over, and by the judgment the defendant is not made liable for anything for the reason of non-collection of taxes, and nothing appears in the case which made it the duty of the town treasurer to notify the surety of any misapplication of the funds of the town, or that he had paid any funds to the town without making an application thereof. This disposes of all questions made by the defendant; The pro forma judgment is reversed, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the amount shown due by the report with interest since the bringing of the suit. The exceptions of both parties being overruled neither is allowed costs in this court. STATE US. ADDIE SHATTUCK. May Term, 1897. Present: Ross, C. J., ROWELL, Tyler, Start and THOMPSON, JJ. Adultery-Out-of-State Marriage-Statute Forbidding Remarriage. The guilty party to a decree of divorce, forbidden by our statute to remarry, may nevertheless remarry in New Hampshire, the laws of that state permitting, and the marriage will be recognized here, although both parties to the new marriage were all the while domiciled in this State. The presumption is that the common law of a sister state is the same as our own, and statutes in restraint of marriage being exceptional, their existence is not to be presumed. INFORMATION for adultery. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1896, Windsor County, Munson, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty. Judgment, sentence and execution thereon at request of the respondent without waiving exceptions. The respondent excepted. W. B. C. Stickney for the respondent. It was for the State to show that Coburn was competent to marry by the laws of New Hampshire. It was an essential fact, and there is no presumption. Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581, 586. As to the law of New Hampshire, see True v. Ranney, 21 N. H. 52: 53 Am. Dec. 164; Emerson v. Shaw, 56 N. H. 418. The New Hampshire marriage was illegal in Vermont. V. S. 2703, 2704, 5056. The statute does not limit the disqualification. The correct principle is, that if a marriage is absolutely prohibited in any country as being contrary to public policy and leading to social evils, the domiciled inhabitants of that country cannot be permitted, by passing the frontier and entering another state, in which the marriage is not prohibited, to celebrate a marriage forbidden in their own state, and immediately returning to their own state to insist on their marriage being recognized as lawful. Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 219; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244: 2 L. R. A. 703; Barney v. Cuness, 68 Vt. 51. J. G. Harvey, State's Attorney, and W. W. Stickney, for the State. A marriage, valid where it is contracted, is valid here, although the parties intended to evade our laws, unless the statutes declare such a marriage void or the marriage is deemed contrary to the law of nature. II Kent, Com. 91; Com. v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602; Roberts v. Railroad Co., 34 Hun. 324; Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerg. 110: 24 Am. Dec. 444; West Cambridge v. Lexington, 1 Pick. 505: 11 Am. Dec. 231; Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met. 451; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. 193; Dannelli v. Dannelli, 4 Bush. 61; Van Storch v. Griffin, 71 Pa. 240; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157: 8 Am. Dec. 131; Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts. 158: 36 Am. Dec. 158; State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. 346: 38 Am. Dec. 699; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18: 40 The Vermont statute contains no express prohibition of such a marriage as this, and Ovitt v. Smith, 68 Vt. 35, where the marriage was celebrated in this State, has no application. V. S. 2703, 2704. ROWELL, J. The charge is that the prisoner, an unmarried woman, committed adultery with Coburn, a married man. It appeared that Coburn's first wife, who is still living, obtained a divorce from him in this State in December, 1895; that on June 13, 1896, he and Grace Hoisington, both of whom were then domiciled in Windsor, in this State, went to Claremont, New Hampshire, and were there married by a clergyman authorized by the law of that state to solemnize marriages; and that immediately after the marriage they returned to Windsor, where they have lived ever since, and where they first cohabited as husband and wife, never having cohabited as such in New Hampshire. The only evidence of the law of New Hampshire respecting marriages was chapter 174 of the Public Statutes of that state, entitled, "Marriages." That chapter imposes no restraint upon remarriage by the guilty party to a decree of divorce. The court charged the jury that if it found that the marriage ceremony was performed by the clergyman, and that he was authorized to perform it, as his testimony tended to show, and also found that the said Grace cohabited with Coburn under the belief that the marriage was legal, as her testimony tended to show,-the marriage was valid, and Coburn was a person with whom the crime of adultery could have been committed. To this the prisoner excepted; and also, for that the court did not charge that there was no evidence in the case to show that Coburn, being disqualified by the laws of this State to contract a lawful marriage, was, notwithstanding such disqualification, competent by the laws of New Hampshire to contract a lawful marriage, and that without such testimony, the fact of his marriage to said Grace was not made out. This last exception is not sustainable. As we have said, the chapter of the New Hampshire statutes put in evidence is not restrictive in this behalf; and if it be said that some other part of the statutes may be, the answer is, that as such restrictions upon marriage are exceptional, the burden was on the prisoner to show the restriction, if any there is. Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 132. And as no such restriction exists in the common law of this State, the presumption is that the common law of New Hampshire is like ours in this regard. Ward & Co. v. Morrison, 25 Vt. 593, 601. The marriage in question must, therefore, be taken to be valid by the law of New Hampshire. But had it been celebrated in this State, it would been void here, for our statute provides that it shall not be lawful for a divorced libellee to marry a person other than the libellant for three years from the time the divorce is granted, unless the libellant dies, and imposes a penalty on a person who violates that provision, or lives in this State under a marriage relation forbidden by it; and we have recently held that a marriage celebration in this State in violation thereof, between parties domiciled here, was void here. Ovitt v. Smith, 68 Vt. 35. The prisoner claims that this marriage is void here notwithstanding it was celebrated in New Hampshire and is valid there, for that when a marriage is absolutely prohibited in a state or country as being contrary to public policy and leading to social evils, the domiciled inhabitants of that state or country cannot be permitted, by passing the frontier and entering another state in which the marriage is not prohibited, to celebrate a marriage forbidden in their own state, and immediately return to their own state, to insist on their marriage being recognized as lawful. It is the common law of Christendom, that as to form and ceremony, a marriage good where celebrated is good everywhere. But as to capacity to marry, the authorities are not agreed, some holding that, as in other contracts, it depends upon the law of domicil, and some, that it depends upon the law of the place where the marriage is solemnized, as do form and ceremony, and that a marriage good where celebrated is good everywhere, unless odious by the common consent of nations, or positively prohibited by the public law of a country from motives of policy. It is undoubtedly true that states may control this matter by statute, as Massachusetts does, where it is enacted that when persons resident in that state, in order to evade its marriage laws, and with an intention of returning to reside there, go into another state or country and are married, and afterwards return and reside in Massachusetts, the marriage shall be deemed void. We have no such express provision. The language of our statute is general, and it is a fundamental rule that no statute whether relating to marriage or otherwise, if in the ordinary general form of words, will be given effect outside of the state or country enacting it. To bind even citizens abroad, it must include them, either in express terms or by necessary implication. Hence if a statute, silent as to marriages abroad, as ours is, prohibits classes of persons from marrying generally, or from intermarrying, or declares void all marriages not celebrated according to prescribed forms, it has no effect upon marriages, even of domiciled inhabitants, entered into out of the state. Those marriages are to be judged of by the courts of such state just as though the statute did not exist. If they are valid by the international law of marriage and the local law of the place where celebrated, they are valid by the law of such state, and the statute has nothing to do with the question, |