Maiming one's self to escape the per 66 heming is when one member of the commonweale shall "take from another member of the same a natural mem"ber of his bodie, or the use and benefit thereof, and thereby disable him to serve the commonweale by his weapons in the time of warre, or by his labor in the "time of peace; and also diminisheth the strength of "his bodie, and weaken him thereby to get his own "lyving, and by that means the commonweale is in a "sort deprived of the use of one of her members.' Wounds which merely disfigured the person without impairing the general strength or the powers of some particular member seem to have been excluded by all the common law definitions of mayhem; though made the subject of several stringent enactments. In this country, however, many of the statutes, punishing maims, embrace also wounds, deemed aggravated from the personal disfigurement involved, merely. Thus, our own statute (2 Rev. Stat., 664, § 27), without defining the term “mayhem," imposes one and the same punishment on any person who "shall cut out or disable the tongue; put out an eye; slit the lip or nose; cut off or disable any limb," &c. So the Revised Statutes of Ohio embrace biting the nose, lip or ear. (1 Rev. Stat. of Ohio, 1860, 411, § 23.) The act of congress of 1790 (1 U. S. Stat. at L., 115, § 13), specifies cutting off an ear. So in Illinois, mayhem is expressly defined to consist in unlawfully depriving a human being of a member of his or her body, or disfiguring or rendering it useless. (1 Purple's Stat. of Ill., 365, § 47.) And there are many other statutes substantially like these, in this respect. (Compare 2 Gavin & H. Stat. of Ind., 1862, 440, § 12; 2 Rev. Stat. of Miss., 565, § 34; Pen. Code of La., 141, art. 235; 1 Md. Code, 235, § 121; Rev. Stat. of Maine, 667, § 15; Rev. Code, D. C., 517, § 20; Code of Iowa, 350, § 2577; Code of Ala., 563, § 3105; Stat. of Conn., Comp. of 1854, 307, § 12; 1 Rev. Stat. of Ky., 382, art. 6, § 1.) Following the example of these enactments, the Commissioners have extended the penalty of maiming to embrace wounding which either disables or disfigures. S264. Every person who, with design to disable himself from performing any legal duty, existing formance of or anticipated, inflicts upon himself any injury whereby he is so disabled, is guilty of maiming. a duty. In countries burdened with a severe military conscription, self inflicted injuries, to escape the service, are not uncommon. "It is curious to observe," says Foderé (Tr. de Med. Leg., vol. 2, p. 480, cited in 1 Beck's Med. Jur., 37) "how many young men have, during the last twenty years, 66 * * 'Ulcers," says Beck (1 Med. Jur., 50), "are frequently induced by the use of acetate of copper quicklime, &c. * Frauds of this description are frequently attempted in hospitals or to avoid the performance of labor of every kind." And he narrates several striking instances of this species of imposture. The military law of France declares any individual drafted to perform military duty who incapacitates himself, either temporarily or permanently, punishable by imprisonment. The extent to which practices of this sort have been St. John, writing in 1851 (Village Life in Egypt), and accounts. During the present war similar means are known to have been resorted to, in some instances, to avoid mili tary service; and this suggests the insertion of the section. one's self alms. $265. Every person who inflicts upon himself any Maiming injury such as if inflicted upon another would consti- to obtain tute maiming, with intent to avail himself of such injury, to excite sympathy, or to obtain alms, or any charitable relief, is guilty of maiming. What inju ry may $266. To constitute maiming it is immaterial by what means or instrument, or in what manner, the constitute injury was inflicted. U. S. v. Scroggins, 1 Hempst., 478. $267. To constitute maiming by disfigurement the injury must be such as is calculated, after healing, to attract observation. A disfigurement which can only maiming. What dismay constiing. figurement tute maim. Designing to maim, &c. Premedi. tated design. Subsequent recovery of injured person, when a defense. Punishment. he discovered by close inspection does not constitute maiming. State v. Girkin, 1 Ired. L., 121. State v. Abram, 10 Ala., 928. S 268. A design to injure, disfigure or disable, is inferred from the fact of inflicting an injury which is calculated to disfigure or disable, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. State v. Girkin, 1 Ired. L., 121. State v. Crawford, 2 Dev., 425. $269. A premeditated design to injure, disfigure or disable, sufficient to constitute maiming, may be formed instantly before inflicting the wound. The Revised Statutes required "a premeditated design evinced, lying in wait for the purpose, or in any other manner;" or an intent to kill or commit a felony. (2 Rev. Stat., 664, § 27.) As, however, the words "premeditated design," as used in the Revised Statutes, relative to murder. have been construed to embrace a design formed at the instant of the act, the Commissioners suggest the employment of them in the same sense in reference to maiming. That rule has been laid down in State v. Simmons, 3 Ala., 497. $270. Where it appears, upon a trial for maiming another person, that the person injured has, before the time of trial, so far recovered from the wound that he is no longer by it disfigured in personal appearance, or disabled in any member or organ of his body, or affected in physical vigor, no conviction for maiming shall be had; but the accused may be convicted of assault and battery, with or without a special intent, according to the proof. To constitute maiming the injury should be permanent. Where, however, the prosecution have proved a wound inflicted by the prisoner, and effective at the time to disable the person injured, it is for the prisoner to show that the injury was only temporary. (Baker v. State, 4 Ark., 56, 64.) S 271. Every person guilty of maiming is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding seven years, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The punishment prescribed by the Revised Statutes, for maiming, is imprisonment in a state prison, not exceeding seven years. (2 Rev. Stat., 664, § 27.) As the Commissioners have extended their definition to embrace self-inflicted injuries, they have provided for a broader range of judicial discretion, in respect to the punishment. CHAPTER IV. KIDNAPPING. SECTION 272. Kidnapping defined. 273. Effect of consent of injured person. 274. Selling services of person of color. 275. Removing from this state persons held to service in another state. 276. Penalty imposed on judicial officers. defined. $ 272. Every person who, without lawful authority, Kidnapping forcibly seizes and confines another, or inveigles or kidnaps another, with intent, either: 1. To cause such other person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will; or, 2. To cause such other person to be sent out of this state against his will; or, 3. To cause such person to be sold as a slave, or in any way held to service against his will, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years. 2 Rev. Stat., 664, 28. The above section embraces substantially the provisions of 2 Rev. Stat., 664, § 30, and is somewhat broader than the term "kidnapping," in the caption of the chapter, would imply. That term is, by earlier writers, used to denote the abduction of children only; and this seems its etymological meaning. (See Philip's World of Words; Webst. Dict.; Johns. Dict.) Many accurate authorities employ it without respect to the age of the subject; but confine it to an abduction committed with intent to export the person injured out from his own home, state or country, to another. Effect of consent of injured person. (See Bell's Dict. Law of Scot.; Bouvier's Law Dict.; Jacob's Law Dict.) Thus, the Revised Statutes of Illinois (vol. 1, p. 366, §§ 54 and 55,) make false imprisonment to consist in a confinement or detention without legal authority, and confine kidnapping to the offense of abducting and sending to another country. The existing provisions of our own Revised Statutes draw no such distinction. The Commissioners have thought it best to preserve them as they now stand. In employing the term kidnapping as a caption to the chapter, they use it only as a convenient title for purposes of reference, and not as restrictive upon the definitions given of offenses prohibited. Particular offenses, analogous to kidnapping, e. g., abduction of females, and child stealing, are the subject of some special provisions in other chapters of this Code. In Hadden v. The People, 25 N. Y., 372, it has been lately held that procuring the intoxication of a sailor with the design of getting him on shipboard, without his consent, and taking him on board in that condition is kidnapping under the Revised Statutes; and that it is immaterial whether the offender did the acts, or any of them, in person or caused them to be done. Where the intent and expectation, in such a case, is that the seaman will be carried out of this state, the offense is complete, although the ship be not in fact, destined to leave the state. $273. Upon any trial for a violation of the preceding section the consent of the person kidnapped or confined thereto shall not be a defense, unless it appear satisfactorily to the jury that such person was above the age of twelve years, and that such consent was not extorted by threats or by duress. See 2 Rev. Stat., 664, § 30. The above section is deemed by the Commissioners unnecessary; but as it is found in the existing law, and embodies a principle clearly correct, they have hesitated to omit it, lest a change in the law should seem to have been intended. They have inserted the words "that such person was above the age of twelve years;" believing that the consent of a child under that age, however freely given, should not operate as a defense. Punishment of accessaries. Section 31, of 2 Rev. Stat., 665, providing that every person convicted as an accessary to any kidnapping or confinement hereinbefore prohibited is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, not exceeding six years, or in a county jail, not exceeding one year, or by a fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, |