FORAKER ACT.
See JURISDICTION, A 4;
PORTO RICO, 3.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
RATE REGULATION, 24, 26, 41, 42.
FRANCHISES.
Sce CORPORATIONS, 2;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.
See COURTS, 4.
Limitations on; effect of order beyond authority of person making it.
Where the limitations on a person exercising authority are notorious
and are simply in accord with national and international law, there
is no hardship in applying the rule that rights cannot be acquired
under orders made by such person which are wholly beyond his
authority. Ochoa v. Hernandez, 139.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2;
GRANTOR AND GRANTEE.
See PORTO RICO, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2-7;
CORPORATIONS, 1, 2;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
HEPBURN ACT.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 16.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-7.
INJUNCTION.
Sec EQUITY, 2, 3;
RATE REGULATION, 19, 32.
1. Act to Regulate; scope of.
Congress in the Act to Regulate Commerce expressly provided that
the provisions of the act should not extend to transportation wholly
within one State. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 352.
2. Act to Regulate; functions of court as to.
It is the function of the court to interpret and apply the law already
enacted, but not, under the guise of construction, to provide a
more comprehensive scheme of regulation than Congress has de-
cided upon. Ib.
3. Carriers embraced by Act to Regulate; how determined.
In terms the Act applies to all carriers engaged in the transportation
of passengers or property by railroad, and the scope of the Act de-
pends on the definition of the word "railroad" as used in 1887
when the Act was originally passed. Omaha Stret Ry. Co. v. In-
terstate Com. Comm., 324.
4. Carriers embraced by Act to Regulate; street passenger railways not
within.
Street railways for passengers only, as they existed in 1887, were not
within the contemplation of Congress in passing the Act to Regu-
late Commerce, such railroads are not subject to its provisions
or under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
even though they carry passengers across the state line. Ib.
5. Carriers embraced by Act to Regulate; quare as 'o effect of act of June 18,
1910.
Quare to what extent since the passage of the act of June 18, 1910,
interstate railways doing passenger, freight and express business
are now under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and if so, to what extent. Ib.
6. Car distribution; discrimination in; preliminary action by Commission
prerequisite to resort to courts.
Without preliminary action by the Interstate Commerce Commission
declaring that the carrier had, by the rule adopted in regard to dis-
tribution of cars, discriminated against a shipper in such distribu-
tion, the Federal courts have no jurisdiction of a suit by such
shipper for damages alleged to be occasioned by undue discrimina-
tion against him and undue preference in favor of his competitor.
Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 304.
7. Car distribution; reasonableness jor determination of Commission.
The question as to the reasonableness of a rule of car distribution is
administrative in its character and calls for the exercise of the
powers and discretion conferred by Congress upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Ib.
8. Car distribution; discrimination in; limitation of actions for.
Where the alleged discriminations in distribution of cars occurred
more than two years before its commencement, the action cannot
be stayed to permit an application to the Interstate Commerce
Commission as under the act of June 29, 1906, all of such claims
are barred after two years. (Southern Railway v. Tift, 206 U. S.
434.) Ib.
9. Constitutional provision; automatic operation to secure against state
interference.
Even without action by Congress, the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution necessarily excludes the States from direct control of sub-
jects embraced within the clause which are of such a nature that,
if regulated at all, their regulation should be prescribed by a single
authority. There is thus secured the essential immunity of inter-
state intercourse from the imposition by the States of direct bur-
dens and restraints. The Minnesota Rate Cases. 352.
10. Federal control to exclusion of state interference.
The Federal Constitution gives Congress an authority at all times
adequate to secure the freedom of interstate commercial inter-
course from state control and to provide effective regulation of that
intercourse as the National interest may demand. Ib.
11. Federal control over; effect of commingling interstate and intrastate
operations.
The authority of Congress extends to every part of interstate com-
merce and to every instrumentality or agency by which it is carried
on; and the full control by Congress over the subjects committed
to its regulation is not to be denied or thwarted by the commingling
of interstate and intrastate operations. Ib.
12. Penal nature of Act to Regulate; measure of damage for private injury
not determined by.
While the Act to Regulate Commerce is in many respects highly penal
there is no fixed measure of damages in favor of a shipper compelled
to pay the published tariff rate while his favored competitors are
given a lesser rate by means of rebates. Neither the American nor
English decisions are authority for such a rule as to the measure
of damages. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 184.
13. Penal nature of Act to Regulate; measure of damage for private injury.
The Act to Regulate Commerce imposes on the carrier heavy penalties
for its violations payable to Government and independent of the
amount of rebatès paid, and is thus a terror to evil doers; but for
private wrongs by which private injury is inflicted the compensa-
tion recoverable by the injured shipper is measured by the damages
actually sustained and proved. Ib.
14. Rates; when question as to, one for Commission and when one for
courts.
Under the Act to Regulate Commerce while reasonableness of rates
and permissible discriminations based upon differences in condi-
tions are administrative matters for the Commission, the courts
have jurisdiction to determine whether differentials in rates can
be allowed for the same commodity under similar conditions of
traffic, on account of differences in the disposition of the conimod-
ity. Ib.
15. Rates and allowances; Commission as tribunal to determine reason-
ableness.
There is a necessity, which is recognized by the Act to Regulate Com-
merce, of having questions as to reasonableness of rates and allow-
ances settled by a single tribunal in order to avoid the conflicting
decisions which would result if several different tribunals could
pass upon the same question; and the act itself has designated the
Interstate Commerce Commission as that tribunal. Mitchell Coal
Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 247.
16. Rebates; effect of Hepburn Act on arrangements made prior thereto.
A carrier can only charge the published rate for the same article and
when collected cannot pay back any part thereof under any pre-
tense, however equitable, to any shipper or to every shipper; and
so held that carriers could not after the passage of the Hepburn
Act continue to give rebates to shippers pursuant to arrangements
made prior to the act on merchandise which the shippers had con-
tracted to sell before that time. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. In-
ternational Coal Co., 184.
17. Rebating; purchase of land by; prohibited.
Carriers, whether saw-mill companies or railroads or both combined,
cannot purchase land by rebating to the grantor a part of the
freight rate on interstate shipments over the road built on the right
of way. Fourche River Lumber Co. v. Bryant Lumber Co., 316.
18. Rebating; purchase of land by; illegality.
A rebate made for purchase of land is illegal even though much less
than the value of the land acquired. Ib.
19. Rebating; evasion of prohibitions against.
The prohibitions of the Act to Regulate Commerce against rebates
cannot be evaded by calling them differentials or concessions, nor
by taking the money from a corporation that is the same as the re-
bating carrier. Ib.
20. Services by shipper; recovery for discrimination resulting from un-
reasonable payment for; jurisdiction of courts.
The courts have not jurisdiction of a suit brought by a shipper against
a carrier for damages by reason of paying other shippers of similar
goods an unreasonable amount for services in connection with such
transportation unless and until there has been a finding by the
Interstate Commerce Commission that the payments so made to
the other shippers were unreasonably large. Mitchell Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 247.
21. Services of shipper; payment for; right of carrier as to.
A carrier has the right under the Act to Regulate Commerce to pay
shippers a reasonable allowance for services in connection with
transportation of goods shipped by them, and the allowance paid
must be treated by the courts as prima facie reasonable until the
Interstate Commerce Commission has determined otherwise. Ib.
22. Services of shipper; allowances for lateral hauling; jurisdiction to de-
termine reasonableness.
Allowances for lateral hauling may be lawfully paid, as they become
unlawful only when unreasonable; whether unreasonable either
past or future is a rate-making question over which the courts have
no jurisdiction, even if the parties attempt to give it by consent.
Ib.
23. Services of shipper; allowances for lateral hauling; determination of
reasonableness for Commission as prerequisite to resort to courts.
This action, having been commenced without any application having
been made to the Interstate Commerce Commission to declare un-
reasonable the allowances paid by the carrier for lateral hauling,
the case must be remanded for dismissal, but the dismissal is
VOL. CCXXX-37
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