I have just received from Mr. Jefferson your letter to him, with the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, sent for his and my perusal, and our opinions on the subject of it.

"From the disclosures of Mr. Canning it appears, as was otherwise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain would be followed by an attempt of the holy allies to reduce the revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former dependence.

"The professions we have made to these neighbours, our sympathies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the great powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of which we have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade. It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours, has presented a co-operation for an object the same with ours. With that co-operation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the way she has proposed, keeping in view, of course, the spirit and forms of the Constitution in every step taken in the road to war, which must be the last step if those short of war should be without avail.

"It can not be doubted that Mr. Canning's proposal, though made with the air of consultation, as well as concert, was founded on a predetermination to take the course marked out, whatever might be the reception given here to his invitation. But this consideration ought not to divert us from what is just and proper in itself. Our co-operation is due to ourselves and to the world; and whilst it must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal. It is not improbable that Great Britain would like best to have the merit of being the sole champion of her new friends, notwithstanding the greater difficulty to be encountered, but for the dilemma in which she would be placed. She must, in that case, either leave us, as neutrals, to extend our commerce and navigation at the expense of hers, or make us enemies, by renewing her paper blockades and other arbitrary proceedings on the ocean. may be hoped that such a dilemma will not be without a permanent tendency to check her proneness to unnecessary wars.

It

"Why the British Cabinet should have scrupled to arrest the calamity it now apprehends, by applying to the threats of France against Spain the small effort which it scruples not to employ in behalf of Spanish America, is best known to itself. It is difficult to find any other explanation than that interest in the one case has more weight in its casuistry than principle had in the other.

"Will it not be honorable to our country, and possibly not altogether in vain, to invite the British Government to extend the 'avowed disapprobation' of the project against the Spanish colonies to the enterprise of France against Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf or the Greeks? On the supposition that no form could be given to the act clearing it of a pledge to follow it up by war, we ought to compare the good to be done with the little injury to be apprehended to the United States, shielded as their interests would be by the power and the fleets of Great Britain united with their own. These are questions, however, which inay require more information than I possess, and more reflection than I can now give them.

"What is the extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer as to 'the remaining possessions of Spain in America? Does it exclude future views of acquiring Porto Rico, &c., as well as Cuba? It leaves Great Britain free, as I understand it, in relation to other quarters of the globe."

Mr. Madison to President Monroe, Oct. 30, 1823, 3 Madison's Works, 339.

"I return the letter of the President. The correspondence from abroad has gone back to him, as you desired. I have expressed to him my concurrence in the policy of meeting the advances of the British Government, having an eye to the forms of our Constitution in every step in the road to war. With the British power and navy combined with our own, we have nothing to fear from the rest of the world; and in the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and despotism, we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former, in this hemisphere at least. I have even suggested an invitation to the British Government to join in applying the small effort for so much good' to the French invasion of Spain, and to make Greece an object of some such favorable attention. Why Mr. Canning and his colleague did not sooner interpose against the calamity, which could not have escaped foresight, can not be otherwise explained but by the different aspect of the question when it related to liberty in Spain, and to the extension of British commerce to her former colonies."

Mr. Madison to Mr. Jefferson, dated at Montpelier, Nov. 1, 1823, 3 Madison's Works, 341.

5. ADAMS-TUYLL CORRESPONDENCE.

§ 934.

Oot. 16, 1823, Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister, in an interview at the Department of State, informed Mr. Adams that the Emperor of Russia, having heard that General Devereux had been appointed as

a minister plenipotentiary from the Republic of Colombia to reside at his court, had determined not to receive him in that capacity, nor to receive any agent from any of the governments recently formed in the New World; and that he (Baron Tuyll) was instructed to make this determination of his Imperial Majesty known, so that there might be no doubt entertained in that respect with regard to his intentions. Baron Tuyll added that he had not been instructed to make an official communication of this fact to the American Government, but that, as he considered such a communication the most effectual means of making it known to them, and thereby of fulfilling the instructions of his sovereign, he should address to Mr. Adams an official note to that effect.

The baron further stated that by two several instructions of prior dates, in June and December, 1882, he had been informed of the satisfaction with which the Emperor had observed that the Government of the United States, when recognizing the independence of the South American States, had declared that it was not their intention to deviate from the neutrality which they had until then observed in the contests between Spain and her American colonies; and that it was the wish and hope of the Emperor that the United States should persevere in that course of neutrality. The baron added that he had not thought it necessary to communicate officially the purport of these instructions, and that he should not refer to them in the note which he proposed to transmit to the Department of State.

Mr. Adams replied that upon the President's return from Virginia, which was expected in a very few days, he would lay before him as well the note which he should in the meantime receive as the purport of the oral communication just made to him; that he should probably be instructed to return a written answer to the note, and also directed what to say in answer to the oral communication; that the declaration. of the American Government, when they recognized the Southern American nations, that they would persevere in the neutrality till then observed between Spain and her emancipated colonies had been made under the observance of a like neutrality by all the European powers to the same contest; that so long as that state of things. should continue he could take upon himself to assure the Baron that the United States would not depart from the neutrality so declared by them but that if one or more of the European powers should depart from their neutrality, that change of circumstances would necessarily become a subject of further deliberation on the part of the United States, the result of which it was not in his power to foretell.

On the same day Mr. Adams received a note from Baron Tuyll in the sense expected.

Further conferences took place, and on the President's return from Virginia on the 5th of November, Mr. Adams laid before him Baron Tuyll's note of Oct. 16, and reported the substance of their conferences. The President, after consulting the members of the administration in Washington, directed Mr. Adams to request another interview with the baron, which took place on the 8th of November.

In this interview Mr. Adams told Baron Tuyll that he had submitted to the President the note declaring the Emperor's determination not to receive any minister or agent from any of the South American states, and that an answer would shortly be given; that he had also reported to the President the substance of their verbal conferences, and that the President had directed him to say that he approved of his answers as far as they had gone, and to add " that he received the observations of the Russian Government relating to the neutrality of the United States in the contest between Spain, and the independent states of South America, amicably; and in return for them wished him to express to the Court the hope of the Government of the United States that Russia would on her part also continue to observe the same neutrality." After some conversation the baron desired Mr. Adams to repeat what he had said, so that he might be sure of perfectly understanding it, which Mr. Adams did. The baron then observed that he should immediately prepare a dispatch to his Government, relating the purport of the conversation, and (it being Saturday) to be sure of its accuracy he would send it to Mr. Adams's house the next day for examination and comment.

Baron Tuyll subsequently handed to Mr. Adams other papers, including extracts from instructions which he had received from Count Nesselrode with reference to the intervention in Spain.

Memorandum of Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, 1823, MS. Inst. Special Missions, I. 1. Published by W. C. Ford in 15 Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Society, Jan. 1902, 394–399.

For the correspondence referred to in the memorandum, see 15 Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Soc., Jan. 1902, 378, 400-405.

See, also, 8 Am. Hist. Rev.. (Oct. 1902), 29-46.

6. CABINET DELIBERATIONS.

§ 935.

From the 7th to the end of November, 1823, the question of Canning's proposals, and the correspondence and conferences between Mr. Adams and Baron Tuyll, frequently occupied the attention of President Monroe and his Cabinet. Mr. Adams thought that Canning wanted some public pledge from the United States not only against the forcible intervention of the Holy Alliance in Spanish America, but also especially against the acquisition by the United States of any

part of those countries. Mr. Calhoun inclined to give discretionary powers to Mr. Rush to join in a declaration against the interference of the Holy Alliance, if necessary, even if it should pledge the United States not to take Cuba or Texas. Mr. Adams was not in favor of this. On the 15th of November, Mr. Adams states in his diary, PresiIdent Monroe showed him the letters from Jefferson and Madison. "Calhoun," says Adams, "is perfectly moonstruck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to Spanish dominion."

At a Cabinet meeting on the 15th of November Mr. Adams expressed himself thus: "Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves, and no other nation, had the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them, either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent. This principle will give us a clew to answer all Mr. Canning's questions with candor and confidence."

At one time President Monroe seemed to be inclined to Calhoun's idea of giving Rush discretionary powers, but Adams was "utterly averse to this." From time to time the nature of the contents of the coming message of the President to Congress formed a topic of discussion. Adams thought a stand should be taken against the interference of the Holy Alliance in American affairs. Wirt intimated that the people would not support the Government in a war for the independence of South America. Calhoun thought otherwise; he believed the Holy Alliance "had an ultimate eye to us; that they would, if not resisted, subdue South America. . Violent parties

would arise in this country, one for and one against them, and we should have to fight upon our own shores for our own institutions." Adams did not believe that the Holy Alliance had any intention of ultimately attacking the United States; but, if they should subdue the Spanish provinces, they might recolonize them and partition them out among themselves. Russia might, take California, Peru, and Chile; France, Mexico, where she had been intriguing to get a monarchy under a prince of the house of Bourbon, as well as at Buenos Ayres, and Great Britain, if she could not resist this course of things, would take at least the island of Cuba as her share of the scramble. Then what would be the situation of the United States-England holding Cuba and France, Mexico? On the other hand, if the allies should interpose and Great Britain successfully oppose them alone, it would throw the colonies completely into her arms and make them her colonies rather than those of Spain. The United States must, therefore, declared Adams, act promptly and decisively. But the act of the Executive could not after all commit the nation to a pledge of war. This was not contemplated by Canning's proposals. As Great