world" will be best maintained by a course of action on the part of the people of the United States, in accordance with the principles promulgated in that document.

These considerations are of the more importance, because a strong indication has been given by the President of the United States to act, if possible, upon the policy enunciated in his address above-mentioned.

He has appointed, as Minister of the United States to the Court of Madrid, Mr. Soulé, a member of the most advanced section of the democratic party, and a gentleman who has taken a very conspicuous part in the agitation in favour of adding Cuba to the possessions of the United States. The proposition to acquire it from Spain by purchase has found much favour with that party; and, although the suggestion has been once indignantly rejected by the Spanish Government, the well-known necessities of that Government, coupled with the fact of the large sum of £6,000,000 sterling, or thereabouts (about 30,000,000 of dollars), having accumulated from surplus

revenue, and now lying idle in the coffers of the Treasury of the United States, have encouraged the revival of the proposal, which there can be little doubt that Mr. Soulé will endeavour to renew to the Spanish Ministry. The addresses received by Mr. Soulé, from his political friends, on the eve of his leaving New York, and his answers to them, sufficiently indicated what was expected of him, and the object to which his endeavours would be directed.

The bold stroke of policy," therefore, which may restore the popularity of the President and reunite his party, may possibly be soon revealed to the world.

Happily for the repose, the dignity, the credit of this country, the Executive is exposed to no such temptations as have been above described. Even the most popular minister, enjoying the most unbounded confidence of Parliament, and wielding all the constitutional powers entrusted to him by the Crown, could take no more effectual course to destroy his popularity in a day, than to propose, on the

one hand, to weaken still more an enfeebled ally, and, on the other, to deny the right of all other powers, who would be affected by such an act, to interfere. That the Crown or a minister should have recourse to such a line of

policy with the view to acquire popularity, or to restore it, is an impossible supposition in this country.

In relation to the above subject, the manner in which the power to make treaties is arranged by the Constitution of the United States, is of some significance. This (by the 2nd sect. of the 2nd article, clause 2) is committed to the President, "by and with the consent of two-thirds of the senators present."

Upon this Mr. Justice Story remarks that—

"Accurate knowledge of foreign politics, a steady and systematic adherence to the same views, nice and uniform sensibility to national character, as well as secrecy, decision, and despatch, are required for a due execution of the power to make treaties."

And, accordingly, as the Senate "may be fairly presumed at all times to contain a very * § 1516.

large portion of talents, experience, political wisdom, and sincere patriotism, a spirit of liberality, and a deep devotion to all the substantial interests of the country," the constitutional check of requiring two-thirds of that body to confirm a treaty will be found to be "a sufficient guarantee against any wanton sacrifice of private rights, or any betrayal of public privileges."*

Mr. Justice Story further thinks that—

"However safe it may be in Governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an executive magistrate chosen for four years. It has been remarked, and is unquestionably true, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people,† has personally too much at stake in the Government to be in any material danger of corruption by foreign powers, so as to surrender any important rights or interests. But a man raised from a private station to the rank of chief magistrate for a short period, having but a slender and moderate fortune, and no very deep stake in the society, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice duty to interest,

* § 1513.

Mr. Justice Story probably alluded to events in English history, a century and a half old, or to some of the absolute monarchies of the continent of Europe.

If

which it would require great virtue to withstand. ambitious, he might be tempted to seek his own aggrandisement by the aid of a foreign power, and use the field of negotiation for the purpose. If avaricious, he might make his treachery to his constituents a vendible article at an enormous price. Although such occurrences are not ordinarily to be expected, yet the history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature which would make it wise in a nation to commit its most delicate interests and momentous concerns to the unrestrained disposal of a single magistrate. It is far more wise. to interpose checks upon the actual exercise of the power, than remedies to redress and punish an abuse of it.”*

The vast patronage in the hands of the President of the United States, and the manner in which, immediately after each presidential election, it has, according to recent usage, been exercised, are circumstances which create some of the most marked distinctions between the position and power of the President, and that of the Executive of this country.

By the clause of the Constitution last quoted,t the President is empowered to nominate, and by and with the consent of the Senate to appoint ambassadors, other public

* § 1515.

Article 2, section 2.