III. Of Money into Court-See REGULE GENERALES.

IV. In Reduction of Damages. Payment shall not in any case be allowed to be given in evidence in reduction of damages or debt; but shall be pleaded in bar. Reg. Gen., Trinity, 1 Vict., 354. And see PARTICULARS OF Demand. PEREMPTORY UNDERTAKING. Default, where made.

Obtaining a rule for a special jury, after a peremptory undertaking, the cause being a proper one to be tried by a special jury, is not such a default as is contemplated by the statute 14 Geo. 2, c. 17. Twysden v. Stulz, 434.

PERSON.

See RAILWAY ACT.

PLEADING.

I. Duplicity.

1. In assumpsit by the drawer against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, the defendant pleaded, that the acceptance was obtained from him by duress, and that he never had any value for the acceptance: -Held, bad on special demurrer on the ground of duplicity. Stevens v. Underwood, 402.

2. A plea containing two distinct defences is not the less a double plea, because one of the defences is badly pleaded. Ib.

II. Uncertainty.

To a count on a bill of exchange (against the acceptor), the defendant pleaded that the bill was not duly stamped or marked with any proper stamp or mark denoting that the lawful, requisite, and proper rate or duty chargeable or charged thereon had been or was duly stamped, marked, or impressed thereon:-Held, bad on special demurrer, inasmuch as it was left in doubt whether the bill was altogether unstamped, or stamped with a stamp of a higher or lower value than required by law. Haward v. Smith, 438.

III. General Issue, by Statute.

It is ordered, that, in every case in which a defendant shall plead the general issue, intending to give the special matter in evidence, by virtue of any act of parliament, he shall insert in the margin of such plea the words "By statute," other

wise such plea shall be taken not to have been pleaded by virtue of any act of parliament; and such memorandum shall be inserted in the margin of the issue and of the Nisi Prius record. Reg. Gen., Trinity, 1 Vict. 353.

IV. What admissible in Evidence under non assumpsit.

A trotting match was made between 0). and T. for a 1,000l., contrary to the sta tutes. The defendant took a 501, share of O.'s risk, and agreed to let the plaintiff participate in it to the extent of 204 0.'s horse won, and the defendant received the 50%. In an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the 201. as money had and received to his use:-Held, that it was not competent to the defendant to set up the illegality of the transaction under non assumpsit. Martin v. Smith, 268.

V. Issuable Pleas.

A defendant who is under terms to plead issuably, cannot plead that the plaintiff has been discharged under the insolvent debtors act, and that the cause of action has passed to his assignees. Wettenhall v. Graham, 603.

VI. Replication de Injuria. Quære, whether de injuriâ is a good replication in an action of debt. Hebden v. Ruel, 442.

VII. Striking out Counts joined in Violation of the Rule of Hilary Term, 4 Will. 4, r. 5-See PRACTICE, VI.

surviving executor under the will of P. S., in exercise of a power to that effect in the will, granted a lease for one thousand years, for the purpose of raising money to pay debts and legacies:-Held, that the leasing power of J. S. under the will was not suspended by the lease of 1812, so far as regarded the grantee of the term under the power to demise by way of mortgage given to the executors; and consequently that such grantee had the immediate reversion in him, and might sue upon the covenants in the lease of 1814. Bringloe v. Goodson, 502.

PRACTICE.

I. Process.

1. A writ of capias was issued against the defendant at the suit of C. D., an attorney, with an indorsement stating that the writ was issued by A. B. and C. D., of &c., attornies for the plaintiff:-Held, that this indorsement was a sufficient compliance with the statute 2 Will. 4, c. 39. Dawes v. Solomonson, 596.

2. A writ of capias and a rule to return it were delivered to the sheriff at the same time. The sheriff two days afterwards returned non est inventus :-The court refused to interfere. Evens v. James, 354. 3. Motion for distringas to compel appearance-affidavit, what sufficient. Moody v. Morgan, 842.

II. Appearance.

Upon application for leave to issue a distringas to compel appearance, it must be made to appear that the defendant is not out of the kingdom. Norman v. Winter, 378.

III. Amendment of Proceedings.

The action having been improperly brought under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, in the name of two persons as public officers, the 9th section only authorizing the action to be brought in the name of one-The court allowed the proceedings to be amended by striking out the name of one of the plaintiffs, on payment of costs. Holmes v. Binney, 346.

IV. Discontinuance.

To induce the court to permit a plaintiff who has incorrectly joined in the action one who was no party to the contract, to discontinue without paying costs, it must be clearly shewn that he was induced by

the defendant's conduct to believe that the contract was entered into with the two, and that the mistake did not arise from his own negligence. Poensgen v. Chanter, 300.

V. Staying Proceedings.

It is ordered, that, in future, in any action agrinst an acceptor of a bill of exchange, or the maker of a promissory note, the defendant shall be at liberty to stay proceedings on payment of the debt and costs in that action only. Reg. Gen., Trinity, 1 Vict., 351.

VI. Striking out Counts joined in Violation of the Rule of Hilary Term, 4 Will. 4, r. 5.

In assumpsit against carriers for the non-delivery of goods, the declaration contained two counts-the first, on a contract for the conveyance of the goods from the port of loading to the port of discharge the second, on a contract to take care of the same goods at the wharf where they should be landed, and to convey them to the plaintiff's place of business, for other reward to the defendants in that behalf:-The court refused to strike out one of the counts, upon a suggestion, that the joining them was an apparent violation of the rule of Hilary Term, 4 Will. 4, r. 5. James v. Bourne, 231.

VII. Striking out Frivolous Demurrers.

Where a demurrer, though not absolutely frivolous, is evidently for the mere purpose of gaining time, the court will permit it to be taken out of its turn. Dawson v. Parry, 890.

VIII. Rule to compute.

The court will not entertain a preliminary motion to dispense with the production of a bill of exchange before the Master on a rule to compute. Landers v. Lee, 732.

IX. Judgment as in Case of a Nonsuit.

1. Issue was joined in Trinity Vacation, and an insufficient notice of trial given for the adjourned sittings after Trinity Term; the defendant refusing to accept the notice, a second notice was given for the first sitting in this term, the plaintiff not proceeding to trial pursuant to this notice, the defendant in the same term moved for judgment as in case

Where a nolle prosequi is entered on a plea going to the whole cause of action, the defendant is entitled to judgment upon the whole record. Peters v. Croft, 897.

XIII. Entering Verdict.

To an action of assumpsit the defendant pleaded-non assumpsit-payment-and a set-off. The cause was referred to an arbitrator who was to have power to certify for whom and for what amount, if any, the verdict should be entered. No evidence was offered before the arbitrator in support of the second and third pleas; but, the plaintiff failing to establish his claim, the arbitrator d rected a general verdict to be entered for the defer dant: -The court sent the matter back to the arbitrator, that the verdict might be entered according to the evidence. Woof v. Hooper, 281.

XIV. Signing Judyment.

1. At a quarter past eleven on the morning after the time for pleading had expired, the defendant's attorney called at the office of the plaintiff's attorney, in Buckingham Street, Strand, for the purpose of delivering a plea. Being informed that a clerk had just gone to the Temple to sign judgment, the defendant's attorney

hastened thither, and arrived at the office just as the judgment had been signed.— Held, that the judgment was regular. Stafford v. Nicholls, 577.

2. A judgment signed on the morning after the time for pleading has expired, whilst the parties are attending a judge on a summons for time to plead returnable before the judgment is actually signed is irregular. Abernethy v. Paton, 586.

XV. Entering and docketting Judgment.

A rule for entering and docketting the judgment must be addressed to the party, and not to the attorney. Engler v. Twysden, 580.

XVI. Entering Satisfaction on the Roll.

Where the plaintiff's attorney had charged in his bill, and had been paid, for entering satisfaction on the roll, but had omitted to do so.-The court, at the instance of the defendant, ordered him to do so at his own cost. Oram v. Parker, 245.

XVII. Business at Chambers.

The swearing an affidavit to hold to bail (in trover) before a commissioner of the court, is a "business depending in the court," within the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 4, sufficient to authorize any judge of either court to make an order for holding the defendant to bail. Driffin v. Taylor, 141.

And see INTERPLEADER-VENUE.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Duty of Agent.

In assumpit for the breach of an undertaking to effect an insurance according to special instructions, the declaration alleged the duty of the defendants to be to effect the insurance according to the instructions, or, in the event of their inability to do so, to give the plaintiff notice of such their inability:-Held, that this was a duty necessarily implied from the nature of the employment. Callander v. Oelrichs, 761.

PRISONER.

I. Discharge under 48 Geo. 3, c. 123, s. 1. A party taken in execution on the 27th November for a debt or damages not ex

ceeding 201., is entitled to move for his discharge under the 48 Geo. 3, c. 123, s. 1, on the 26th November following, the ten days' notice required by rule 90 of Hilary Term, 2 Will. 4, having been previously given. Poras v. Wilkins, 893.

Discharge of, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.

1. Upon the equity of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 7, a defendant who was arrested and had given bail before that statute came into operation, was held entitled to have an exoneretur entered upon the bailpiece on entering a common appearance. Bateman v. Dunn, 739.

2. The affidavit upon which to found an application for an order to arrest or detain a party under ss. 3 and 7, must be such as to shew to the satisfaction of the court or the judge that there is probable cause for believing that he is about to quit England unless he be forthwith apprehended; and must shew the grounds of such belief. Ib.

And see BAIL.

PROMISSORY NOTES.

It is ordered, that, in future, in any action against an acceptor of a bill of exchange, or the maker of a promissory note, the defendant shall be at liberty to stay proceedings on payment of the debt and costs in that action only. Reg. Gen., Trinity, 1 Vict., 351.

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

See COVENANT, II.

RAILWAY ACT.

Construction of.

1. By a railway act, it was provided that no action should be brought against any person for any thing done or omitted to be done in pursuance of the act, or in the execution of its powers or authorities, unless twenty days' previous notice in writing should have been given by the party intending to commence and prosecute such action, to the intended defendant, &c.:-Held, that the company were included in the word "person," and entitled to notice of action, notwithstanding that, in numerous instances throughout the act, the terms "person" and "party" were used in opposition to "corporation." Boyd

VOL. VI.

v. The London and Croydon Railway Co., 461.

2. Service of declaration and notice in ejectment upon the Southampton Railway Co. Doe d. Martyns v. Roe, 610.

REBELLION, WRIT OF. See WRIT OF REBELLION.

RECOVERY.

Operation of, on Reversion in the Crown.

By letters patent, King Charles the Second, in the twenty-fifth year of his reign, in consideration of natural love and affection, granted an estate tail in certain lands to his illegitimate son, H. F., afterwards created Duke of Grafton:-Held, that such estate, and all other estates tail and remainders and reversions thereupon expectant or depending, were effectually barred and extinguished by indentures of bargain and sale under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 15, notwithstanding the statute 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20. Duke of Grafton v. The London and Birmingham Railway Co., 719.

REGULÆ GENERALES.

I. Fees payable on Admission of Attornies, and Distribution thereof.

Whereas it is provided by the act of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 45, s. 3, that, after the 1st November, 1838, any person entitled to be admitted an attorney of any of the superior courts of common law at Westminster, shall, after being sworn in and admitted as an attorney of any one of the said courts, be entitled to practise in any other of the said courts, upon signing the roll of such court, and not otherwise, in like manner as if he had been sworn in and admitted an attorney of such court; provided that no additional fee besides those payable under an act of 1 Vict., c. 56, shall be demanded or paid; and that the fees payable for such admissions shall be apportioned in such manner as the judges of the said courts, or any eight of them, shall by any rule or order made in term or vacation direct and appoint:

We therefore direct and appoint that the fees payable by virtue of the said last-mentioned act for the judge's fiat, be received in the first instance by the clerk of the judge granting the fiat, and paid

921 REGULÆ GENERALES.

over by him to the clerk of the Chief Justice or Chief Baron of the court, as the case may be; and, the day after each term, all the fees so received shall be divided into fifteen portions, one of which shall be paid to the clerk or clerks of each judge; and, further, that the fees payable by virtue of the said act to the ushers, shall be received, in the first instance, by one of the ushers of the court in which the admission shall take place, and shall, on the day after each term, be divided into three equal portions, one of which shall be paid to the ushers of each court. Reg. Gen., Michaelmas, 2 Vict., 709.

II. Payment of Money into Court. Whereas it is expedient that certain of the rules and regulations made in Hilary Term, 4 Will. 4, pursuant to the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 1, should be amended, and some further rules and regulations made pursuant to the said sta

tute:

It is therefore ordered, that, from and after the first day of Michaelmas Term next, inclusive, unless parliament shall in the meantime otherwise enact, the following rules and regulations, made pursuant to the said statute, shall be in force:

It is ordered that the 17th and 19th of the General Rules and Regulations made pursuant to the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 1, be repealed; and that, in the place thereof, the two following amended rules be substituted :

"C. D.

ats. A. B.

"The day of

"The defendant, by

his attorney, [or, in person, &c.] says, [or, in case it be pleaded as to part only, add, as to- -7., being part of the sum in the declaration (or, count) mentioned,' or 'as to the residue of the sum of .'] that the plaintiff ought not further to maintain his action, because the defendant now brings into court the sum of -1. ready to be paid to the plaintiff: And the defendant further says that the plaintiff has not sustained damages [or, in actions of debt, 'that he never was indebted to the plaintiff"] to a greater amount than the said

REGULÆ GENERALES.

sum of &c., in respect of the cause of ac tion in the declaration [or, in the introductory part of this plea'] mentioned: And this he is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment if the plaintiff ought further to maintain his action thereof."

For the 19th Rule]-The plaintiff, after the delivery of a plea of payment of money into court, shall be at liberty to reply to the same by accepting the sum so paid into court in full satisfaction and discharge of the cause of action in respect of which it has been paid in, and he shall be at liberty in that case to tax his costs of suit, and, in case of non-payment thereof within forty-eight hours, to sign judgment for his costs of suit so taxed; or the plaintiff may reply "that he has sustained damages [or, "that the defendant was and is indebted to him," as the case may be,] to a greater amount than the said sum;" and, in the event of an issue thereon being found for the defendant, the defendant shall be entitled to judgment and his costs of suit. Trinity, 1 Vict., 351–3.

III. Pleading-General Issue by Statute.

It is further ordered, that, in every case in which a defendant shall plead the general issue, intending to give the special matter in evidence, by virtue of any act of parliament, he shall insert in the margin of such plea the words "By statute," otherwise such plea shall be taken not to have been pleaded by virtue of any act of parliament; and such memorandum shall be inserted in the margin of the issue and of the Nisi Prius record. Trinity, 1 Vict., 353.

IV. Particulars of Demand.

In any case in which the plaintiff (in order to avoid the expense of a plea of payment) shall have given credit in the particulars of his demand for any sum or sums of money therein admitted to have been paid to the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary for the defendant to plead the payment of such sum or sums of money.

But this rule is not to apply to cases where the plaintiff, after stating the amount of his demand, states that he seeks to recover a certain balance, without giving credit for any particular sum or sums. Trinity, 1 Vict., 353.

V. Payment to be pleaded. Payment shall not in any case be