See also section 241, supra) If the accused was com- The word "misdemeanor " is substituted for the phrase The restriction "in cases where such killing would be murder at the common law," is omitted because it is deemed essential to the usefulness of the Code that its definitions should not be dependent upon a recourse to the common law to render them intelligible. Subd. 2. This provision embodies two sections of the existing law; 2 Rev. Stat., 661, §§ 10 and 12. Both species of homicide there respectively defined as manslaughter in the second and third degrees, are here brought within the first degree, in harmony with the design of the Commissioners to simplify the law of manslaughter by reducing the number of its degrees. Subd. 3. This embodies the provision of 2 Rev. Stat., 661, § 11. The phrase "to commit a crime" is substituted for "to commit any felony or to do any unlawful act," because the words "unlawful act" might be deemed to embrace trespass; yet the case of homicide of a person committing a trespass, is specifically declared manslaughter in the third degree by 2 Rev. Stat., 661, § 13. unborn by injury to S 249. The willful killing of an unborn quick child Killing by any injury committed upon the person of the mother of such child, and not prohibited in the next following section, is manslaughter in the first degree. Substituted for 2 Rev. Stat., 661, § 8, the language of which is obscure. Whether an injury to the mother resulting in death would be murder depends wholly on the intent, and not at all on the description of the injury. quick child person of mother. istering S 250. Every person who administers to any woman By adminpregnant with a quick child, or who prescribes for drugs, &c. such woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or who uses or employs any instrument or other means with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to pre Punish ment of serve the life of such mother, is guilty, in case the death of the child or of the mother is thereby produced, of manslaughter in the first degree. Laws of 1846, ch. 22, § 1. In the final report this section and the preceding may perhaps be embodied in one. S 251. Every person guilty of manslaughter in the manslaugh first degree is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not less than four years. ter in first degree. Manslaughter in second degree defined Liability of owner of mischievous animal. Liability of persons vessels. Founded upon 2 Rev. Stat., 662, § 20; but modified to correspond with the reduction in the number of degrees in manslaughter, introduced by the preceding provisions. S 252. Every killing of one human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, which under the provisions of this chapter is not murder, nor manslaughter in the first degree, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide, is manslaughter in the second degree. S253. If the owner of a mischievous animal, knowing its propensities, willfully suffers it to go at large, or keeps it without ordinary care, and such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances permitted, to avoid such animal, the owner is deemed guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. See 2 Rev. Stat., 662, § 14. S254. Every person navigating any vessel for navigating gain, who willfully or negligently receives so many passengers or such a quantity of other lading on board such vessel, that by means thereof such vessel sinks or is overset or injured, and thereby any human being is drowned or otherwise killed, is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. Liability of persons in charge of steamboats. See 2 Rev. Stat., 662, § 15. $255. Every captain or other person having charge of any steamboat used for the conveyance of passen gers, or of the boilers and engines thereof, who, from ignorance or gross neglect, or for the purpose of excelling any other boat in speed, creates, or allows to be created, such an undue quantity of steam as to burst or break the boiler or other apparatus in which it shall be generated, or any apparatus or machinery connected therewith, by which bursting or breaking any person is killed, is deemed guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. See 2 Rev. Stat., 662, § 16. persons in steam en S 256. Every engineer, or other person having Liability of charge of any steam boiler, steam engine or other charge of apparatus for generating or employing steam, ein- gines. ployed in any manufactory, railway or other mechanical works, who willfully or from ignorance or gross neglect creates, or allows to be created, such an undue quantity of steam as to burst or break the boiler, engine or apparatus, or to cause any other accident whereby the death of a human being is produced, is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. physicians. S257. Every physician who, being in a state of Liability of intoxication, without a design to effect death, administers any poison drug or medicine, or does any other act as such physician, to another person, which produces the death of such other, is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. See ? Rev. Stat., 442, § 17. persons keeping contrary to law. S 258. Every person guilty of making or keeping Liability of gunpowder or saltpetre within any city or village, in making or any quantity or manner such as is prohibited by law gunpowder or by any ordinance of said city or village, in consequence whereof any explosion occurs whereby any human being is killed, is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. See Laws of 1846, ch. 291, § 19. ment of $259. Every person guilty of manslaughter in the Punishsecond degree is punishable by imprisonment in a manslaugh ter in second degree. Excusable homicide defined. Justifiable homicide by public officers. Justifiable homicide by other persons. state prison not more than four years, and not less than two years, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Founded on 2 Rev. Stat., 662, § 20; but modified to correspond with the reduction in the number of degrees in manslaughter, introduced by the preceding provisions. $260. Homicide is excusable in the following cases: 1. When committed by accident and misfortune, in lawfully correcting a child or servant, or in doing any other lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent; 2. When committed by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat; provided that no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and that the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. 2 Rev. Stat., 660, § 4. The verbal alterations introduced are intended only to attain greater clearness of expression; and not to introduce any substantive changes. S 261. Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, either: 1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent. court; or, 2, When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the execution of some legal process, or to the discharge of any other legal duty; or, 3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued, or who have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. $262. Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the following cases: 1. When resisting any attempt to murder such person, or to commit any felony upon him or her, or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person is; or, 2. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, master, mistress or servant, when there is a reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or, 3. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed; or in lawfully suppressing any riot; or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace. 2 Rev. Stat., 660, § 3. CHAPTER III. MAIMING. SECTION 263. Maiming another person defined. 264. Maiming one's self to escape performance of a duty. 265. Maiming one's self to obtain alms. 266. What injury may constitute maiming. 267. What disfigurement may constitute maiming. 268. Designing to maim, &c. 269. Premeditated design. 270. Subsequent recovery of injured person, when a defense. person S 263. Every person who, with premeditated design Maiming to injure another, inflicts upon his person any injury end. which disfigures his personal appearance, or disables any member or organ of his body, or seriously diminishes his physical vigor, is guilty of maiming. Definitions of mayhem found in several of the more Earlier authorities, however, are to be found giving |