the plaintiff and his mother had before enjoyed, and which is described in the new lease. And it must be remembered, that, at the time the Earl grants the new lease, he must be taken to know the actual state and condition of the premises which form the subjectmatter of the demise: for, although, when his ancestor granted the original ground lease, in 1728, he demised a large vacant piece of ground, in 1819 the Earl demised a messuage or dwelling-house of a certain definite and known shape, size, and character, consisting of certain parts and additions, as it then actually stood. We cannot, therefore, feel any doubt but that, under the description contained in the lease, the coal-shoot and the several pipes passed to the lessee as a constituent part of the messuage or dwelling-house itself. 1838. HINCHLIFFE v. The Earl of cessary incident. The next question which then arises, and that upon Right of way which the determination of the present case rests, is, whe- passed as a nether the right of passing and repassing over the soil of the passage, and using it for the purposes above mentioned, did also pass to the lessees under this lease. And we are of opinion, that, upon the facts found in this special verdict, such right did pass as a necessary incident to the subject-matter actually demised, although not specially named in the lease. The rule laid down in Plowden's Commentaries, 16 a., is, "that, by the grant of any thing, conceditur et id sine quâ res ipsa haberi non potest; as, if one grants his trees, the grantee may enter upon his land for the cutting down and carrying them away," for which the authority of the Year Book, 2 Ric. 2, is cited. And, again, Twisden J., in Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Saund. 322, lays down the rule of law to be-" When the use of a thing is granted, every thing is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. As, if a man gives me a license to lay pipes of lead in his land to convey water to my cistern, I may afterwards enter and dig the land to mend the pipes, though the soil belongs to another 1838. HINCHLIFFE v. The Earl of and not to me." Now, in the present case, the jury have expressly found in their verdict, that the passing and repassing over the way or passage is not merely convenient but necessary" for the use of the coal-shoot, and of the pipes, and for the repairing and amending the same and the side or wall of the house;" to the performance of which, it is also to be observed, the lessees are expressly bound by the covenant entered into by them with the lessor by the same lease. Since, therefore, as it appears to us, the right in question passed to the lessees under the reversionary lease of 1819, as incidental to the enjoyment of that which was the clear and manifest subject-matter of demise, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question argued at the bar before us, how far the same right might or might not pass to the lessees under the express words of the lease itself, as an "appurtenant unto the said piece or parcel of ground, messuage or tenement, erections, buildings, and premises belonging or appertaining." There are strong authorities in the law books to shew these words capable of a wider interpretation, and of carrying more than is an appurtenant in the strictly legal sense of that word, where such interpretation is necessary in order to give that word some operation. Such are the cases in F. Moore's Reports, 682, Archer v. Bennett, 1 Lev. 131, Sid. 211, Hill v. Grainge, Plowd. Com. 170, and others. But we think it at once sufficient, and at the same time safer, to rely upon the ground on which we have already held that the right claimed by the plaintiff may be supported, and to give no opinion upon the second point. Upon the whole, it appears, upon the facts stated in this special verdict, that the ground upon which the defendant has principally relied for the extinguishment of the right set up by the plaintiff, viz. the unity of possession of the messuage and of the soil of the passage over which such right is claimed, does not exist; that the way in question was in fact enjoyed in alieno solo at the date of the lease, and that the same was necessary for the use and repair of the coal-shoot, pipes, and side or wall of the house; that the lease was made by the person entitled to the reversion both of the messuage and the soil of the passage, that is, by a person who had the power to grant or to continue the existence of such right at the time the lease was to come into operation and effect; and that, if the words of the lease will admit of such a construction, it was the apparent intention of the parties to that instrument, arising from the state and circumstances of the property, and the language of the instrument itself, that they should be so construed: more especially when it is observed that the lessor, at the time he is making a reversionary demise of the messuage which has been built upon his land during the existence of the original lease, requires from the lessee a covenant to repair and keep in repair the said messuage and all other erections that should be built, and to purge, scour, and cleanse all pipes &c. made or to be made-words that are peculiarly applicable to the existing state of the premises. Under these circumstances, we think, in supporting the right claimed, upon the legal principle on which we have placed it, without laying down that the easement or right is included in the express words of the lease, we do no more than carry into effect the intention of the parties themselves. We therefore give judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. 1838. HINCHLIFFE บ. The Earl of 1838. Tuesday, June 12th. Pending an action brought by an attorney CURLING v. SEDGER. AN action having been brought in this court by an attor ney of the court for the recovery of a bill of costs for busithe recovery of ness done for the defendant in the conduct of a prosecution of this court for for business done in the Central Crimi a bill of charges in the Central Criminal Court, and for attendances at a Metropolitan police office-Lord Abinger, at the instance of the defendant, made an order for referring the bill to be taxed by one of the Masters of this court. nal Court, it is competent to a judge of either of the superior courts to make an order for such bill. that this power of the statute 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23. The rights of a party to have a signed bill delivered, and to have it referred for taxation, are correlative. Stephen, Serjeant, in Easter Term last, obtained a rule the taxation of nisi to discharge the order, on the ground that a bill for such business was not taxable.-To bring a case within is independent the statute 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23, it is requisite that the business should have been transacted in a court wherein attornies alone are authorized to practise, and having a taxing officer. None but attornies of one of the superior courts can practise in the county court-12 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 7-or in the courts of Quarter Sessions-22 Geo. 2, c. 46, s. 12; and these statutes, being in pari materiâ, have received in this respect the same construction as the 2 Geo. 2, c. 23-Sylvester v. Webster, 9 Bing. 358, 2 M. & Scott, 506. In the Central Criminal Court, however, the practice is not so restrained; it needs no qualification to enable a party to practise there. In Becke v. Wells, 1 C. & M. 75, 3 Tyr. 193, it was expressly decided that a bill for business done in the Middlesex county court is not within the statute. He produced affidavits stating that there is no officer in the Central Criminal Court whose duty it is to tax bills of costs as between party and party or attorney and client; and that Mr. Justice Littledale and Mr. Justice Williams had in similar cases refused to make orders for referring bills to be taxed. Wilde, Serjeant, and Smythies, on a subsequent day in the same term, shewed cause. The 23rd section of the 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, enacts" that no attorney or solicitor shall commence or maintain any action or suit for the recovery of any fees, charges, or disbursements at law or in equity, until the expiration of one month or more after such attorney or solicitor respectively shall have delivered unto the party or parties to be charged therewith, or left for him, her, or them, at his, her, or their dwelling-house or last place of abode a bill of such fees, charges, and disbursements, written in a common legible hand, &c., which bill shall be subscribed with the proper hand of such attorney or solicitor respectively; and, upon application of the party or parties chargeable by such bill, or of any other person in that behalf authorized, unto the said Lord High Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, or unto any of the courts aforesaid, or unto a judge or baron of any of the said courts respectively in which the business contained in such bill, or the greatest part thereof in amount or value, shall have been transacted, and upon the submission of the said party or parties, or such other person authorized as aforesaid, to pay the whole sum that upon taxation of the said bill shall appear to be due to the said attorney or solicitor respectively, it shall and may be lawful for the said Lord High Chancellor, &c., respectively, and they are hereby required, to refer the said bills, and the said attorney's or solicitor's demand thereupon (although no action or suit shall be then depending in such court touching the same), to be taxed and settled by the proper officer of such court without any money being brought into the said court for that purpose," 1838. CURLING v. SEDGER. 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 23. &c. &c. In Smith v. Taylor, 5 M. & P. 66, 7 Bing. 259, Act remedial. the statute was held to be remedial. A bill for business Business at done at the Quarter Sessions, is taxable-Ex parte Wil- quarter sessions, liams, 4 T. R. 124, 496; Clarke v. Donovan, 5 T. R. 694, 1 Esp. 137; Sylvester v. Webster, 2 M. & Scott, |