the councils of the nation."*

It was pro

posed at the time of the framing of the Constitution, that as promptitude of action, as well as wisdom, were required on such critical occasions as may justify war, it would be more expedient to place the power of declaring it in the Senate alone; a body composed of men of great "weight, sagacity, and experience."* But the argument prevailed that it would be desirable to interpose delay, by requiring the consent of the bodies more directly representing the mass of the people, who would have to pay the taxes incident to war.

Mr. Justice Story is of opinion that the restriction might have been usefully extended still further; that "the Executive who is to carry it on" ought to have a voice in determining whether it ought to be entered upon at all. And he adds, that "there might be a propriety in enforcing still greater restrictions, as, by requiring a concurrence of twothirds of both Houses ;"* for in his opinion "the history of republics has but too fatally § 1171.

*

proved that they are too ambitious of military fame and conquest, and too easily devoted to the views of demagogues, who flatter their pride and betray their interests.”

Under such circumstances war "is sometimes fatal to liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow wherever a successful commander will lead."*

It is continually asserted with great earnestness by persons who have the highest claims to respectful attention in the United States, -and their opinions are reflected in the most respectable portions of the press of that country-that the tendencies of the public mind there are not towards " military fame and conquest," and that the ambition of military glory, and the readiness to be swayed by those who have obtained it, are not, to any dangerous extent, the characteristics of the mass of the people. That the persons who take this view do so in all sincerity, there can be no possible doubt; and their hope is that their influence, and those ties of peace arising * § 1171.

out of material interests, which are daily expanding, and embracing more and more persons in the community, will be sufficient in any time of real danger to counterbalance and restrain the aggressive tendencies of the more excitable portion of their fellow-citizens.

Whatever may be the case in future, it cannot be said that the history of the past gives encouragement to any such hope. It is perfectly well known, and admits of no dispute, that both the Texan and the Mexican war were entered into against the opinions and in spite of the energetic warnings of a vast proportion of the most mature statesmen of the country, supported by the whole weight of that portion of the community above referred to. But there is no need to go back even to those comparatively recent instances for proof of the aggressive tendencies of the people of the United States, considered as a whole, and judged of by the acts of their Government. The whole of the exceedingly minute and elaborate despatch of the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs in that country,

Mr. Everett, on the subject of Cuba, dated 1st December, 1852, and addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, is devoted to proofs and illustrations of the fact that the public opinion of the United States has compelled the Government to advance in that career of conquest and annexation, the successive steps of which he at so much length describes. But Mr. Everett goes beyond that, and avows, in relation to the question then at issue, that any treaty entered into between the United States, France, and Great Britain, containing mutual engagements to respect the present state of possession of the Island of Cuba in all future time, would but give "a new and powerful impulse" to those acts of lawless aggression which the Government of the United States, though it had disavowed and discouraged them, had not been able to prevent.

It cannot be a matter of surprise that Lord John Russell, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, should, in his answer of the 16th of February, 1853, to Mr. Everett's despatch,

have described the above argument and admission as "disquieting."

The attacks that had been made on the island of Cuba "by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with the avowed design of taking possession of that island," had been, under various pretexts, for the most part openly justified by a large, powerful, and active portion of the press of that country, representing the opinions of the ultra-democratic party; or, if condemned, condemned with such a quality of censure as implied, and in fact gave, encouragement to renewed efforts. One of the most common topics of justification was, that Great Britain. and France were each intriguing to obtain a cession of the island from Spain, and that it was necessary to anticipate them by assisting the inhabitants to declare their independence of Spain, with the view to their then applying for admission into the Union.

of

To prove to the world that the imputation

any such intrigue was groundless, the Earl of Malmesbury, then Secretary of State for