6 A MOTION TO COMMIT. [COMMUNICATED.] ON Thursday the 22nd, Mr. Glasse, Q. C., instructed by Messrs. England and Co., of Hull, moved before Malins, V.C., to commit the publishers of the Weekly Register and Eastern Morning News newspaper, for contempt in publishing an article reflecting upon the plaintiff in the suit of Saurin v. Starr and others. Mr. Bury, who appeared for the Weekly Register, apologised and made submission to the court, and an order was made directing the publisher of that paper to pay all the costs of the application. Martineau, instructed by Messrs. Rollit and Mr. Son, appeared for the Eastern Morning News, the Hull daily paper, and read an affidavit by Mr. Hunt, the publisher, stating that the the Weekly Register; that he had merely repubarticle in question had originally appeared in lished it as an extract, with the name of the original paper attached; that this was done inadvertently and in accordance with the universal practice in newspaper offices, and that he had similarly published numerous articles in favour of Miss Saurin. The affidavit also stated that the first intimation Mr. Hunt had received of any cause of complaint, was the service upon him of the notice of motion to commit by a clerk in the office of the plaintiff's solicitors, and that he had at the earliest opportunity afterwards inserted an ample expression of regret for any inadvertent injury. Under these circumstances Mr. Martineau contended that Mr. Hunt ought not to be visited with the entire costs, and cited Mostyn v. Tich horne (Weekly Notes 1867) and Daw v. Eley (Ib. 1868). Mr. Glasse pressing for costs, his Honour asked why Mr. Hunt had not been written to in the first instance, as an apology might have been obtained at once, but said he thought the costs were not pressed for in the Tichborne case. Mr. Martineau said he thought such was not the case, but immediately his client had received Honour in delivering judgment said the publisher notice of any complaint he had apologised. His of the Weekly Register, in which the article had first appeared, must pay all the costs. Mr. Hunt, however, had acted in a most becoming and honourable manner, so soon as he was apprised of any complaint, though with some want of discretion in the first instance. Such articles could, however, only be copied at the peril of the publisher, if the matter was brought to the notice of the court; but he thought justice would be done in this case by merely ordering Mr. Hunt to pay the costs of the application, from which he should except those of any affidavits sworn after the publication of the apology by him. We certainly think Mr. Hunt had reason to complain of somewhat discourteous and unusual treatment on the part of the plaintiff's solicitors. The service of notice to commit, in the first instance, in lieu of the usual letter of complaint, is even more surprising than the pressure for costs, the motive of which seems inexplicable, and at variance apparently with the course pursued in previous cases. It is certainly usual in the Profession to acquaint those who may have rendered themselves liable to proceedings of the nature of the complaint against them, to afford them an opportunity of making reparation. This seems to have been denied Mr. Hunt, and has afforded him, we think, just ground of complaint. ELECTION LAW. THE LAW TIMES. [MAY 1, 1869. question in the negative, but remarked that public-house, he would be in danger of imperilling whenever a sitting member had a score at a his seat, by giving an opportunity for the presen tation of a petition.' In the present instance, the election was ordered to stand, and costs were the scene of another Conservative triumph. Mr. Sidebotham was confirmed in this return; the judge deciding that though there was bribery in a given against the petitioners. Stalybridge was mild form, by the promise of payment of wages to voters, agency was not sufficiently proved to void boroughs where the charge of direct bribery was the election. deemed to be clearly proved; and though, as usual, Bridgwater was one of the few the judge completely exonerated the Liberal members, Messrs. Vanderbyl and Kinglake, from any tensively, and sentenced the respondents to pay personal complicity, he annulled the election, on the the cost of the petition. At Taunton the plea for ground of corrupt practices having prevailed exthe petitioner, Mr. Henry James, rested substantially on the allegation that a number of votes recorded in Serjeant Cox's favour were vitiated by the payment of what was called barrister's money; that is, of a sum of about five shillings to voters fore the revising barrister. The plea was found for their attendance, or supposed attendance, begood; and Mr. Justice Blackburn decided that the Conservative victory had been unfairly won, and that Mr. James was the rightful representative of Wyllie, the Liberal members, have just been unseated by the learned judge on the ground of their Taunton. At Hereford, again, Messrs. Clive and election having been influenced by corrupt practhis statement, it appears that out of six inquiries tices on the part of their agents. According to held by this judge, four have resulted in the success of the petitioners. By his decision two out of their seats, while two Conservatives have Conservatives and four Liberals have been turned been confirmed in their elections. But notwithMr. Justice Willes in holding that in no single standing the severity of his decisions, Mr. Justice instance was the member whose return has been Blackburn has agreed with Baron Martin and successfully disputed cognisant of the corrupt practices which led to the loss of his seat. dence explains itself. The question of residence on the evidence. Where the names of persons is a matter of fact which the judge will decide appear in the list of voters, although struck off by the revising barrister, and those persons voted, it would seem doubtful whether the judge has any power to amend. It is competent to the judge to deal with objections actually taken and overruled by the revising barrister. The petitioners in preparing their lists did not refer to persons who had not paid their rates before July into, as it was one which must have come before 31: Held, that the matter could not be gone the revising barrister. An objection of double occupancy is one which should be taken before the revising barrister, and if not then taken votes are tendered and rejected at the poll they cannot be raised before the judge. Where good will be added on the scrutiny. Persons making threats through other persons, and persons through whom they are made are guilty of a misdemeanor, and their votes are bad, and will be struck off on a scrutiny: (Oldham Election Petition, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 302. Blackburn, J.) the petitioners, finding that the respondents had PRACTICE-COSTS.-At the trial of the petition a class of objections which petitioners had thought it undesirable to bring forward, applied to add a list of particulars. An order to that effect was accordingly made by the judge: Held, that the petitioners having failed, must pay the costs in respect of that class. Two classes of petitioners' objections, allowed by judge's order, were rejected, improperly as they alleged, by the judge at the trial. Had it been known that these classes would have been rejected, the petitioners inquiry to such length. The petitioners also stated that they should not have protracted the proved at the trial two cases of mild bribery and person. But the judge being of opinion that two cases of intimidation by an unauthorised the petitioners would, in the event named, have prosecuted the inquiry as far as they could, and that the respondents, not having exhausted their objections, might have recriminated and proved bribery and intimidation at the trial: Held, that the order that the costs should follow the event SAYINGS AND DOINGS OF THE could not be varied: (The Oldham Petition, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 329. Blackburn, J.) Correspondence. TAUNTON PETITION.-Mr. Serjeant Cox answers my question, but he does not favour us with particulars of that it most concerns the Profession to learn-who were the persons guilty of the breach him and his legal advisers, of which he complains, of professional honour and good faith towards and what are the specific acts of which they were guilty. This is a professional question in which we are all concerned, for it strikes at the root of professional confidence. I hope the learned serjeant will favour us with full particulars. CAVEAT EMPTOR. ELECTION PETITIONS.-The two special cases out of the seventy election petitions arising out of the late general election have been appointed to be argued in the Court of Common Pleas on Wednesday next. The cases are New Sarum and Manchester. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. THE HANGING JUDGE.-We extract the followSCRUTINY-OPENING REGISTER-PROCEDURE ing from an able article on -PARTICULARS-RECEIPT OF PAROCHIAL RE- matters the unseating of a member may be re"The Election Petitions," in St. Paul's:-"If in electioneering LIEF- - PERSONATION RESIDENCE POWER TO AMEND BARRISTER'S LIST-NON- death, we describe Mr. Justice Blackburn as a JUDGE'S garded as the legal equivalent of punishment by PAYMENT OF RATES-DOUBLE OCCUPANCY-TEN-hanging judge.' It may be that the cases subDERED VOTES-INTIMIDATION.-There were four candidates, H., P., and C., of whom two, H. and P., were returned. C. and S. petitioned against their return. C. was in a minority of six as regarded P., and of twenty four as regarded H. S. was in a minority of thirty-eight as regarded P., and of fifty-six as regarded H.: Held, that the best course to pursue was for the petitioners to put C. in a majority over P., and then for the respondents to attack the votes of the petitioners; and that if C. should succeed in beating P., then S. should be left to beat H. The court will not allow any formal objection to the several heads of objection in the lists provided to be given by the 7th of the Regulæ Generales: Semble, if a name is placed on the register any objection should be in the shape of an appeal, as the register is intended to be conclusive. The court will order the books of the overseers to be produced for examination by counsel on either side, for the purpose of showing what voters have received parochial relief. The charge of personation is a matter of fact in which the evi mitted to his jurisdiction have been of a darker COURTS. [CONTRIBUTED BY THE REPORTERS OF THE ROLLS COURT. deserving of notice:The past week has produced the following cases Re The British and South American Steam 66 was an Navigation Company, Ewbank's case, application by Messrs. Ewbank, Schmidt, and Co., of Rio Janeiro, to have their names removed from the list of contributories to this company in respect of 500 shares, which came into their names under the following circumstances:-On the formation of the company in 1864, the post of agents to the company at Rio Janeiro was offered to Ewbank tribute among their friends at Rio 500 shares in and Co., on condition of their undertaking to disthe company. Ewbank and Co. made no application for the shares; and, strictly speaking, there board of directors there was an entry, dated 31st was no allotment, but in the minute book of the hereby allotted to Ewbank, Schmidt, and Co., or Jan. 1865, in these words: "That 500 shares are The words, their nominees, and that the secretary be hereby directed to write them accordingly by next mail. had been done. The 500 shares were, however, through, but there was no evidence by whom this or their nominees " had been struck accepted by Ewbank and Co., and were duly registered in their names, and 17. per share was paid to the company's bankers by Ewbank and Co.'s branch house at Glasgow. In 1866 the company passed and later in the same year it was resolution to wind-up voluntarily, to be wound-up under ordered of the 500 the court. the supervision of No calls had been made in respect knew as early as Oct. 1865 that their names were shares; but Ewbank and Co. took no steps to repudiate their liability till they received notice from the liquidator that they had on the register as holders of these shares, and been placed on the list of contributories. They now asked to have their names removed, on the ground that the shares had been allotted to them merely for the purpose of disposing of them it was contended on behalf of the liquidator, that among their friends at Rio. On the other hand, there was an ulterior condition that Messrs. Ewbank and Co. were themselves to take so many of the shares as they should not succeed in disposing of. His Lordship inferred from the evidence that the shares were allotted for the purpose of distri bution only, and that there was no such ulterior condition as the liquidator contended. Even if a there was such a condition, there would have been an implied contract that a reasonable time should be given them for the distribution of the shares; but such time had not been given, owing to the collapse of the company before it had fairly commenced operations. He was, therefore, of opinion that the names of Messrs. Ewbank and Co. must be removed from the list of contributories; but, under the circumstances, he would give no costs. Beachey v. Hooper was a suit instituted by Mrs. Beachey, a widow, to set aside a deed of settlement on the ground that when she executed the deed she was not aware of its effect. The plaintiff being entitled to a life estate in certain property under her marriage settlement, and to a life or widowhood estate in certain other property under her late husband's will, and being indebted to tradesmen and others in the sum of 7001., applied to the trustees of her marriage settlement to pay her debts out of the trust funds. Thereupon a deed of security and settlement was prepared; such deed was dated the 14th Jan. 1865, and made between the plaintiff of the one part, and the defendants, Hooper and H. G. Beachey, of the other part, and thereby, in consideration of the payment by the defendants, out of the trust funds, of the sum of 7001. in discharge of the plaintiff's debts, the plaintiff assigned to the defendants the rents and income to which she was entitled for her life, to secure the repayment of the sum of 700l. and interest, and the plaintiff thereby covenanted that the defendants should hold the said rents and income upon trust to pay the same to the plaintiff until she should assign, charge, or otherwise dispose of the same by way of anticipation, or until she should be declared bankrupt, and upon the occurrence of any such event, upon certain trusts in favour of the plaintiff's children, and in default of children, upon certain trusts for accumulation; and it was thereby declared that if at any time during the plaintiff's life circumstances should exist which, in the opinion of the defendants, their executors, &c., might justify or render it expedient that such accusations, or any part thereof, should be placed at the disposal of the plaintiff, then the defendants should be at liberty to make any such payment to the plaintiff at their discretion. In May 1867 the plaintiff mortgaged her life-interest to secure payment of a sum of 2001., and she now sought to set aside the deed of Jan. 1865, alleging that, when she executed it, she did so under the impression that it was a deed of security merely, and that she was not aware of the settlement contained in it. His Lordship was of opinion that the deed could not be supported; the plaintiff must pay into court the sum of 7001. secured by the deed; and there must be a decree in the terms of the prayer of the bill. should have taken all steps for the protection of their interests in that suit. The bill must be dismissed. Daw v. Eley was a suit instituted by Mr. G. H. Daw (the winner of the prize recently offered by the Secretary of State for War for cartridges) to restrain the defendants from manufacturing or selling cartridge cases for breech-loading firearms in infringement of the plaintiff's patent for improvements in the manufacture of such cases, by making them of a metal tube formed from a strip of thin rolled sheet metal, bent into a tubular form and having its overlapping edges soldered or cemented together so as to form a perfect tube. The defendants were alleged to have infringed this patent by selling cases of brass lined with paper or thin pasteboard, made after Rochatte's patent, of which the defendants are proprietors. His Lordship said that this was not a subject-matter for a patent. If a patent might be granted for this, it might be granted for anything. To render a patent valid, it must be granted for some invention or some new adaptation; there was nothing of the kind in this instance. It was admitted that the use of metallic tubes for cartridge-cases was known before, the method of cementing the tubes was known before; the principal innovation in Daw's patent was that he made use of thinner metal. This was not the subject of an invention, it was not subject matter for a patent; the bill must therefore be dismissed with costs. V.C. MALIINS' COURT. Daring the past week there has only been one case of any interest; one or two others, however, may be touched upon. The first was Cutler v. Saville, which was a bill filed by the plaintiff a well known West-end tailor, to be absolved from a liability which he had come under by adding his name to a security under these circumstances: Mr. Saville was in partnership with another person, as a printer, and, being in weak health, it was desired that he should retire, and it was agreed that his partner should, on payment of 5000l., take the whole business himself. Not having the money, he applied to his two brothers, who came forward, and the plaintiff, the husband of a sister, added his name to the security then given for that sum. He now sought to be relieved from the liability; but, after a lengthened hearing, Mr. Saville being dead, and his widow standing in his shoes, the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that the plaintiff failed in his contention, and dismissed the bill. The next was a case of Johnson v. Hammons, which, being brought as a short cause, the Vice-Chancellor made some very strong remarks on the discreditable nature of the suit. It was instituted, he said to charge property with a sum of several thousand pounds in favour of an infant thirteen years old, who, on coming of age, repudiated it; also to raise 8007., for which 500l. costs were incurred, and a poor widow, knowing nothing of the circumstances, might be beggared by the costs (it was stated that they might be 1000l.). He should thoroughly investigate the whole matter, and, if he saw fit, fix costs on those who had so improperly acted. Gwynne v. Gell was a suit instituted to make the estate of a trustee answerable for a breach of trust committed by him in allowing the widow of the testator, George Gwynne, to receive the rents of the testator's real estate required for payment of debts, and also to make the widow's estate liable to repay the amount of the rents received by her. By an indenture dated the 26th March, 1836, and made between Samuel Gwynne and Elizabeth, his wife, of the one part, and George Gwynne and Thomas Gwynne, of the other part, Samuel Gwynne assigned his share in the personal estate of his brother, Iltid, deceased, unto George and Thomas, in trust, to invest the same, and hold it upon trust for Samuel and his wife during their lives, and after their death upon trust for such of their children as should attain twenty-one. The plaintiffs in the present suit were three of these children. Thomas Gwynne died insolvent, and George died without having invested the share assigned by the deed of March 1836. By his will he devised certain copyholds and all his freehold hereditaments to trustees upon trust to sell and to pay the proceeds in the first place to his executors in aid of his personal estate, and after the payment of his debts, &c., in trust for wife Sarah Gwynne absolutely. The testator died in 1838. After the execution of his will he became possessed of certain other freeholds, with regard to which he died intestate. All his devised freeholds were sold and applied in accordance with the directions of the will, but the trustees allowed the widow to enter into possession of the devised copyholds. In 1853 Samuel Gwynne and two of the plaintiffs in this suit filed a bill on behalf of them-cated in France, but the mother of Léon on selves and all other the creditors of George Gwynne for the administration of his estate, and it then became known to the plaintiffs that the widow was in possession of the copyholds, but they took no steps to obtain possession of the rents, or to obtain a receiver. The present bill was filed in Nov. 1866. His Lordship said that, assuming that the will of George Gwynne had created a trust, and that the Statute of Limitations did not apply, he was of opinion that the plaintiffs were debarred from recovering by their own laches. It was no excuse for their laches that their interests do not accrue in possession until the death of Samuel Gwynne in 1860. Two of the present plaintiffs were plaintiffs in the former suit, and The case first referred to is that of Pronjé v. Matthews, which in form is to set aside a settlement contained in letters between the plaintiff's wife, Harriet Pronjé, and the defendants, her solicitors, under the most extraordinary circumstances. M. and Mme. Pronjé were married in 1829, with a French settlement, and in 1832 a son was born, Léon; the wife then eloped with one Dunailly to England, was taken back by her husband; again left him, and never afterwards lived with him. She then resided at different places in France, went to India and back several times, joined the firm of Greenfields and Co. at Calcutta, and amassed 8000l. or 10,000l. She then returned to Bordeaux, and entreated her husband to take her back, which he would not do, having meantime solaced himself with another lady, by whom he had several children. Meantime Léon, the son, met and formed an illicit connection in Paris with Julia Camille, who was the wife of another man, of which Léon was said to be ignorant, and had a female child by her, took her to London, and went through the ceremony of marriage with her at St. James's, Westminster. The child was eduseeing the photograph, said it was too ugly to be his child. He then died in India, and Harriet Pronjé having lived in India with a Dr. Cheviot as his wife till his death, came to Bordeaux, remitted nearly 30001. to England to be settled on her grandchild, and left nearly 60001. in securities in a casket in the hands of one Madame Degage. The plaintiff arrived after the funeral and obtained legal possession of the casket, and now sought to set aside a proposed settlement of the 3000l. contained in letters between Harriet Pronjé and ber solicitors, the wife of one of whom was a school friend of hers. The opinions of French advocates were taken, and there was a large mass of evidence, correspondence, &c., of a most singular description, chiefly letters of Harriet Pronjé, not one of her husband's. After a lengthened hearing, the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion on the evidence of the French advocates, that the plaintiff could not succeed on the whole of his claim, but he must take till Trinity Term to consider the question, as the French law was most difficult to interpret. On English law she was clearly entitled to have dealt as she thought proper with property of which her husband knew her to be possessed; but, there being no divorce in France, he had allowed her to amass and deal with it for thirty-one years without interference. It was a most unconscionable claim, which, if successful, might reduce this poor child to beggary, and he trusted that some settlement would be come to. One more case, viz., Overend, Gurney, and Company (Limited) v. Gurney and others, may be noticed. This came on upon a demurrer on the ground that the case involved a common tort, and that the remedy was at law. After considerable argument, the Vice-Chancellor held that a bill involving such grave charges, which for this purpose must be taken to be true, must be answered; and that was held in The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk., and followed by Lord Langdale, in 2 Beav. It had been said that the Lords Justices had that day said that all matters involved in this winding-up could be disposed of summarily; but if such a case as this had been presented, any court would have directed a bill to be filed. demurrer must be overruled, reserving the costs. The bill was filed against the directors involving the identical charges made in the Oake's and Peek's cases, involving the charge of breach of trust. The COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Leverson v. The Queen.-This was the case of the writ of error, brought by Mrs. Leverson otherwise Madame Rachel, to try the question of the correctness of her conviction, and which stands very low down in the Crown paper, and not likely to be reached in the regular course for a considerable time to come. The Solicitor-General applied that it may be advanced, in order that it might receive an earlier determination, as it involved a question of very great and pressing importance as to the administration of justice at the Central Criminal Court, namely, whether the two com missioners who must be present at a trial in that court need be the same two throughout the trial? The same principal Judge, Mr. Commissioner Kerr was present throughout, but not the same other commissioners. Upon the decision in this case will depend the question of whether or not a great number of prisoners have been lawfully convicted. After much consideration (Mr. Mellish appearing for the plaintiff in error), it was arranged that the case shall be argued on Saturday the 1st of May. In the cases of The Queen v. Hall, an interesting question arode as to the right of appointing the Registrar of the County Court of Ashton-underLyne. By the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95 sect. 13 (The County Court Act), a provision is made reserving the rights of certain Lords of Manors in which County Courts were directed to be held, and which courts are named in schedule C of the Act, to appoint at the then next vacancy the clerk (now Registrar) of the court. Amongst the number of courts so included in the said schedule there is that of Ashton-under-Lyne; at the time of the passing of the above statute there was a court of requests held at Ashton, of which a Mr. Robert Worthington, was clerk, Lord Stamford and Warrington being the Lord of the Manor. Shortly after the passing of the Act, the old court of requests was by order in council abolished, and the next day a County Court was constituted in its stead, and Mr. Joseph St. John Yates, was appointed judge, and he thereupon without any communication with the lord of the manor, appointed the above named Mr. Worthington to the office of clerk of the court, and he has continued to fulfil the duties until his death in July last, whereupon Lord Stamford treating the vacancy as the first, under sect. 13 appointed a Mr. Hall; Mr. Yates, however, treating his original appointment of Mr. Worthington as the first appointment, considered the present vacancy not as the first, but the second vacancy to which Lord Stamford would have no right to appoint, and he consequently appointed a Mr. Leaf, the present relator. The appointment of Lord Stamford received the approval (as provided for by sect. 13) of the Home Secretary; but upon Mr. Leaf applying to the Lord Chancellor for his approval (as provided for by sect. 24) it was suspended to abide the event of the present litigation. It was now contended on the part of Mr. Hall that the appointment of Mr. Worthington by Mr. Yates, was not in reality the first appointment, but merely a continuation of his old appointment, to which he was entitled under the 34th section, and that the present was the first real vacancy in the office; or that if this were not so, the relator who represented Mr. Yates has no right to apply inasmuch as Mr. Yates usurped the right to appoint in the first instance of Lord Stam ford, and so cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. The court without expressing any opinion of the merits, thought that as the only legal means of properly raising the question was by quo warranto, made the rule absolute. the candidate held liable had done everything in In ex-parte Thomas Byard Shepherd, Re a proeeeding against the Rev. J. C. Bennett, Mr. Stephen, Q.C., moved for a mandamus to be directed to the Bishop of London directing him to issue a commission under the Church Discipline Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, to inquire into a certain charge made against Mr. Bennett, who is vicar of Frome in the county of Somerset, contained in a letter addressed to the said bishop on behalf of Mr. Shepherd, who is a parishioner of the said Mr. Bennett, relating to a work of the latter gentleman entitled "An Examination of Archdeacon Denison's Propositions of Faith, in which, as it was alleged, he had maintained doctrines on COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. the subject of the Lord's Supper opposed to the 29th article of the Articles of Religion. Mr. Shep- special paper, but before the cases in that paper Thursday was one of the days set apart for the herd having in due form applied to the Bishop of London upon the subject, he received in February arguments in a new trial which had been comwere taken, the court heard the conclusion of the the following reply: "Having carefully considered menced the day before; the question in dispute the matter laid before me, and having examined was the liability of the defendant upon the conthe book, I am of opinion that it is not a case instruction of a guarantee. The plaintiff Bew was which I ought to issue a commission under the assignee of a bankrupt, and he proposed to some Act, and I therefore decline to accede to your of the creditors to institute legal proceedings application." It was contended that the bishop against a person named Bill, who had obtained was wrong in this refusal, and a number of pas possession of some of the bankrupt's goods under sages were cited from Mr. Bennett's book to show a bill of sale; he declined, however to take any that they were heretical and opposed to the steps unless the general body of creditors agreed Thirty-nine Articles, especially to the 29th. to guarantee their shares of any costs which In the course of the argument it transpired might be incurred, and with that object he that proceedings are now pending against Mr. Bennett in respect of similar doctrines promul-which purported to be signed by several persons sent copies to several creditors of a document gated by him. The court felt that under existing who each undertook his share of the legal costs circumstances, as similar proceedings are pend- which would result from prosecuting the action: ing, and as the present application is to the discre- defendant signed one of these copies, and three tion of the court, and the bishop himself had other persons signed each of them another, but investigated the subject and examined the book which in fact was published ten years ago, it would by far the larger portion of the creditors declined to make themselves responsible. The action be unwise to grant the present application, and against the assignee of the bill of sale was decided they therefore refused a rule. against the creditors' assignee, and the latter now attempted to get the defendant's share of the costs upon the guarantee note signed by him. There was an equitable plea to the effect that the defendant signed this document upon the representation by the plaintiff that all the other creditors would be liable for their share of the costs. The court now entered judgment for the defendant, on the ground that this plea was a sufficient answer to the action. In Reg. v. The Mayor, &c. of London, which came before the court on Thursday, Mr. Mellish (with Mr. Archibald) showed cause against a rule obtained by the Solicitor-General, calling on the defendants to show cause why they should not deliver to Mr. Walker a sum of 2701. found in the possession of the burglars engaged in the great robbery of watches in the city, which ended some time ago in the transportation for life of the burglars after a trial at the Old Bailey. The money has been retained by the corporation of London, and it seems that applications for it have been made to them from more than one quarter. The Solicitor General (with Mr. Crompton Hutton) now argued in support of Mr. Walker's right to the restitution of the money. The question turned on the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench to order the restitution of the money, and this now depends on the construction of sect. 100 of the Act 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, which provides that "if any person guilty of any such felony or misdemeanor as is mentioned in this Act, in stealing, taking, obtaining, extorting, embezzling, converting, or disposing of, or in knowingly receiving any chattel, money, valuable security, or other property whatsoever, shall be indicted for such offence by or on behalf of the owner of the property, or his executor or administrator, and convicted thereof, in such case the property shall be restored to the owner or his representative; and in every case in this section aforesaid the court before whom any person shall be tried for any such felony or misdemeanor shall have power to award from time to time writs of restitution for the said property, or to order the restitution thereof in a summary manner, &c." The court, consisting of Mr. Justice Mellor, Mr. Justice Lush, and Mr. Justice Hannen, were of opinion that they had no jurisdiction under this section to order the restitution of the money to the plaintiff, and the rule was discharged with costs. In Ex parte Stevenson, the question whether the foreshore of the sea is within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of Sewers was argued on motion of certiorari to quash a conviction for taking away sand from a part of the foreshore of Lincolnshire, between high and low water mark. The court were clearly of opinion that the foreshore was within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of Sewers, and refused the rule moved for. Great amusement was created in court by the facts of the case of Peacock v. Young and White, as stated by Mr. Hawkins, Q. C. (with whom was Mr. Cockerell). It was an application to send back to the deputy judge of the Wisbeach County Court, to state more correctly a case for appeal, and to hear the parties before doing so. The facts of the case arose out of the late election for the county of Cambridgeshire, and were reported in the newspapers of the time, and the public were somewhat surprised to hear that a County Court judge held one of the candidates (Mr. Young) liable to pay for the windows broken by one of the mob which the election proceedings brought together at Wisbeach. Although it appeared that The rest of the day, besides several hours of Friday, was occupied in arguing the special case, Dungey v. The Mayor. &c. of London, the question in which was the liability of the corporation for damages claimed by the owner of a house, which he alleged was injuriously affected by the construction of the Holborn Valley Viaduct. The first point raised was, whether the Holborn Valley Improvement Acts incorporated the 68th section of the Lands Clanses Consolidation Act 1845; the second was whether, even if that section were not incorporated in the Act, the various sections of the Improvement Acts did not imply a right to compensation; the third point was, whether the right of action at common law for this injury was taken away by these statutes; and the fourth was as to whether the circumstances of this case established a claim for injury under the Lands Clauses Act. The court, still consisting of Justices Keating and Smith only, took time to consider their judgment. In Waygood v. James, the Taunton election petition, Mr. Mellish, Q. C., moved for a rule nisi, calling upon the petitioners to show cause why this petition should not be taken off the file, and quashed, and all further proceedings stayed. It was stated that at the last general election Mr. Serjt. Cox was elected one of the members for Taunton, Mr. Henry James being the unsuccessful candidate; that upon a petition by some of the electors duly filed, Mr. Serjt. Cox was declared by Blackburn, J., to have been unduly elected; at the same time the judge declared Mr. Henry James to have been duly elected. The bribery, which was held to have been established against the sitting member, consisted of the payment by the Conser vative Working Men's Association of 5s. a head to voters, nominally for their expenses in attending the revising barrister's court, really in many cases where they never attended at all. Notice had been given that recriminatory evidence against Mr. James's return, under the 53rd section, would be adduced at the hearing of the petition, and, although no such evidence was actually given, Mr. James and his witnesses were cross-examined as to the allegations against the unsuccessful candidate. Attention was called to the 6th section, which requires a petition to be presented within twenty-one days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, and to the 13th clause of the 11th section, which makes the determination of the judge upon his certificate final to all intents and purposes. It was argued that there was no new return when Mr. James was declared duly elected, and that the Act did not provide for any second petition. Mr. Justice Keat ing said, "My brother Blackburn has given a certificate that Mr. James was duly elected, and the Act makes that certificate final. If there should be a new petition, there will have to be another certificate. At all events, you have said enough for us to grant a rule nisi." In Trenfield v. Lowe, one of the registration cases which have been postponed to this term for the convenience of counsel, the court held that upon the facts stated, the appellant was entitled to a vote for West Gloucestershire. On Saturday, according to notice given the day before, there was no sitting of this court in banc : the Lord Chief Justice was still absent from ill health, Mr. Justice Willes was engaged in an election petition, one judge was at Nisi Prius, another at chambers, and two of the judges of this court were required at the Court of Criminal Cases Reserved. The first case of the special paper on Monday was Trowsdale v. The North British Railway Company, a dispute between a railway contractor and the company with whom he contracted. By one of the articles of the contract, it was agreed that any difference between them should be referred to an engineer named Tone, and power was given to either party to refer without consent of the other. To the present claim of the contractor, the defendants pleaded an award made by Mr. Tone on the matters in difference upon a request of the secretary of the company to arbitrate upon it. It was now contended by the plaintiff that although it was competent to either to refer any matter of difference, it was necessary, especially when the other party did not consent, that a proper submission of the matter should be previously made. Here the plaintiff had persistently refused to refer, and had always protested against the award, and at the same time the only submission was contained in a letter by the secretary; there was no seal of the company attached, and it was shown that the secretary was not authorised by the directors to make this submission. The court decided in favour of the plaintiff. The next case was Morris v. Ogden, in which several points were raised under the Act for enforcing the residence of clergy, and under the Church Discipline Act. The arguments were not concluded on Monday. It appeared from the facts stated in the special case, that the plaintiff, who was some years ago incumbent of St Peter's, Ashton-under-Lyne, had been convicted, in the Divorce Court, of adultery with one of his parishioners. The Bishop of Manchester issued a monition requiring him to reside in the parish under the 54th section of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106; the plaintiff answered, as his excuse for not residing, that his life was in danger from the inhabitants, who had on more than one occasion hooted at and stoned him; the bishop, not deeming this excuse satisfactory, ordered him to reside within thirty days, and sequestered the living upon noncompliance at the end of that time. By sect. 58 a benefice continuing sequestered for one year, becomes void; before the year in this case was concluded, the plaintiff had been suspended, under the Church Discipline Act, for three years. That term of suspension being now concluded, the defendant, who had been appointed to the benefice on the supposition that it had become void, was sued for breaking and entering the plaintiff's pulpit. Four points were taken by Mr. Brown, Q.C., for the plaintiff; first, that the order to reside was not personally served upon the plaintiff as required by the statute; secondly, that the sequestration was void because it was made without the plaintiff's having notice to show cause against it; thirdly, that the order to reside and the sequestration were revoked by the decree of suspension; fourthly, that the benefice was not voided, because there was no wilful disobedience; the plaintiff did not reside, only because he would have been in danger of his life. the petitioners and respondent in the Salisbury Upon the application of counsel representing election petition, which has been turned into a special case, Wednesday May 5th was fixed for hearing the arguments. The Manchester petition is to be taken on the same day. A couple of rules were granted on Wednesday, and the court early took the renewed arguments in the special case, Morris v. Ogden, which came on last Monday, and for a short time were continued on Tuesday. It had been admitted by Mr. Holker, the counsel for the defendant, that the first sequestration was invalid in consequence of the want of any notice to the plaintiff to show cause, before the order of sequestration was made, and therefore the case now turned upon the effect of the subsequent proceedings. The order of suspension was dated the 13th Sept. 1861, and consisted of the following words :-"We hereby suspend him (the plaintiff), accordingly ab officio et a beneficio for the space of three years, to commence from Sunday the 15th Dec. 1861, on which day we direct our said sentence to be published by affixing the same on the principal door of the said church of St. Peter, Ashton-under-Lyne. And we further decree that the said sentence shall remain in force until he, the said Thos. W. Morris shall produce a certificate to our satisfaction, signed by three neighbouring beneficed clergymen of the diocese of Manchester, of his good conduct during the period of suspension, and that such suspension be not taken off until he shall produce such certificate." Subsequently the living was sequestered. The order of suspension was affixed to the church door, but the plaintiff was in ignorance of its terms for about a year after, during which time he was residing at Leeds, out of the diocese. He obtained certificates of good conduct during that time from neighbouring clergy, and as soon as he became aware of the particulars of the order, he went to Manchester, and remained there during the rest of the three years. Upon the conclusion of the period of suspension, he sent to the bishop certificates of good conduct for the time he was at Leeds, and also from beneficed clergy of the diocese of Manchester during the subsequent two years. The bishop, however, declined to accept these certificates, and appointed the defendant to the incumbency, at the same time revoking both the sequestrations which he had ordered. This action was commenced before the termination of three years from the time of the plaintiff's coming to Manchester. The points taken by Mr. Brown, for the plaintiff, were, (1) that the period of suspension had elapsed before the action was brought; (2) that the sequestration was not in force after the revocation; (3) that the sentence of suspension was invalid on the face of it, because it did not show the jurisdiction of the bishop, because it did not show either that the proceedings were public, or that notice had been given to the plaintiff, and because it was uncertain, by reason that it was recited that the plaintiff had been guilty of adultery or fornication. By the Ecclesiastical Law, it was alleged there was a distinction between the two charges. The arguments were concluded at the rising of the court, but judgment was reserved. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. In the case of Spendlove v. The Midland Railway Company, in which a rule was applied for on Tuesday, April 20, to set aside a nonsuit of Mr. Justice Hayes, a point arose somewhat analogous to that raised by the case of Siner v. The Great Western Railway, recently decided in the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The court, however, thought the matter sufficiently doubtful to make it proper that a rule should be granted. The facts were as follows:-The plaintiff was a butcher near Rotherham, and was, when the accident happened, returning from a weekly cattle fair by a special market train. On the way an express train had to pass the slower market train. The latter was shunted on to a siding to let the former go by, but as it did not arrive the market train proceeded again. Near Rawmarsh station the train slackened, and then there was a great deal of whistling, and after a violent jerk, it came to a stop altogether. One of the passengers looked out, and cried out "Good God! we shall all be killed, the train has divided and we are left behind." The latter part of his statement was true, though fortunately the prediction was not true, inasmuch as no one was injured but the plaintiff. All the persons in the carriage that had been thus deserted by the rest of the train hastily descended, and the plaintiff, unfortunately, in the hurry of the moment, slipped in getting down, fell, striking the lower part of his back on the step, and rolled down an embankmdnt, thus sustaining severe injuries to the spine. It appeared that there had been an accident by the express running into this market train some time before, which would be known to the plaintiff, and might cause him to get out with more precipitation. It appeared that the express was not in sight, but it was overdue at the time. The court seemed doubtful whether there was any cause of action; it was admitted that the question was, whether the plaintiff had acted in a reasonably prudent manner by descending as he did, and that that question depended on whether he had suffireason for thinking the express near at hand under the circumstances; as before-mentioned, however, they thought enough had been stated to show the case ought to be discussed. On Thursday the 23rd, a curious point of law arose with relation to the measure of damages in the case of Wright v. Chappell and another. It appeared that the defendants had carried on a business as music and musical instrument sellers, under the firm of Cramer and Co. at Brighton. This business, and the premises where it was carried on, they assigned to the plaintiff, covenanting with him that they would not thereafter carry on the same business within forty miles of Brighton, or do any act whereby the business should be prejudiced either in plaintiff's hands or those of his assigns. Some time after plaintiff assigned the goodwill of his business as carried on on the defendant's former premises and elsewhere, to the firm of Hawkins and Potts. By the articles of agreement between plaintiff and Hawkins and Potts, the former agreed not to carry on the busi ness within fifty miles of Brighton, and also to execute all proper deeds, &c., which might be necessary to carry out the articles. There was no assignment in terms of the benefit of the defendants' covenant to Hawkins and Potts. Subsequently one of the defendants became a shareholder and director in a company which was incorporated to carry on a business which defendants had formerly carried on in London. This company set up a business in Brighton under the style of Cramer and Co. (Limited). The plaintiff thereupon brought an action for breach of cove nant against defendants, as was alleged, as a trustee for Hawkins and Potts. The case was tried before the Chief Baron, and a verdict entered for nominal damages with leave to move to increase them to the damages found by the jury, viz., 250. It was now urged by Mr. Prentice, Q.C., Mr. W. G. Harrison, and Mr. Hume Williams, for the defendants, that the plaintiff could only recover nominal damages inasmuch as he had personally sustained no damage at all, and was not, there being no assignment of the covenant, a trustee for Hawkins and Potts. Mr. Grantham, in the absence of Mr. Brown, Q.C., his leader, contended that plaintiff was a trustee for Hawkins and Potts of the covenant, and as such entitled to recover the damages the latter had sustained. He contended that the first deed clearly contemplated the protection of assigns, and the subsequent agreement being for the sale of the goodwill of the business as carried on by the plaintiff included the business of defendants, and the protection under which plaintiff carried it on, and moreover that as the latter agreement stipulated that all necessary deeds should be executed that would entitle Hawkins and Potts in equity to an assignment of the benefit of the covenant, and so equity would make plaintiff a trustee of the damages on the principle that equity considers id factum esse quod fieri debet. Mr. Brown, Q.C., then appearing, proposed to argue further on the same side, but was stopped by Chief Baron Kelly, who stated that although he continued of the same opinion as he was at the trial, his learned brethren Barons Martin and Cleasby differing from him, the decision of the court would be for the plaintiff. In the case of Isitt v. Beeston the court approved of and followed a Nisi Prius decision of Lord Tenterden, in the case of Cotton v. James, 1 Moo. & Malk. 273. That case cannot exactly be considered a binding authority on the Court in banc, inasmuch as, although those very learned judges, Littledale and Parke, intimated their concurrence with Chief Justice Tenterden, when the case went to the court above it there ultimately turned on another point. For this reason the present decision of the Court of Exchequer is of some importance. The question was this: The 67th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act enacts that a fraudulent gift, delivery, or transfer of his goods by a bankrupt, to defeat or delay his creditors, shall be deemed an act of bankruptcy. In Cotton v. James, Lord Tenterden held that the word "delivery," taken in its collocation with the words "gift" and "transfer," must mean a delivery with intent to pass some title to or interest in the goods delivered. In the present case the goods had been delivered to a store warehouseman early one morning, and the bankrupt then absconded. The assignee brought an action against the warehouseman, who pleaded that he held the goods as a pledge. It appeared that this was so, he having, subsequently to this delivery, advanced money to the bankrupt on the goods. The whole question, therefore, was, whether the delivery was an act of bankruptcy, it being admitted that if it was not the subsequent advance was valid, and the defendant entitled to hold the goods. The court held, that the delivery not being at the time it was made intended to pass any interest, was no act of bankruptcy, and therefore defendant must succeed. On Saturday, in the case of Mosscrop v. Dewhurst, various points of interest arose. It appeared that the action was brought against colliery proprietors, under Lord Campbell's Act, to recover damages for the death of a man who was killed on a siding running from the colliery to a railway. The siding belonged to the colliery company, and was not constructed under any statutory powers; it crossed a highway on a level, and appeared to have been so constructed with the consent of the highway authorities. It appeared that on the day in question deceased was riding a horse, and had occasion to cross at the level crossing. At that time a train of coal waggons was being backed at the rate of four miles an hour across the highway. The case for the plaintiff was that the horse was startled by a puff of steam, and, rushing across the rails, was caught by the train. The case on the other side was that the deceased deliberately endeavoured to cross before the train. The jury found in plaintiff's favour. It was contended for defendants that there was no evidence of negligence, and a rule was obtained to set the verdict aside on that ground, and also on the ground that it was against the weight of evidence on the ques tion of contributory negligence. On showing cause it was attempted to be argued that drawing trucks on a tramway crossing the highway on a level was itself illegal and a nuisance in the absence of statutory authority, and that the highway authority could give no authority to do it: (Reg. v. Train, 31 L. J. 169, M. C.) Baron Bramwell expressed strong doubts whether this were so. In Reg. v. Train the tramway was found a nuisance in fact, but why should a string of coal waggons going at the moderate pace of four miles an hour in a colliery district across the highway be more of a nuisance than a string of brewers' drays crossing from premises on one side of a street to another in London, or dung carts crossing from a close on one side of the road to another on the opposite side. This point, however, it was not ultimately necessary to decide, inasmuch as it appeared that by the General Highway Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50), s. 71, it is provided that, whenever a railway crosses a highway on a level, the proprietors shall keep gates and persons to watch them. This, it appeared, the defendants had not done, and the court thereupon, thought they could not say there was no evidence of negligence, inasmuch as if there had been gates the horse might have been stopped if running away. They thought, however, the verdict was against evidence with respect to the question of contributory negligence, and that there must therefore be a new trial. In the case of Dixon and others v. Wrench, the plaintiff's had obtained a judgment against the defendant for 2811. odd in Dec. 1867, and on the 10th March 1868, an application was made at chambers, on summons, to Mr. Justice Willes for an order charging a number of preference shares in the Stockton and Darlington Railway standing in the name of Matilda Wrench (deceased), and also for an order charging a certain sum of stock, amounting to 2331. 4s. 10d. in the Three per Cent. Reduced Annuities, standing in the joint names of G. Hillhouse and Matilda Wrench (deceased), which orders the learned judge made. The defendant, it appeared, was interested in the stock and shares in question, under the will of Matilda Wrench, dated 3rd Feb. 1865, whereby she gave, assigned, and disposed to and in favour of W. Wynne and G. W. Skyring, or the survivor of them as trustees, all and sundry lands and the whole estate and effects of the said testatrix, on trust, in the first place for the payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses; secondly, for the payment of certain specific legacies; and, with regard to the residue and remainder of her estate and effects, upon trust to pay, assign, and dispose of the same equally between the defendant and two other persons when they should attain the age of 21 years respectively. And by the said will the trustees were directed to pay or invest as thereinbefore directed the legacies thereby bequeathed so soon after the decease of the said testatrix as her estate could be judiciously converted into cash; and, in any event, that that should be done not later than twelve months after her death. The testatrix died on the 1st Oct. 1866, being at that date absolutely entitled to the shares and stock in question. Wrench, the defendant mortgaged his share and interest therein to one Banks; and on the 10th April 1867 Wrench and Banks filed a bill in equity against the surviving trustee of Matilda Wrench's will for the administration of her estate; and a decree in the suit directing the usual inquiries to be made, and that the personal estate not specifically bequeathed should be applied in payment of debts and funeral expenses in due course of administration, was made on the 27th July following. Subsequently the plaintiffs recovered the above-mentioned judgment in this action and obtained the above orders, by which the course of administration was impeded and the trustee was rendered unable to deal with the stock and shares in question. Thereupon an order was made by Vice-Chancellor Malins directing an application to be made to the Court of Exchequer, in pursuance of which a rule was obtained by Mr. Day in Michaelmas Term last to set aside the above-mentioned charging orders of Mr. Justice Willes, and it was argued in Hilary Term last by Mr. MacIntyre, who showed cause against it for the plaintiffs, and Mr. Day who supported it for the defendants. The court, however, after having looked into the will of Matilda Wrench, desired to have the case argued again, and accordingly it now came on for a second argument. Mr. MacIntyre for the plaintiffs showing cause and contending that the defendant had a sufficient interest to justify the making of the orders and the court in confirming them. The case of Cragg v. Taylor (15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 584; 36 L. J. 63, Ex.; L. Rep. 2 Ex. 131), was at one with the present case, and an authority for the plaintiffs. The defendant's interest here, though contingent and remote was attachable under the statute. Mr. Day for the defendant supported his rule, and distinguished the case from that of Cragg v. Taylor. In that case the defendant had an interest though contingent in the property itself, but here he had no interest in the specific property. The court (Chief Baron Kelly, and Barons Bramwell and Cleasby) were of opinion that the present case was quite distinguishable from the case cited on the ground mentioned by Mr. Day, and that the stock and shares in question were not an "interest which was chargeable under either 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 14, or 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 1, and they therefore made the defendant's rule absolute. The following are the fluctuations of the and develop the Clegir Mawr mine in North Wales. week: ENGLISH FUNDS. Fri. Sat. Mon. Tues Wed Thu 911 93 93 92 241 241 241 91 91 924 92 93 The lease has about thirty-four years to run, and the property is satisfactorily reported on. Orinoco Gold Mining (Limited.) - Capital 150,000l. in 2l, shares. The object is to work gold fields in Venezuela, and the purchase price of the concession is in paid-up shares, upon which the dividend is deferred, until 10 per cent. has been annually paid to the other proprietors. Port Philip and Colonial.-A distribution of 1s. 91 91 92 921 92 924 per share has been declared on account. Bank of England Stock 239 241 5 Ann. Jan. 5, 1880 Do. exp. July 1880 India Bonds (10001.) In Baker v. Astley, a nice question as to the authority of a wife to bind her husband arose under the following circumstances:-The defendant and his wife had been tenants of a house or lodg-5 ings at Brighton, at a rent of 10 guineas a week. The husband left, and the wife continued on in possession. Being pressed by the landlord for the rent, she wrote to the plaintiff, a house agent, the following letter: Mr. Baker, I hope you understand I have a private fortune of my own, nothing to do with Mr. Astley. I promise to pay you the rent if you will advance it to Mr. D." (the landlord). "I can pay you in July, if you will settle with Mr. D. Can you do this for me? I know I can rely on you to relieve me and help me.' (Signed) "Mrs. Astley." Thereupon the plaintiff paid some 701. odd. The husband (the defendant) had previously to such payment been made a bankrupt. The plaintiff sued the husband to recover the amount so paid, and as evidence of a confirmation by him of the wife's letter, he proved that he subsequently met the defendant, who said, "I am very sorry I have not been able to pay you, but I have not yet had the money to do so.' At the trial before Baron Pigott, at Guildhall, in Febru ary last, the plaintiff had a verdict, and now, Mr. Archibald, for the defendant, moved pursuant to leave reserved for a rule to enter the verdict for the defendant, or to reduce the verdict by the sum of 10 guineas (being for the week during which the wife occupied the house after her husband had left), on the ground that the act of the wife did not bind her husband; and the court, (Chief Baron Kelly, and Barons Bramwell, Pigott, and Cleasby) granted a rule to show cause. Do. 5001. Do. 1001, and 2001, premium. 212 100 100 100 100 10s b 13s.b 13s.b14s.b a 21 and 22 per cent., 38. 89.b a d a d 14s.b C a C a с e 24 and 21 per cent. 78. premium. d 24 and 21 per cent., 28. premium, 02 West Flanders.--A dividend of 5s. 6d. per share. Oriental. A dividend at the rate of 12 per cent. Standard of British South Africa.-A dividend for the half-year of 10s. per share on the shares with 251. paid, and of 4s. per share on the shares with 101. paid. FINANCE, CREDIT, AND DISCOUNT COMPANY, Australian Mortgage, Land, and Finance.-A dividend at the rate of 10 per cent. REPORTS OF SALES. [NOTE. The reports of the Estate Exchange are officially Friday, April B. By Messrs. E. and H. LUMLEY, at the Guildhall Coffee Leasehold premises known as the Battersea Soap Works, By Mr. WHITTINGHAM, at the Mart. Freehold residence, situate in Summerhill-road, West-green, Freehold residence, situate as above-sold for 3901. By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. Freehold, r. 16p. of land, situate at Bromley, Kent-sold for 2807. Freehold, 2r. 15p, of land, situate at Bromley, Kent-sold Freehold, Sa. Ir. Sp. of land, situate in the Staines-road, By Messrs. BROAD, PRITCHARD, and WILTSHIRE. Leasehold, house and shop, No. 2, Great Earl-street, Seven Dials, annual value 257, per annum, term 1939 years from 1791, at 3. per annum-sold for 2657. Leasehold honse, No. 4, Great Barl-street, term and ground rent similar to above-sold for 1097, Wednesday, April 28, Copyhold residence with stabling and gardens, situate at Copyhold five residences, Nos. 1 to 3, Lonsdale-cottages, road, let on lease at 1207. per annum, term 61 years unex LEGISLATION AND In Pullen v. Williams a rule was applied for by Mr. Gibbons on the part of the plaintiff to set aside the verdict found for the defendant at the trial, and to enter it for the plaintiff for an agreed sum of four guineas. It was an action of replevin, and the question was as to the defendant's right to distrain. The plaintiff had entered into possession of the premises under an agreement which it was conceded and admitted by both parties in itself gave no right of distress, and so it became necessary to give evidence of a tenancy. By the agreement a lease for twenty-one years from Christmas 1867, was to be prepared; the rent was, to be 1001. a year, commencing on the 25th March 1868, and was to contain the usual covenants. Nothing was said in the agreement as to when the rent was to be paid. The plaintiff went in under that agreement, and after occupying for half a year and Provincial Law Assurance Society, held on At the annual general meeting of the London was called on to pay rent, whereupon he wrote a letter to the following effect, "Under the copy of Saturday the 17th ult., the report of the directors the agreement which I hold, the rent is payable was read. It stated that the new policies issued yearly, and so no rent would accrue till 25th next were 220 in number, assuring 306,6251., and proMarch, on which day I will take care a cheque is ducing in new premiums the sum of 10,0671. 19s. 9d. sent for the amount." In November a distress The total premiums received in the year were was put in for the half year's rent to Michaelmas, 77,2371. 9s. 6d, and the income from all sources. and the above letter was relied on as evidence of amounted to 97,9371. 12s. 1d. The charges of a new agreement, under which the defendant was management, 3478. 12s. 7d.. have, notwithstanding entitled to distrain. Mr. Gibbons, in moving for the increased business, scarcely exceeded those of the above rule, cited the case of Regnard v. Porter, 1867. The assets of the society amounted to in 7 Bing. 451, and contended it was clear that it 495,1837. 148. 9d, and the average rate of interest could only be by treating the letter as evidence of at which they were invested, on the 31st Dec., a new agreement that there was any right to was 41. per cent. This calculation excludes the distrain in the present instance, but the letter was sum which represents the value of the society's not, he contended, either a new agreement or any-house, but estimates the amount invested in the thing from which such a new agreement could be purchase of reversions as producing 5 per cent. implied-it was a proposal merely to pay rent The increase in the assets during the year exceeded which was not accepted by the other side. It was 50,0007., being more than half the total income. not agreed to, but if it were, or if it were evidence Adding to the above sum the amount of premiums of anything but a proposal, it was to pay rent on which were actually due at the closing of the the 25th March 1869, and there was no right to account, and which were paid before the expira-ments. distrain till that period arrived. The court (Chief tion of the usual days of grace, viz., 5426/. 3s. 8d., Baron Kelly, and Barons Bramwell and Cleasby) the assets exceeded half a million sterling. The were of opinion that the effect of the plaintiff's exact figures being 500,6091. 18s. 5d.. letter was an admission by him that he was tenant from year to year, at a rent payable according to the provisions of the lease which was thereafter to be executed, and they accordingly refused to grant a rule. JURIS COUNTY TREASURERS. for the Home Department when the abstract of Mr. ROUND asked the Under-Secretary of State accounts of county treasurers for the past year would be laid upon the table of the House.-Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said there had been some delay in certain counties forwarding their accounts; but all the counties had now sent them abstract would be laid on the table on an early with the exception of Anglesea, and he hoped the day. BANKRUPTCY BILL. when certain amendments were inserted, and The House went into committee on this Bill. the Chairman was ordered to report it, and the House resumed. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT BILL. This Bill passed through committee with amend GRAVESEND COUNTY COURT. Sir C. WINGFIELD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when it was intended to commence the construction of the county courthouse at Gravesend, as the site for this building was purchased two years ago. Mr. AYRTON said a sum was placed in the estimates of the present House the building would be commenced at once. year for this building, and if it were voted by the EVIDENCE AMENDMENT BILL. Mr. DENMAN, ir moving the second reading of this Bill, admitted that, in the course of the last twenty years, the Legislature had done much to nevertheless contended that the law, even as now remove anomalies in the law of evidence; but he improved, was still mischievous, irrational, and absurd. Much testimony was still excluded which might in every case be fairly admitted, and taken for what it was worth. For instance, in suits or husband and wife are excluded from giving proceedings instituted on account of adultery, the evidence; but, since the establishment of the of the form of the suit, the husband or wife, as it Divorce Court, cases have arisen in which, because |