By His Excellency George Cumine Strahan, Captain Royal Artillery, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Gold Coast Colony.

Whereas, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty has resolved to abolish slavedealing in Her Protectorate of the Gold Coast, and the importation thereinto of slaves and persons intended to be dealt with as slaves, and also to provide for the emancipation of persons holden as slaves within the same Protectorate:

And whereas, the Governor and Legislative Council of the Gold Coast Colony have, by Her Majesty's command, enacted an Ordinance, bearing date the 7th September, 1874, by which all buying, selling, or dealing in slaves is declared unlawful, and is absolutely and for ever abolished, prohibited, and made penal, and another Ordinance, also bearing date the 17th December, 1874, providing for the emancipation of persons holden in slavery:

Now, I do hereby proclaim, publish, and make known the said ordinance to all persons whom it may concern.

And further, in order and to the intent that all the Kings, Chiefs, Headmen, and other persons throughout the aforesaid Protectorate and elsewhere, may the more readily understand and obey the laws now made and enacted, I hereby require every person to take notice and observe that and now and from henceforth,

It is unlawful to sell or purchase or transfer or take any person as a slave.

It is unlawful to sell or purchase or transfer or take any person so as to make such person a slave.

It is unlawful to put or take any person in pawn for or on account of any debt.

It is unlawful to bring any person, whether slave or free, into the Protectorate territories from Ashanti or elsewhere in order that such person should be sold or dealt with as a slave or pawn.

It is unlawful to take or send any person out of the Protectorate territories in order that such person should be sold or dealt with as a slave or pawn.

It is unlawful to make any contract or agreement for buying, selling, or pawning any person or for bringing any person into or out of the Protectorate territories to be dealt with as a slave or pawn.

It is unlawful that any King, Chief, Headman, or other person should in any palaver, or by any means whatsoever, force or constrain any person for the purpose of compelling him to remain at any place, or serve any master, contrary to the will of such person.

Whosoever offends against any of these laws shall be punished with imprisonment and hard labour, and may also be fined. If in any contract hereafter made it should be agreed that any person shall be put in pawn or bought or sold or transferred, the whole contract shall be null and void.

And further, let all persons whom it may concern take notice that all children, who, after the 5th day of November, 1874, have been or shall be born in the Protectorate, have been declared free. But it is not intended by any of the aforesaid laws or otherwise to offer inducements to any person to leave any master in whose service he may be desirous of remaining, or to forsake the kroom where he may have been accustomed to inhabit, and that it is intended to permit the family and tribal relations to continue in all respects according as used and wont, except only that of slavery, and such customs as arise therefrom, and are thereon necessarily dependent.

Given at Government House, this
Seventeenth day of December, in
the year of Our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-four,
and in Her Majesty's reign the
thirty-eighth.

GEO. CUMINE STRAHAN, R A.,
Governor.

LETTER FROM PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF TO COUNT SCHOUVALOFF, THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

St. Petersburg, Jan. 24 (Feb. 5), 1875. The English Ambassador has, by order of his Government, communicated to me a despatch from Lord Derby, dated January 20th, of which I enclose a copy for your information.*

I have considered it my duty to bring this document to the knowledge of His Majesty the Emperor. Our august master has been fully sensible of the manner in which Lord Derby appreciates the considerations of humanity which have inspired him in convoking the European Governments to a common understanding, with the object of seeking means of softening as much as possible the rigours of war. His Imperial Majesty regrets all the more the resolution of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to no longer take part in this deliberation. It would have been desirable that the voice of a great nation like that of England had made itself heard in an inquiry, the object of which appeared to have met with its sympathies.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty are alone the judges of the motives that dictate to them this abstention. It is not for us to enter into a discussion on this subject. However, as the despatch of Lord Derby contains a judgment on the opinions and acts of the Brussels Conference, I have thought it useful to make some remarks on manner of looking at them. These are contained in the subjoined document, of which your Excellency is authorised to give a copy to the principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty simultaneously with this despatch. Receive, &c.

our

1st. The project of the Russian Government regarding the laws and customs of war in no way contemplates the introduction of new principles in international law. To speak properly, no posi

In this despatch, which it is unnecessary to print at length, Lord Derby announced that the British Government could not take part in the proposed Conference on the Usages of War, to be held at St. Petersburg.

tive international law exists. There is, however, a law of nations (droit des gens) more or less tacitly allowed, of which some portions have acquired the power of law by formal treaties. During the last century the rights of maritime neutrality did not exist legally until the Empress Catherine II. had proclaimed them, and had made them the object of treaties with other Governments. England disputed them for a long time, as militating against the laws and existing customs. Now they are generally admitted, but they have only the power of obligatory law by treaties that bind them and for the contracting Governments of these treaties. The law of nations has not been formed otherwise. Jurisconsults have laid down on their own authority maxims based on experience, morals, and public interest. These have by degrees been absorbed in manners and customs. Some of them, defined and rendered obligatory by treaties, have become positive laws. The project of the Russian Government has had no other object but to act thus with regard to the laws and customs of war as it at present exists. That is to say, to seek a common agreement which might be defined and completed, and receive a compulsory sanction by an exchange of declarations between the Cabinets.

2nd. The greater part of the objec tions made by the English despatch to the Brussels project bear to the same degree altogether on the law of nations. It is, doubtless, difficult to draw up clear and precise rules that define the character and range of acts of war such as acts of oecupation, and to lay down the duties and the rights of the invaders and the invaded. These difficulties are inherent to the very nature of things; the law of nations affords no remedy for them, neither does the English despatch solve them in affirming the necessary antagonism between the interests of the invaders and invaded. That dogma would be the absolute proclamation of power without limits. The law of nations admits the necessities of war, reason proves them, and experience confirms them. Power will be able to avail itself of them. In leaving matters in this indefinite state, the relations be tween the invaders and the invaded, between military power and private indi viduals, would not be improved. There

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would be no diminution of violence and reprisals, of grievances and recriminations, of reciprocal invocations to international law, and contradictory interpretations of its vague principles. However, these are the very painful aggravations of the rigours of war. The greater the difficulty to remedy them, the greater the necessity imposed upon Governments and peoples to do so, as the progress of civilisation increases the means of warfare and multiplies its calamities. If competent delegates from all the Governments, deliberating in a spirit of reciprocal benevolence, have been unable to come to an understanding on the practical manner in which these questions should be regarded, how much more difficult will be the respective positions of the armies and the peoples in the midst of the excitements of contests and in the face of an uncertainty that will open the door to all sorts of excess and all sorts of suffering? It is precisely because the law of nations is wanting in precision and clearness that the Brussels project endeavours to obviate as far as possible these uncertainties and contradictions. Because it is wanting in authority, the Conference has sought the only possible sanction in practise-that resulting from reciprocal declarations exchanged between the Governments and made the basis of their instructions to their armies. However imperfect the proposed rules may be as yet, the Governments that have discussed them and would have accepted them, would have done so in a spirit of humanity. It may then be assumed that they practically interpreted them in the same spirit. The progress of civilisation and the bond of interest can only increase the sentiment of general responsibility, which will tend to bring about some amelioration to the sufferings imposed by the scourge of war. The Russian Government has thought, and still thinks, that, however this result may be attained, real service will be rendered to humanity.

3rd. The English despatch exclusively supports the points enunciated for the benefit of weak States. War, however, cannot always take place between a great and a little State. It may be made between Powers presumed to be of equal strength. Such wars are indeed the most terrible, and it is impossible not to take this eventuality into consideration. Amongst the States exposed to make war there are those which, by their position, have only to look for aggressive wars, others that have only to regard defensive wars. The first-named would place no limit to the exercise of force; the latter would allow it no rights. But

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there are others that are exposed to run the same chances according to the fortunes of battle. They are the best judges of the question, and they have manifested a certain amount of unanimity. They know, in fact, that the victor of today may be the vanquished of to-morrow. They are, therefore, interested in regarding with impartiality the rights and the duties of the most weak, as well as those of the strongest. And if the principles which they believe they can admit are intended to render war less cruel in regulating it, it seems beyond all question that the most feeble States will profit equally with them.

4th. The Russian project has no idea of developing the military power of the great States, or of procuring advantages to those which have large armies and compulsory military service. These powers exist. The advantages they derive from their military organisations exist also. It is not the Conference that has created them. The state of things may be regretted, but as it does exist it appears that the only practical means to remedy them are:-1st. To prevent conflicts between these great agglomerations of military forces; 2nd. When the conflicts break out, to restrain the effects of their destructive powers. The first of these means rests on the political action of the Governments, on their wisdom and moderation, supported by a community of their interests which are attached to the maintenance of peace. The second has been the object of the Brussels meeting. The question proposed by the Russian Government has been to know if, instead of abandoning these great military forces to the unbridled and lawless excitement of struggles that might assume a character of extermination, it would not be for the general interest to agree with common accord to certain rules drawn from existing laws and customs, and destined to limit as far as possible the dimensions and the consequences of these struggles.

5th. It is observable that the Brussels Conference is reproached on the one hand with the development of militarism, and on the other with paralysing the national defence. It is, nevertheless, evident that a nation which developes its military strength creates a defensive as well as an aggressive power. The majority of European States have for a long time past occupied themselves with the organisation of defensive forces side by side with their active armies. Several have already obtained that object by legislative measures which have carried their powers of self-defence to the utmost de

gree of efficiency. The Brussels Conference has, therefore, merely admitted and regulated a fact which exists in the nature of things, and the necessities of an epoch. So far from restraining the right of national defence, it tended, on the contrary, to reinforce it, by rendering it, on the one hand, more effective, and depriving it, on the other, of the consequences of the abuse of power, and assuring to it a legal treatment by

the enemy. The conditions proposed with that object have been reduced to their simplest form of expression. They would be easily applied, and are by no means onerous. Their special object is to distinguish the citizen who defends his country from the marauder, the plunderer, and the assassin, and to assure to the former the respect which is due to him, and to save him from the severe measures which the laws and usages of war authorise in regard to the latter.

6th. As to the method of conducting the deliberations of the Conference, the Russian delegates proposed to formulate only the points agreed upon, in order to come to a general understanding. But, as sharp divergencies of opinion arose on questions of the most essential importance, they proposed to record in the protocols all the different views, with the view that they might obtain from those points on which they were not in accord the light necessary to guide them to any important agreement. And even though the Conference may have had no further result for the moment, its labours will remain as a serious inquiry as to how the necessities and consequences of war are regarded at this moment by civilised States. Its protocols will be consulted, in case of war, as evidence of great moral value. One may be assured that the work will not be fruitless, and that, developed and sanctioned by experience, it will help to determine the laws of war to the advantage of civilisation and humanity; and on that account it is to be regretted that the voice of England should not be heard in the Conference.

7th. The special articles of the project regarding which an agreement was finally arrived at by mutual concessions, so far from being restricted to the sanction of practices generally admitted, all gave rise to divergencies of opinion and laboured discussions. The fact that agreement was only arrived at by mutual concessions proves it sufficiently. Nothing demonstrates more clearly, on the other hand, how obscure the law of nations is even in respect of questions which seem at first sight the most simple and the least open to dispute.

8th. With regard to the chapter on reprisals, it was not the only one which might have given rise to burning contentions. There was scarcely one of the subjects discussed which would not have provoked irritating questions in recent wars. The Russian Government had confidence in the intelligence and the goodwill of the Cabinets to which it appealed, and that confidence was perfectly justified by the conduct of their delegates. There is so much the greater reason to believe that it would be the same in case of a second réunion. That chapter was not suppressed for that reason, but because several delegates preferred to risk an evil for which there are no limits rather than recognise it, even for the sake of restraining and reducing it. Reprisals will therefore continue as one of the most terrible necessities of war. They are recognised by the law of nations, confirmed by experience-only they will continue to be without rule or limit. It remains to be seen what either conquerors or conquered will gain thereby in the future. The English despatch affirms that in suppressing that chapter the Conference has eluded one of its principal difficulties-that of determining how to enforce rules established. It admits that the only means is to use reprisals in case of their violation. That argument applies to the whole right of nations at present existing. It is the best proof of its imperfection, and it is remarkable that on the one side the right of nations refuses to recognise the principle of reprisals, and on the other that the principle is accepted as the only sanction for the laws of war. It was the object of the Brussels project to remedy that state of things by giving moral sanction, derived from reciprocal engagements, to the laws and usages of war. If, agreeably to that project, the principles of the law of nations, elucidated and completed as far as possible, were placed under the guarantee of declarations publicly exchanged between the Governments, and by obligation made known to their armies, there is reason to hope that the number of cases in which a people is forced to resort to reprisals would be reduced.

9th. If, nevertheless, the English Government declares in conclusion that it will uphold the principles of international law upon which it has hitherto acted, and that it will impose the same obligation on its allies, it would be desirable that it should complete that declaration by saying what those principles are. How will England and its allies interpret those doubtful points and cover those deficiencies in international law which were the object of the discussions