that "in the adoption of no State constitution has the assent been asked of any but the qualified voters ;" and who shall be the qualified voters has been, and is continually being settled and altered by themselves, "no two States having fixed the qualifications of voters upon the same uniform basis." "From this," he adds, "will be seen how little, even in the most free of republican governments, any abstract right of suffrage, or any original indefeasible privilege, has been recognised in practice."*

If, therefore, there be any person in this country, of any pretensions to fair reasoning or competent information, who is still prepared to maintain that the franchise is anything more than a trust, placed by the legislative authority of the State, for the time being, in the hands of those who, in the judgment of that authority, will not abuse it, but will use it for the promotion of the common good, he must have recourse to the example of some country whose practice has gone beyond that

of "the most free of republican governments," the several States of the American Unionif such there be-and to arguments which those republican governments do not recognise.

The fact has been, that in free States this privilege of the franchise has been intrusted to a greater or less number, "without any State being able to assert that its own mode is exclusively founded in natural justice, or is most conformable to sound policy, or is best adapted to the public security."

It is

entirely a question of local and temporary discretion; for "what may best promote the public weal and secure public liberty in one age or nation, may totally fail of similar results under local, physical, or moral predicaments essentially different."*

At the time of the framing of the Constitution of the United States, the differences in the manner in which the franchise was settled in the different States was remarkable. In Virginia, the exclusive right to vote was in the freeholders; in Rhode Island and Con

necticut, in the freemen; in Massachusetts, in persons possessing a given amount of personal property; in other States, in persons paying taxes, or having a fixed residence. The question was much debated by the convention which drew up the Constitution, whether it would not be more fair and equal, and more likely to insure a direct and immediate representation of the popular opinion, if a uniform qualification for voting were adopted for the House of Representatives. It was, however, unanimously decided otherwise, and upon grounds precisely similar to those which are held to justify and recommend the very great diversity of qualifications for the elective franchise that has so long existed in this country. On this point Mr. Justice Story's reasoning is as follows:

"It might be urged that it is far from being clear, upon reasoning or experience, that uniformity in the composition of a representative body is either desirable or expedient, founded in sounder policy, or more promotive of the general good, than a mixed system, embracing and representing, and combining, distinct interests, classes, and opinions. In England, the House of Commons, as a representative

body, is founded upon no uniform principle, either of numbers, or classes, or places. And in every system of reform which has found public favour in that country, many of these diversities have been embodied from choice, as important checks upon undue legislation, as facilitating the representation of different interests and different opinions, and as thus securing, by a well-balanced and intelligent representation of all the various classes of society, a permanent protection of the public liberties of the people, and a firm security of the private rights of persons and property.

Accordingly, the diversities of franchise in each State were adopted as the basis of the elections for the representatives of the Union; the electors" of the most numerous branch of the State legislature" being fixed upon as those to be invested with the franchise for the election of the members of the House of Representatives.

The length of time for which the members of the House of Representatives should be elected was not settled by the framers of the Constitution without considerable differences of opinion. They had before them the varied examples in their own country, of Virginia,

* § 585.

electing its representatives for seven years, North and South Carolina for two years, Connecticut and Rhode Island for six months, and the other States for a year. Abstract maxims and theoretical arguments had great influence in creating a preference for annual elections. The resolution ultimately adopted was, that the members of the House of Representatives should be elected for two years. Whether or not this was a wise decision, may be gathered from the views which Mr. Justice Story does not hesitate to place before his countrymen, with his usual fairness and honesty. His proposition is, that—

"The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society; and, in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, while they continue in their public trust."*

The latter object may to some extent be attained by frequency of elections. But how frequent they ought to be is clearly a matter for the exercise of a wise discretion. For it is

* § 589.