91 O'CONNOR, J., dissenting micromanagement of state bar rules-facilitation of a "consumer's access to legal services." Ante, at 110. Facilitation of access to legal services is hardly achieved where the consumer neither knows the organization nor can readily verify its criteria for membership. "[A]dvertising claims as to the quality of services . . . are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction." Bates, supra, at 383-384; see also In re R. M. J., supra, at 201 (“[C]laims as to quality . . . might be so likely to mislead as to warrant restriction"). As the Supreme Court of Illinois properly concluded, certification is tantamount to a claim of quality and superiority and is therefore inherently likely to mislead. 126 Ill. 2d, at 410, 534 N. E. 2d, at 986. Indeed, the plurality's citation of others' descriptions of NBTA certification supports the conclusion that it is intended to attest to the quality of the lawyer's work. The plurality refers to the Task Force on Lawyer Competence of the Conference of Chief Justices, Report with Findings and Recommendations to the Conference of Chief Justices, Publication No. NCSC-021, (May 26, 1982), which stated: "The National Board of Trial Advocacy, a national certification program that provides recognition for superior achievement in trial advocacy, uses a highly-structured certification process in addition to a formal examination to select its members." Id., at 33-34 (emphasis added). Not only does the certification claim lead the consumer to believe that this lawyer is better than those lawyers lacking such certification, it also leads to the conclusion that the State licenses the lawyer's purported superiority. The juxtaposition on petitioner's letterhead of "Licensed: Illinois, Missouri, Arizona" with the claim of NBTA certification increases the likelihood of deception. As the court below reasoned, 126 Ill. 2d, at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984, the proximity of the two statements might easily lead the consumer to conclude that the State has sanctioned the certification. As it is O'CONNOR, J., dissenting 496 U. S. common knowledge that States police the ethical standards of the profession, that inference is likely to be especially misleading. The plurality disposes of this difficulty by drawing an unconvincing distinction between licensing and certification: "We are satisfied that the consuming public understands that licenses . . . are issued by governmental authorities and that a host of certificates . . . are issued by private organizations." Ante, at 103. Yet, no such bright line exists. For example, California is now certifying legal specialists. See Cal. Rules Ct., Policies Governing the State Bar of California Program for Certifying Legal Specialists (1990). See also Ariz. Rule Prof. Conduct ER 7.4 (1990); Ark. Model Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(c) (1990); Fla. Rule Prof. Conduct 4-7.5(c) (1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rule of Prof. Conduct 7.4 (1988); N. J. Ct. Rule 1:39 and N. J. Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4 (1989); N. M. Rules Governing Practice of Law, Rule of Prof. Conduct 16-704 (1988); N. C. Ann. Rules, Plan of Certified Legal Specialization, App. H, Rule 5.7 (1989); S. C. Rules on Lawyer Advertising, Ct. Rule 7.4 (Supp. 1989); Tex. State Bar Rules, Art. 10, 89, DR 2-101(C) (1989); Utah Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (1990). Thus, claims of certification may well lead the ordinary consumer to conclude that the State has sanctioned such a claim. "[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services," "the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the [attorney commercial speech] arena." Bates, supra, at 383. The Supreme Court of Illinois did not err when it concluded that the ordinary consumer is likely to be misled by the juxtaposition of state bar admission and claims of civil trial specialty. Because the statement of certification on petitioner's letterhead is inherently misleading, the State may prohibit it without violation of the First Amendment. See In re R. M. J., supra, at 203 ("Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely"). Petitioner does not suggest a less burdensome means of regulating attorney claims of certification than case-by-case 91 O'CONNOR, J., dissenting determination. Under petitioner's theory, the First Amendment requires States that would protect their consumers from misleading claims of certification to provide an individual hearing for each and every claim of certification, extending well beyond NBTA certification to any organization that may be used by a resourceful lawyer. In my view, the First Amendment does not require the State to establish such an onerous system and permits the State simply to prohibit such inherently misleading claims. As a majority of this Court agree, see ante, at 111 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment, joined by BRENNAN, J.); ante, at 118 (WHITE, J., dissenting); supra, at 121-124 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting, joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, J.), petitioner's claim to certification is at least potentially misleading. If the information cannot be presented in a way that is not deceptive, even statements that are merely potentially misleading may be regulated with an absolute prohibition. See In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. It is difficult to believe that a disclaimer could be fashioned, as the plurality suggests, ante, at 110; see also opinion concurring in judgment, ante, at 117, that would make petitioner's claim of certification on his letterhead not potentially misleading. Such a disclaimer would have to communicate three separate pieces of information in a space that could reasonably fit on a letterhead along with the claim of certification: (1) that the claim to certification does not necessarily indicate that the attorney provides higher quality representation than those who are not certified; (2) that the certification is not state sanctioned; and (3) either the criteria for certification or a reasonable means by which the consumer could determine what those criteria are. Even if the State were to permit claims of certification along with disclaimers, in order to protect consumers adequately, the State would have to engage in case-by-case review to ensure that the misleading character of a particular claim to certification was cured by a particular disclaimer. Alternatively, the State would be forced O'CONNOR, J., dissenting 496 U. S. to fashion its own disclaimer for each organization for which certification is claimed by the attorneys within its borders, provide for certification itself, or, at the least, screen each organization. See, e. g., Ala. Code Prof. Resp. Temp. DR 2-112 (1989) (providing for state screening of certifying organizations). Although having information about certification may be helpful for consumers, the Constitution does not require States to go to these extremes to protect their citizens from deception. In my view, the Court would do well to permit the States broad latitude to experiment in this area so as to allow such forms of disclosure as best serve each State's legitimate goal of assisting its citizens in obtaining the most reliable information about legal services. Petitioner also contends that Rule 2-105 violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to him on the ground that there is no rational justification for allowing attorneys in certain areas to claim specialization, e. g., admiralty, patent, and trademark, while precluding him from claiming a civil trial specialty. Yet, petitioner's claim is not merely a claim of concentration of practice, which the Illinois rules permit, but rather a claim of quality. It is not irrational for the State to assume that the reporting of professional experience is less likely to mislead the public than would claims of quality. Moreover, while the claim of NBTA certification is misleading in part because the public does not know what meaning to attach to it, the claim of concentration of practice merely states a fact understandable on its face to the ordinary consumer. Finally, as the Supreme Court of Illinois noted, historically lawyers have been permitted to advertise specialization in patent, trademark, and admiralty law because of the difficulties encountered by the general public in finding such attorneys. See 126 Ill. 2d, at 410-411, 534 N. E. 2d, at 986. Locating an attorney who is a civil trial advocate hardly poses the same obstacle. Thus, I would conclude that the regulation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. |