provision of treaties, and of the traffic "of such vessels as now exist," it was to have "the exclusive right to grant concessions for the navigation of the rivers and navigable waters of the territory. The Bolivian Government was indeed to be permitted to appoint a representative in the territory, to be known as the "national delegate;;" but, subject only to the "supervision" of this delegate, whose salary the company was to pay, the company was to "provide and maintain" a "sufficient force of police" for the "protection of the inhabitants" and the enforcement of law and order; and if at any time the Government should think it necessary, the company was to equip and maintain, in addition to the police force, military and naval forces "for the defense of the rivers" and "the preservation of internal order." Finally, it was stipulated that if, on the expiration of the specified term, the concession should not be renewed "on the same conditions," or on other mutually agree on, the Government was to "resume" the "administration" of the territory. In consequence of this concession, which embraced territory a part of which was claimed by Brazil, the Brazilian Government, apprehensive as to the ultimate results of the syndicate's operations, entered upon a course of reprisals against Bolivia, and suppressed in Brazilian rivers the freedom of transit for exports and imports of that country. Subsequently a modus vivendi was entered into between the two countries, and on November 17, 1903, a treaty was concluded by which Brazil purchased from Bolivia all the latter's rights in the Acre territory. As one of the preliminaries to the amicable settlement with Bolivia, the Government of Brazil obtained from the syndicate, for a sum of money, the absolute renunciation of all its rights and claims under the concession, the effect of which was thus completely nullified. In a report to the President of Brazil of December 27, 1903, on the treaty of settlement with Bolivia, Baron Rio Branco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, said: “An Anglo-American syndicate, called the Bolivian Syndicate, armed with almost sovereign rights which the Bolivian Government had granted it for the administration, defence, and use of Acre, tried, happily without success, to interest some commercial powers of Europe and the United States of America in the enterprise, which was the first attempt to introduce in our continent the African and Asiatic system of chartered companies.. From the foreign syndicate we legally obtained a declaration absolutely renouncing any and all rights or possible claims against anyone whatsoever, in consideration of a pecuniary indemnity incomparably less than the smallest expense which either Brazil or Bolivia would incur on account of a serious international complication." In the same report Baron Rio Branco referred to the attempt to introduce "the perturbing system of the chartered companies" as a "menace" to the "security of this continent." Brazil and Bolivia, Boundary Settlement, Treaty for the Exchange of Territories and other Compensations, signed at Petropolis, November 17, 1903, together with the Report of Baron Rio Branco, Minister for Foreign Relations of Brazil: New York; especially pp. 19, 22, 23, 41. See, also, For. Rel. 1903, 34-36. See the charter of the Imperial British East Africa Company, Sept. 3, 1888, 79 Br. & For. State Papers, 641; also, the charter of the British South Africa Company, Oct. 29, 1889, 81 id. 617. 4. CENTRAL AMERICA. § 947. The British settlers on the Bay of Honduras, under the treaties between Great Britain and Spain, began very early "to make encroachments on the surrounding lands; and these have been carried to such an extent, that the Government of Central America, upon which they have been principally made, has become alarmed, and has appointed a commissioner to proceed to Great Britain for the purpose of remonstrating. In the meantime an agent has been dispatched by the occupants of the territory in question to London, to solicit that the settlement may be declared to be a colony of Great Britain, and that its limits may be coextensive with their usurpations. This agent, it is understood, has been directed by the British Government to proceed to Madrid, for the purpose of arranging the matter with the Spanish Government. The Government of Central America has asked the intermediation of the United States in the negotiation which is about to be set on foot with the Court of St. James. A brief history of the settlement alluded to, with the necessary references, is sent to you with this dispatch. It is expected that you will keep an eye upon the movements of the agent above mentioned in Madrid, and that you will use all prudent means to prevent the conclusion of any arrangement on the subject, as being incompatible with with the rights of the Republic of Central America, and injurious to the commercial interests of the whole world, including those of Spain herself." Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Barry, min. to Spain, No. 2, June 30, 1835, MS. Inst. Spain, XIV. 70. "The independence, as well as the interests of the nations on this continent, require that they should maintain an American system of policy, entirely distinct from that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any interference on the part of the European governments with the domestic concerns of the American republics, and to permit them to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to jeopard their independence and ruin their interests. These truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be impressed upon the public mind; but what can the United States do to resist such European interference whilst the Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves by division and civil war and deprive themselves of the ability of doing anything for their own protection?" Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hise, min. to Cent. Am., June 3, 1848, 1 Curtis's Buchanan, 623; H. Ex. Doc. 75, 31 Cong. 1 sess. 92-96. "A guarantee for the general use and security of a transit route, and also for its neutrality, is a desirable measure, which would meet the hearty concurrence of the United States. These views have already been made known to the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and they have been informed "that the President indulges the hope that these routes may yet be considered by general consent as neutral highways for the world, not to be disturbed by the operations of war.' These great avenues of intercommunication are vastly interesting to all commercial powers, and all may well join in securing their freedom and use against those dangers to which they are exposed from aggressions or outrages originating within or without the territories through which they pass. "But the establishment of a political protectorate by any of the powers of Europe over any of the independent states of this continent, or, in other words, the introduction of a scheme of policy which would carry with it a right to interfere in their concerns, is a measure to which the United States have long since avowed their opposition, and which, should the attempt be made, they will resist by all the means in their power. The reasons for the attitude they have assumed have been fully promulgated, and are everywhere well known. There is no need upon this occasion to recapitulate them. They are founded on the political circumstances of the American continent, which has interests of its own, and ought to have a policy of its own, disconnected from many of the questions which are continually presenting themselves in Europe, concerning the balance of power and other subjects of controversy arising out of the condition of its States, and which often find their solution of their postponement in war. It is of paramount importance to the states of this hemisphere that they should have no entangling union with the powers of the Old World, a connection which would almost necessarily make them parties to wars having no interest in them, and which would often involve them in hostilities with the other American states, contiguous or remote. The years which have passed by since this principle of separation was first announced by the United States have served still more to satisfy the people of this country of its wisdom and to fortify their resolution to maintain it, happen what may." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Lamar, min. to Cent. Am., July 25, 1858, Wharton, in his Int. Law. Digest, said: "The Clayton-Bulwer treaty is See, fully, as to Central America, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the M. de Sartiges, the French minister, having called at the Department of State and stated that he had been directed by Count Walewski to say "that the French Government had been invited by the British. Government to despatch a naval force to San Juan del Norte with orders to land a force, if requested to do so by the Nicaraguan Government, to repel any attack which might be made by illegal military expeditions against that country," Mr. Cass replied: "That this measure, if carried into effect, would but complicate still more the difficulties in Central America. That this Government was doing all in its power to prevent such expeditions from leaving the United States. That a concert of action between France and Great Britain for the employment of force in that region would give much dissatisfaction to the American people, as well as to this Government. Although we have no treaty with France respecting the affairs of Central America, still the French Government is aware of the position which the United States have taken against the exercise of a protectorate or of any dominion over the Isthmian states, and could not view with indifference the adoption of a policy which could scarcely be carried out without the exercise of a control, which would be unacceptable." 66 Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dallas, min. to England, confid., Nov. 26, See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mason, min. to France, No. 169, Should unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances ever bring it into question, the United States will be prepared to repeat and enforce the principle declared by its highest authority, more than half a century ago, that with the Governments [of the American continents] which have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by an European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."" Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to Cent. Am., May 7, 1881, 5. CHILE. § 948. "The policy of the United States in regard to the several SpanishAmerican States, is, or ought to be well known now, after the exposition it has received during the last five years. We avoid in all cases giving encouragement to expectations which, in the varying course of events, we might find ourselves unable to fulfill; and we desire to be known as doing more than we promise rather than falling short of our engagements. On the other hand, we maintain and insist with all the decision and energy which is compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican system which is accepted by the people in any one of those States shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. We thus give to those Republics the moral support of a sincere, liberal, and as we think it will appear, a useful friendship. We could claim from foreign states no concession to our own political, moral, and material principles or interests if we should not conform our own proceedings in the needful intercourse with foreign states to the just rules of the laws of nations. We, therefore, concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral, conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other, and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other. "We certainly thought that is was an act of friendship on our part that we obtained assurances from Spain, at the beginning and at other stages of the present war, that in any event her hostilities against Chile should not be prosecuted beyond the limits which I have before described. We understand ourselves now and henceforth ready to hold Spain to this agreement, if, contrary to our present expectations, it should be found necessary. In this we think we are acting a part certainly not unfriendly to Chile. It was thought to be an act of friendship when we used our good offices with both parties to prevent the war. We have thought we were acting a friendly part using the same good offices to secure an agreement for peace without dishonor, or even damage, to Chile. Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican State on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and the unwavering policy of the United States. They forget the frequency and variety of wars in |