the bar in every county of the State, and, in many instances, by nearly the entire bar of the county. These petitions are identical in form and language and state as the reason for supporting his petition, that they believe he "has been sufficiently punished for the cause for which he was removed, and that the ends of justice will be met if he is reinstated in said offices." These petitions of the bar, so numerously signed, demand, and have received, the careful consideration of this court. It is to be observed that the petition of Mr. Enright, and the petitions of the bar in support of it, all proceed upon the ground that the judgment of disbarment had for its sole object the punishment of Mr. Enright for the offense found against him, as an attorney, and that the punishment has been sufficiently severe for that single offense. The argument in the petitioner's behalf, by the oldest practicing member of the bar, has proceeded upon that ground alone. We do not doubt but that this court has the power, on a proper cause shown, to set aside the judgment of disbarment. To determine whether a proper cause is shown to set that judgment aside, we must consider the object and purpose of admission to the bar, and the scope and end to be accomplished by a judgment of disbarment. By admission to the bar, the applicant becomes an officer of the court, endowed with certain peculiar privileges which amount to a sacred trust. The oath of office places him under the highest obligation known to the law, among other things, to do no falsehood, nor to consent that any be done in court, that he will act in the office of attorney within the court, according to his best learning and discretion, with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to his client. The ultimate end sought to be accomplished by courts is, to ascertain the truth in regard to the matter in controversy, and thereon adjudge and award to the parties their respective rights. By becoming an officer of the court, as well as by his oath of attorney, he binds himself to put forth his best endeavors to accomplish these ends. Hence

the wide scope and clear, searching provisions of his oath. The court is empowered, by rules, to make provisions for admission to the bar, only of such persons, in character and in knowledge, as will help the court in accomplishing the ends for which they are established. Among these rules,— and they would not accomplish the desired ends unless there was such a rule,—is one requiring that all applicants for admission shall establish that they are of good moral character. By his admission, the court endorse the applicant and hold him out as possessing the knowledge and character requisite to render him a worthy member of the bar. The ends to be accomplished through courts and its officers, the attorneys, being the establishment of the truth, in regard to the matter in hand, and the rights of the parties according to such truth, absolutely forbid the use of falsehood and deception in any of the proceedings connected therewith. When an attorney, one of its officers, is charged with unprofessional conduct and the court institutes inquiry in regard to the truth of the charge or charges, it is not mainly for the purpose of punishing him, but to ascertain whether he has violated the trust reposed in him. If the charges are found established and show such misconduct in his office as amounts to a violation of his trust, it then becomes the duty of the court to remove him from the office of an attorney, not primarily as a punishment to him, but as a protection to the court and community. Such is the scope of the judgment rendered in Mr. Enright's case, as found in the 67th Vt. It is not claimed that the misconduct there found established against him is untrue, nor that it did not go to the essence of his right to be an attorney, nor that he was unjustly removed from the office of attorney. The cause set forth, in all these petitions, does not touch the real grounds of the judgment of disbarment then rendered, nor furnish an adequate reason for disturbing it. That judgment establishes a serious impeachment of Mr. Enright's moral character, shown in

his conduct as an attorney. To restore him to the office of an attorney for the reasons set forth in the petition would, in effect, abrogate the rule requiring the applicant for admission as an attorney to establish that he is of good moral character and furnish Mr. Enright an opportunity to repeat the commission of the same offense for which he was disbarred, and of other offenses of like character. If the present was his original application for admission to the bar, he could not be admitted, without more being shown than is contained in these petitions.

In these views all the members of the court concur.

The petition is dismissed.

LORD, STONE & Co. vs. WILLIAM H. BUCHANAN.

January Term, 1897.

Present: TAFT, ROWELL, TYLER, MUNSON and START JJ.

Trespass and Trover-General and Special Owners.

The special owner in possession of a chattel may recover in trespass or trover its full value against a stranger who unlawfully removes and converts it, the action being presumed to be with the consent of the general owner and the recovery being for his benefit to the extent of his interest. Consequently when such a recovery has been had it is a bar to an action of the same nature in behalf of the general owner.

TRESPASS AND TROVER. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the March Term, 1896, Washington County, Ross, C. J., presiding. Upon the facts found, which are sufficiently recited in the opinion, judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiffs excepted.

T. R. Gordon and G. W. Wing for the plaintiffs.
Frank J. Martin for the defendant.

TYLER, J. The plaintiffs sold a stove to a Mrs. Harroun by the following contract:

"BERLIN, VT., Sept. 27th, 1894. For value received I promise to pay Lord, Stone & Co., or bearer, the first day of November, February, May and August next, thirty-two dollars with interest. The consideration of this note is one model crown portable cooking range which I have received of said Lord, Stone & Co.; nevertheless, it is understood and agreed between the undersigned and said Lord, Stone & Co. that the title of the above mentioned property does not pass to me, and until this note is paid the title to the aforesaid property shall remain with the said Lord, Stone & Co., who shall have the right, in case of non-payment at maturity of said note, without process of law, to enter and retake, and may enter and retake immediate possession of said property wherever may be and remove the same.

it

MRS. J. HARROUN."

The defendant, as a public officer, in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage against the vendee's husband, entered her dwelling-house, took the stove and duly advertised and sold it, the plaintiffs and the vendee making known to the defendant their respective claims and forbidding the sale.

The vendee sued the defendant in trespass for breaking and entering her dwelling-house, converting the stove to his use and depriving her thereof. Judgment was rendered for her to recover the value of the property and special damages, and no exception was taken. This suit was brought a few days later, is in trespass and trover, and special damages are alleged for that "the plaintiffs were for a long time prevented from transacting their necessary business and were put to great trouble and expense in being deprived of the stove."

During the trial the defendant conceded that the stove in controversy was not the one included in the mortgage and did not seek to justify the taking.

The plaintiffs claim that they held the title to the stove, and as there was an overdue payment, that they were entitled to the possession; that the taking was an invasion of their right for which they should have at least nominal damages. The vendee had possession of the property and an interest in it, and was entitled to recover the full value thereof and her damages. Harker v. Dement, 52 Am. Dec. 670 and notes; White v. Bascom, 28 Vt. 268. It is said in the latter case that naked possession is sufficient against all the world except him who has a superior title, and that where the suit is brought by the special owner, the law presumes it is by consent of the general owner who alone can interfere, and that what is recovered by the special owner above his interest is held by him in trust for the general owner.

The question is whether the plaintiffs can recover the damages which they suffered in consequence of the defendant's wrongful act. The rule is, that to entitle a plaintiff to maintain trespass or trover he must, at the time of the taking, have either the actual possession, or the title, with the right of present possession. Hurd v. Fleming, 34 Vt. 169. This rule is stated in substance in I Chit. Pl. 48, and it is there said that though the action may be brought by the general or special owner against a stranger, yet both actions cannot be supported at the same time, and that when the general owner has not the right of immediate possession, as where he has demised goods for a term, he cannot maintain trespass or trover even against a stranger; though if the injury were sufficient to affect his reversionary interest he may support a special action on the case; and a recovery in an action by the party having a possessory interest would be no bar to an action for an injury to the reversionary interest.

In this case the plaintiffs cannot recover the special damages found by the trial court for the reason that they are not declared for. They in fact only claim nominal damages, which would be for the unlawful taking of the