES, 1.
CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
Paramount authority; displacement of local laws.
The paramount authority of Congress enables it to intervene at its
discretion for the complete and effective government of that which
has been committed to its care, and, for this purpose and to this
extent, in response to a conviction of national need, Congress may
displace local laws by substituting laws of its own. The Minnesota
Rate Cases, 352.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 10, 11;
RATE REGULATION, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7;
STATES, 1, 3.
1. Ciril action for; when maintainable.
No civil action lies for a conspiracy, unless there be an overt act that
results in damage to the plaintiff. Nalle v. Oyster, 165.
2. Civil action for; overt act; what constitutes.
Publication of a privileged statement in an action as an essential part
of a pleading by several defendants members of an official body
held in this case not to be an overt act of a conspiracy. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Commerce clause. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 9;
1. Contract impairment; effect of municipal ordinance abrogating street
rights granted to public service corporation.
An ordinance requiring a telephone corporation to remove from the
streets its poles and wires which had been placed there under a
former ordinance granting permission so to do without specifying
any period, or else pay a rental not prescribed in the original or-
dinance, held unconstitutional under the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution. Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13,
dis-
tinguished. Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 58.
2. Contract impairment; municipal grants within protection against.
There is a distinction between a definite grant for a period longer than
the law of the State permits and an indefinite grant; while the
former may be altogether void as an effort to obtain that which is
illegal, the latter is simply limited in duration to the period estab-
lished by law, and during that time it is protected from impair-
ment by the contract clause of the Constitution of the United
States. Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 84.
3. Contract impairment; effect of municipal ordinance imposing addi-
tional obligations on assignee of grantee of easement in streets.
The municipal ordinance of a town in Idaho imposing additional obliga-
tions on a corporation holding by assignment an easement granted
by a former municipal ordinance within fifty years for use of the
streets for water mains held an unconstitutional impairment of the
obligation of the contract of the former ordinance. Ib.
4. Contract impairment; rights protected against; street rights granted to
public service corporation.
Rights acquired under an ordinance granting the right to a water com-
pany to lay and maintain pipes in the streets is a substantial prop-
erty right, with all the attributes of property; and the obligation of
the contract in the ordinance on which it is based is protected
against impairment by the contract clause of the Constitution of
United States. Ib.
5. Contract impairment; rights protected against; street rights granted to
public service corporation; status of successor.
Where, under the statutes of the State, a corporation formed by con-
solidation of several previously existing corporations becomes by
express terms vested with all the assets of such constituent cor-
porations, rights in the streets under municipal ordinances pass
to the new corporation, and such rights are protected against im-
pairment by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.
Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 58.
6. Contract impairment; effect of municipal ordinance requiring electric
company to remove wires and poles from streets.
An ordinance, not based upon necessities of the municipality, requir-
ing an electric light company to remove its poles and wires held,
in this case, to be an arbitrary impairment of the contract of the
original ordinance granting the right in perpetuity and therefore
void because unconstitutional under the contract clause of the
Constitution of the United States. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha,
100.
7. Contract impairment; effect of municipal ordinance requiring public
service corporation to discontinue service theretofore acquiesced in by
municipality.
Acquiescence by the municipality in the extension of a franchise for
electric light to distribution of electricity for power and heat evi-
denced, as in this case, by collection of taxes imposed on receipts
therefrom and the purchase by the city of current for power, held,
to entitle those who had advanced money on the security of the
franchise to insist upon the recognition and continuation of the
right of the corporation to supply electricity for power and heat
as well as light; and an ordinance requiring the corporation to dis-
continue such distribution of heat and power is void under the
contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 12, 13.
8. Due process of law defined.
While the exact definition of the term "due process of law" may be
uncertain, it is certain that it inhibits the taking of one man's prop-
erty and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes
of procedure, and without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Ochoa v. Hernandez, 139.
9. Due process of law; deprivation of property without; effect of military
order reducing period for title to real estate in Porto Rico.
The provision in the judicial order of General Henry published April 7,
1899, during the military occupation of Porto Rico by the United
States, reducing the period for prescriptive title to real estate in
that island from the periods previously established by law down to
six years with retroactive effect and without any opportunity for
third parties to be heard, amounted to a deprivation of property of
the actual owners without due process of law and was beyond the
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