defined. S 5. A felony is a crime which is, or may be, pun- Felony ishable with death, or by imprisonment in a State prison. See Rep. Code Cr. Pro., 3, § 5. S 6. Every other crime is a misdemeanor. Rep. Code Cr. Pro., 3, § 6. Misdemeanor. Penal Code. S 7. This Code specifies the classes of persons who Objects of are deemed capable of crimes, and liable to punishment therefor; and defines the nature of the various crimes; and prescribes the kind and measure of punishment to be inflicted for each. The manner of prosecuting and convicting criminals is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Conviction must precede ishment S 8. The punishments prescribed by this Code can be inflicted only upon a legal conviction in a court unhaving jurisdiction. A similar provision has already been reported in the Code of Criminal Procedure. (§ 7.) As however the language employed in the various sections of the Penal Code, prescribing punishments, requires some such general restriction to render it accurate, the commissioners have repeated the provision here, in order that each Code may be, as far as possible, complete and independent, and that the legislature may have it in their power to consider either, without being embarrassed by its connection with others. The same consideration has induced them in a number of instances to insert a provision deemed necessary to the completeness of the Code, notwithstanding that it has been embodied in one of the Codes already reported, and now before the Legislature for its consideration. -S9. Whenever a crime is distinguished into degrees, the jury, if they convict the prisoner, shall find the degree of the crime, of which he is guilty. S 10. The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. Jury are to of crime. find degree Construc tion of the Penal Code. Of sections declaring crimes punishable. ments, how S 11. The several sections of this Code which declare certain crimes to be punishable as therein mentioned, devolve a duty upon the court authorized to pass sentence, to determine and impose the punishment prescribed. Punish- S 12. Whenever in this Code the punishment for a determined crime is left undetermined between certain limits, the punishment to be inflicted in a particular case shall be determined by the court authorized to pass sentence, within such limits as may be prescribed by this Code. Punish ment of felonies. Punishment of misdemeanors. S 13. Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by this Code or by some existing provision of law, every offense declared to be felony is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. S 14. Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by this Code, or by some existing provisions of law, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Based upon 2 Revised Statutes, 597, § 40; which provided that misdemeanors for which no punishment was expressly provided, should incur a year's imprisonment, or a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars. In raising the limit of the fine to five hundred dollars, the commissioners do not intend to intimate that cases formerly coming within the operation of the general provision should incur a higher fine; but merely to simplify the provisions of the Code by allowing the general provision to cover misdemeanors of a more aggravated character, than were embraced by the section of the Revised Statutes referred to. TITLE I. OF THE PERSONS LIABLE TO PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME. SECTION 15. Who are liable to punishment. 16. Who are capable of committing crimes. 17. Intoxicated persons. 18. Morbid criminal propensity. 19. Insane persons, acquitted, how disposed of. 20. Involuntary subjection. 21. Subjection by duress. 22. Subjection inferred from coverture. 23. When not inferred. 24. Inference may be rebutted. 25. Exemption of public ministers. S 15. The following persons are liable to punish- Who are ment under the laws of this State: 1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this State; 2. All who commit theft out of this State, and bring, or are found with the property stolen, in this State; 3. All who, being out of this State, abduct or kidnap, by force or fraud, any person contrary to the laws of the place where such act is committed, and bring, send or convey such person within the limits of this State, and are afterwards found therein; 4. And all who, being out of this State, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another person, causing an injury to any person or property within this State by means of any act or neglect which is declared criminal by this Code, and who are afterwards found within this State. The principles embodied in this section are also presented, viewed from a somewhat different point, in the Reported Code of Criminal Procedure (§§ 127-137), coupled with provisions distinguishing the proper county for the trial of various offenses. The question of county jurisdictions belong wholly to the Code of Procedure. But the jurisdiction of the State over offenses planned or in part committed outside its boundaries, ought to be asserted in this Code, unless elsewhere enacted. The liable to punishment. Who are capable of principle has therefore been restated; although in language somewhat different from that employed in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subd. 2.-Subdivision of this section embodies the rule prescribed by 2 Rev. Stat., 698, § 4. The familiar rule of the English law was that one who committed theft in one county, and carried the stolen goods into another county, might be tried in the latter county; the detaining of the goods there being deemed a continuance of the theft. The former cases in this State held that no such rule was applicable, where property was stolen in another of the United States, and brought into this State. (People v. Gardner, 2 John., 477; McCullogh's case, 2 City H. Rec., 45.) The contrary view was, however, adopted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, (Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass., 116; Same v. Andrews, 2 Id., 14,) which held that there was a sufficient analogy between the different States comprising the Federal Union, and the counties of a single State, to justify the adoption of the English rule. The Revised Statutes following these Massachusetts decisions (see Revisers' Notes), prescribed the same rule. The commissioners now propose that it be extended to thefts committed out of the State, whether in another state of the Union, or elsewhere. Subd. 3. The third subdivision is new; but is sug gested as a parallel provision applicable to the case of abduction of the person. It has been held that such abduction furnishes no ground for a civil action for damages in the courts of this State. (Malony v. Dows, 8 Abbott's Pr., 316.) Conceding this to be so, it is conceived that cases may arise in which the State may be interested to punish the act. S16. All persons are capable of committing crimes, committing except those belonging to the following classes: 1. Children under the age of seven years; crimes. 2. Children of the age of seven years, but under the age of fourteen years, in the absence of proof that at the time of committing the act or neglect charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness; 3. Idiots; 4. Lunatics, insane persons, and all persons of unsound mind, including persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness; 5. Persons who committed the act, or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. But ignorance of the law does not excuse from punishment for its violation; 6. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof; 7. Persons who committed the act, or made the omission charged while under involuntary subjection to the power of superiors. Subd. 4. As drafted, this subdivision expresses the rule of the common law as very uniformly understood and practised, until within a recent period. (McNaughton's case, 1 Townsend's St. Tr., 312, 401.) Within a few years past, some respectable authorities in medical jurisprudence, and some adjudications in cases involving civil rights, have advanced the view that any mental aberration, any monomania however limited in subject, is to be deemed a disease of the mind, as a unit, necessarily involving and embarrassing all the mental action of the individual. That what have been heretofore deemed partial insanities, are in truth special developments of a disease of the mind, which is necessarily so fundamental as to render its soundness, even upon subjects furthest removea rom the particular hallucination exhibited, wholly uncertain. (Waring v. Waring, 12 Jurist, O. S. C. S., 948; Moore's Privy Co. R.; Ray's Med. Jur. of Insanity, 2 ed., 27, 29.) If this view shall be deemed sound, and to be a proper element in the criminal jurisprudence of insanity, a question will arise which is now suggested only for the consideration of the Legislature; whether the last clause of the subdivision- the words "upon proof that, &c., they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness," may be omitted. Intoxicated $ 17. No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication, shall be deemed less crimi- persons. nal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the |