representatives, and delegates from territories, to the President of the Senate, pro tempore, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 3000 dollars; and to each senator, member of the House of Representatives, and delegate, 1500 dollars." This Act was repealed on the 9th of February, 1817. It is now fixed, by the Act of the 22nd of January, 1821, at eight dollars a day to both senators and representatives, and eight dollars for every twenty miles travelled; and to the President of the Senate, pro tempore, (in case of there being no Vice-President of the Republic, who is ex officio President of the Senate,) eight dollars a day additional.

A proposition was last year brought before the Senate, by one of its committees, to change the mode of compensation from eight dollars per working day to 2000 dollars per year, without reference to the number of days that a member might be engaged in his legislative duties.

This, no doubt, would be a more dignified manner of assigning the stipend, and would

relieve members of both Houses from the imputations continually heaped upon them by the public press, that they wilfully prolong business for the sake of adding to the number of days for which they may claim their salaries. But the yearly amount proposed by that committee did not satisfy public opinion "out of doors." It was urged that the annual payments ought to be, for the President, 50,000 dollars a year (instead of 25,000 as at present); each cabinet minister 10,000 (instead of 6000); each senator, 6000; and each member of the House of Representatives, 5000. It was argued that, with so many means as now existed of making fortunes, by the application of ordinary talents and industry in any one of the various careers of life, it was not to be expected that men of the first qualifications would give themselves to the service of the republic for eight dollars per working day; that at the present rate of living, and considering the unavoidable expenses of a member of Congress at Washington and elsewhere, it was not probable that members in general would be satisfied with that sum.

Hence it has arisen-and it is a matter too notorious in the United States to make any reluctance necessary in referring to it herethat accusations without stint or measure are launched against a considerable proportion of the members of both Houses of Congress, to the effect that, in order to make up such incomes as will enable them to live in the manner they think requisite, they accept money payments from persons interested in questions. before the Legislature, to give their especial attention to such questions.

It is not necessary to impute corrupt motives to the members who thus allow themselves to become paid agents for the prosecution of claims, or the advancement of measures upon which they have also to decide in their deliberative capacity, in order to show how completely their conduct is a descent from the high position which the theory of their Constitution and the expectations of its framers claimed for it. That it is a departure from the first principles of a representative and deliberative body, is too obvious to need any

comment.

Neither, if corrupt motives are very freely imputed in the United States to such members (as is the well-known fact), do I desire to use that fact for the purpose of invidiously contrasting it with the general character of our own Legislature. Unhappily, the history of our railway legislation has left stigmas behind it which we should be glad to forget. And the circumstance that there always have been constituencies not very particular as to the moral qualities or the independence of the candidates of their choice, is sufficient to account for the degree of corruption that, in one form or another, is not unknown in the House of Commons. A marked distinction, however, between our system and that of the United States must not be forgotten, namely, that under their Constitution the frequency of elections, the very great diffusion of the franchise, and the payment of their members of both Houses, cause a class of men to be sent to the National Legislature, the majority of whom are not possessed of independent means sufficient to enable them to dispense with those

extraneous and unrecognised sources of emolument which are inconsistent with their position and character, should a low estimate of either happen to second the temptation; whereas, under ours, the vast preponderance among the members of the House of Commons of men of either hereditary or acquired wealth, or of competence honourably achieved and maintained, materially contributes to diffuse and preserve a high tone of feeling and of principle, which reduces the corrupt elements to exceptions; which is ever on the watch against their increase; and which despises and repels, though it may sometimes be obliged by political necessities to use them. And as regards the House of Lords, seldom indeed does even the voice of slander assail the honesty and independence of any one of its members. The extreme rarity -even during the moral contagion of the railway mania-of any instances in which members of that House were known to have made a discreditable use of their position for their own private advantage, was a proof of the