in the last half-century. It is difficult to believe that any court would find in the Constitution a requirement that treaties deal with matters of "international concern," or "affect the foreign relations" of the United States, in some special narrow sense unrelated to the realities of international intercourse today.

There is room for difference about the desirability or effectiveness of international human rights covenants, or of American participation in such covenants. There is, however, no excuse for lawyers to fabricate constitutional doctrine to confuse the issue. Almost ten years ago, in the pages of this Review, I wrote:

Many will have deep sympathy for those who dream of old days thought good, or better; who yearn for decentralization even in foreign affairs and matters of international concern, for limitations on federal power, for increase in the importance of the States; who thrill to a wild, poignant, romantic wish to turn back all the clocks, to unlearn the learnings, until the atom is unsplit, weapons unforged, oceans unnarrowed, the Civil War unfought. The wish remains idle, and the effort to diminish power in this area for fear that it may not be used wisely is quixotic, if not suicidal. It is not the moment to attempt it when all ability, flexibility, wisdom are needed for cooperation for survival by a frightened race, on a diminishing earth, reaching for the moon."

The lesson is more urgent than ever; it is yet to be learned.

79 Law of the Land 936.

Mr. HENKIN. It is wholly appropriate under the Constitution for the United States to adhere to all these human rights agreements. Nor are these treaties in any sense inconsistent with "the legal prerogatives of States rights."

Almost 60 years ago the Supreme Court resolved, yet again, that there are no proper States rights objections to U.S. adherence to such treaties. At that time, indeed, the Court held that the United States could conclude a treaty even on matters on which Congress had no power to legislate.

U.S. adherence to these human rights conventions would be permissible even if their subject matter were not also subject to the legislative power of Congress. That is the lesson of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In fact, however, the subjects of the conventions before you all are within the legislative power of Congress. Properly and reasonably construed, almost all of the provisions of the agreements already are required, either by the Constitution or by acts of Congress, and the few that are not already required could properly be required by Congress.

In my view, then, there are no meaningful States rights issues to concern you.

Of course, treaties are subject to the Bill of Rights. That was decided definitively, I believe, in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) in the plurality opinion of Justice Black, and no one has ever questioned that since.

There is one provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which raises serious questions under the first amendment. Article 20 of the covenant provides that any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law; and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Unless these provisions were construed to apply only to propaganda that incites to violence or other unlawful action, U.S. compliance with that provision would violate the first amendment. A reservation to that article is necessary. That, I believe, incidentally, is the only reservation that is constitutionally required. Of course, there might be some reservations which we might like for some other reasons, but I think most of those which have been suggested are undesirable for any

reason.

The implementation of these conventions also would raise no serious problems. Since the agreements largely require what the United States is already doing under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the United States would be in compliance with almost all of the provisions without the need for special implementation.

A few provisions might require implementation by further legislation, and such legislation could be enacted by Congress; or some implementation could be left to the States. We can do that without any reservation, although the United States would be responsible for making sure that the States acted and that the provisions were carried

out.

I think, Senator, I have stayed within my 7 minutes and briefly have addressed the principal questions put to me by Senator Church's letter. Fuller answers on the constitutional questions may be found in the 1968 article to which I referred.

If there are any questions you would like to put to me, I shall attempt to reply to them.

Thank you for your consideration.

[Professor Henkin's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Professor Louis B. HENKIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: My name is Louis Henkin. I hold the title of University Professor at Columbia University. Previously I was Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law and prior to that the Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy. I appear here by invitation of Senator Church, the Chairman of your Committee. I do not speak on behalf of my University or of any organization. The views I express are my

own.

I strongly support United States adherence to the four covenants and coventions which President Carter submitted for the Senate's consent, as well as to the Genocide Convention which has been before the Senate now for more than 30 years. I am deeply opposed, however, to most of the reservations which the Executive Branch has proposed to the four agreements now before you. Most of them are unnecessary and undesirable, indeed ignoble and unworthy of us, and would largely undermine the important reasons why the United States should adhere to these agreements. I urge that your committee recommend Senate consent to these international agreements and that you recommend against attaching most of these reservations. The firmest supporters of United States adherence to the agreements, I believe, are also firmly opposed to most of these reservations. Some of the reasons for this opposition are set forth in a memorandum which The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights transmitted to Secretary of State Vance on October 15. With your permission I offer a copy of the letter and memorandum for the record.

It is not, however, my purpose today to agrue the case for United States adherence to the human rights agreements, or the case against the reservations. Senator Church invited me to "address the issue of whether these treaties, with or without the Administration's proposed reservations, are compatible with the United States Constitution and the legal prerogatives of states' rights." He asked that I consider also "the effect of ratification of these treaties on the legal implementation of U.S. human rights policies.'

The Constitutional issues can be disposed of clearly and quickly. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President can make treaties. (U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 2.) The international agreements before you would be ratified by the United States as treaties. They are wholly proper treaties.

I hope that in 1979 it is no longer necessary to belabor that human rights are appropriate subjects for treaties under the Constitution. The agreements deal with a matter of great international concern, matters which are important to the foreign policy and the foreign relations of the United States. These agreements were prepared under the auspices of the United Nations (and in the case of the American Convention, under the auspices of the Organization of American States); many nations have already adhered to them; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has more than 100 parties, the international covenants more than 50 each.

If it is necessary once again to prove the obvious Constitutionality and propriety of United States adherence to such agreements, I respectfully refer the Committee to an article I wrote in 1968, "The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights,” 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1012 (1968). I shall be pleased to pro vide a copy for the record.

It is wholly appropriate under the Constitution for the United States to adhere to all these human rights agreements. Nor are these treaties in any sense inconsistent with "the legal prerogatives of states' rights." Almost sixty years ago the Supreme Court resolved, yet again, that there are no proper states' rights objections to U.S. adherence to such treaties. At that time, indeed, the court held that the United States can conclude a treaty even on matters on which Congress had no power to legislate. United States adherence to these human rights conventions would be permissible even if their subject matter were not also subject to the legislative power of Congress. Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416 (1920)). In fact, the subjects of the conventions before you are all within the legislative power of

Congress. Properly and reasonably construed almost all the provisions of the agreements are already required either by the Constitution or by acts of Congress, and the few that are not already required, could properly be required by Congress. In my view there are no meaningful states' rights issues to concern you.

Of course, treaties are subject to the Bill of Rights. Reid v. Covert (354 U.S. 1 (1957)) (plurality opinion of Black, J.). There is one provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which raises serious questions under the first amendment. Article 20 of that Covenant provides:

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. Unless these provisions were construed to apply only to propaganda that incites to violence or other unlawful action, United States compliance with that provision would violate the first amendment. A reservation to that article is necessary. (That, I believe, is the only reservation that is constitutionally required.)

The implementation of these Conventions would also raise no serious problems. Since the agreements largely require what the United States is already doing under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the United States would be in compliance with almost all of the provisions without the need for special implementation. A few provisions might require implementation by further legislation, and such legislation could be enacted by Congress. Or, some implementation could be left to the States, although the United States would be responsible for making sure that the States act and the provisions are carried out.

I have addressed briefly the principal questions put to me by Senator Church's letter. Fuller answers may be found in the 1968 Article to which I referred. If there are questions you would put to me now I shall attempt to reply to them. Thank you for your consideration.

Senator PELL. Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Anderegg, we would be happy to hear from you now. [Professor Anderegg's biographical sketch follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROFESSOR J. PHILIP ANDEREGG

Born, Chicago, Ill.

A.B. Harvard College, 1939.

LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1942.

Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.

Formerly lecturer and adjunct professor of law in Columbia University.

Author: "The Patent Cooperation Treaty", New York Law Forum, vol. 18, pp. 32 to 57 (1972). "The Best Mode Requirement of 35 U.S.C. Section 112”, APLA Quarterly Journal, vol. 6, pp. 219 to 246 (1978).

STATEMENT OF J. PHILIP ANDEREGG, FORMER LECTURER AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, FOREST HILLS, N.Y.

Mr. ANDEREGG. Thank you, Senator.

I am J. Philip Anderegg. I am testifying as an individual in response to an invitation from Senator Church, which no doubt in turn is in response to a request of mine for an opportunity to testify.

I am an attorney at law. I speak only for myself.

I have been requested, like Professor Henkin, to address the question of the compatibility of these treaties with the Constitution of the United States and with the prerogatives of states' rights and the result or the effect of ratification thereof upon implementation of U.S. human rights policies.

I believe that the Racial Discrimination Convention and the U.N. Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights are open to objection on constitutional grounds because those treaties would compel invasion of liberties or immunities from Government action which are preserved by the Constitution to the American people and to others present on the territory of the United States.

In the Racial Discrimination Convention, article 2, paragraph 1(d) reads:

Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.

I contend that this would invade the freedom of association which is protected by the First Amendment in, for example, the formation of partnerships, of boards of trustees, and the like. I believe that Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) is a case recognizing the existence of the right of individuals to associate together without their motives being examined as to whether or not racial or other motives are involved in the rejection or selection of applicants.

I am aware that a related matter is under litigation in the State of New York and has not yet been concluded.

In the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 7(c) reads:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work, which insure, in particular: (c) equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence.

This is not restricted to employment by state enterprises and I think the result of ratification of this treaty would require the United States to attempt to eradicate nepotism in all enterprises in the United States. I do not believe that lies within the proper power of the government. If a man wants to be a fool and wreck his business by advancing his incompetent son over a more meritorious fellow employee, I think it is his right and liberty to do so. I do not endorse nepotism and I do not endorse racial discrimination in the sense of sheer prejudice. However, I believe that the business of life is living and that we should not examine all our decisions by lawyers or other agents of government.

I believe similarly that the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention are open to constitutional objections, but on different grounds-on the ground that they invade the right of the States, under article I section 2 and the 17th amendment of the U.S. Constitution, to determine the qualifications of voters for Senators and Representatives.

In the Civil and Political Covenant, the effect of article 2, paragraph 1, and article 25(b) together would be to deny to the States altogether the right to require a literate, or even an oral, knowledge of the English language, a right sustained to them by the Supreme Court in Lassister v. Northampton, 360 U.S. 45 [1959] and still existing in the long run, absent discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, despite the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1975 extention thereof.

To the same effect, in my opinion, are articles 1.1 and 23.1(b), taken together, of the American Convention.

Neither of these matters is cured by the reservations, understandings, and declarations which are proposed for the Civil and Political Covenant and for the American Convention. The point I previously made with respect to the Racial Discrimination Convention, as such, perhaps would be cured by the understanding at the bottom of page vi in the pamphlet wherein these treaties have been printed. By "pamphlet" I mean the "Message from the President of the United States