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496 U. S.

HORTON v. CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 88-7164. Argued February 21, 1990-Decided June 4, 1990 A California policeman determined that there was probable cause to search petitioner Horton's home for the proceeds of a robbery and the robbers' weapons. His search warrant affidavit referred to police reports that described both the weapons and the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds. Upon executing the warrant, the officer did not find the stolen property but did find the weapons in plain view and seized them. The trial court refused to suppress the seized evidence, and Horton was convicted of armed robbery. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Since the officer had testified that while he was searching Horton's home for the stolen property he was also interested in finding other evidence connecting Horton to the robbery, the seized evidence was not discovered "inadvertently." However, in rejecting Horton's argument that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, therefore required suppression of that evidence, the Court of Appeal relied on a State Supreme Court decision holding that Coolidge's discussion of the inadvertence limitation on the "plainview" doctrine was not binding because it was contained in a four-Justice plurality opinion.

Held: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view even though the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. Although inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view seizures, it is not a necessary condition. Pp. 133–142. (a) Coolidge is a binding precedent. However, the second of the Coolidge plurality's two limitations on the plain-view doctrine-that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent, id., at 469-was not essential to the Court's rejection of the State's plain-view argument in that case. Rather, the first limitation—that plain view alone is never enough to justify a warrantless seizure, id., at 468-adequately supports the Court's holding that gunpowder found in vacuum sweepings from one of the automobiles seized in plain view on the defendant's driveway in the course of his arrest could not be introduced against him because the warrantless seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. In order for a warrantless seizure of an object in plain view to be valid, two conditions must be satisfied in addition to the essential predicate that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which

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the object could be plainly viewed. First, the object's incriminating character must be "immediately apparent," id., at 466. Although the cars in Coolidge were obviously in plain view, their probative value remained uncertain until after their interiors were swept and examined microscopically. Second, the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself. Justice Harlan, who concurred in the Coolidge judgment but did not join the plurality's plain-view discussion, may well have rested his vote on the fact that the cars' seizure was accomplished by means of a warrantless trespass on the defendant's property. Pp. 133-137. (b) There are two flaws in the Coolidge plurality's conclusion that the inadvertence requirement was necessary to avoid a violation of the Fourth Amendment's mandate that a valid warrant "particularly describ[e]... [the] . . . things to be seized,'" id., at 469-471. First, evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by applying objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the officer's subjective state of mind. The fact that an officer is interested in an item and fully expects to find it should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by a warrant's terms or by a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirements that an unparticularized warrant not be issued and that a warrantless search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Here, the search's scope was not enlarged by the warrant's omission of reference to the weapons; indeed, no search for the weapons could have taken place if the named items had been found or surrendered at the outset. The prohibition against general searches and warrants is based on privacy concerns, which are not implicated when an officer with a lawful right of access to an item in plain view seizes it without a warrant. Pp. 137-142.

Affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 142.

Juliana Drous, by appointment of the Court, 493 U. S. 952, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General,

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Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John H. Sugiyama, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorney General.*

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we revisit an issue that was considered, but not conclusively resolved, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971): Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. We conclude that even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate "plain-view" seizures, it is not a necessary condition.

I

Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wailaker returned to his home after the Club's annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with an electrical shocking device, sometimes referred to as a "stun gun.” The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently to identify petitioner's distinctive voice. His identification was partially corroborated by a witness who saw the robbers leaving the scene and by evidence that petitioner had attended the coin show.

Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated the crime and determined that there was probable cause to search petitioner's home for the proceeds of the rob

*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Brian J. Martin; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Gregory U. Evans, Daniel B. Hales, George D. Webster, Jack E. Yelverton, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, Bernard J. Farber, and James P. Manak.

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bery and for the weapons used by the robbers. His affidavit for a search warrant referred to police reports that described the weapons as well as the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds, including three specifically described rings.

Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner's residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38-caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim.1 LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery. Thus, the seized evidence was not discovered "inadvertently."

The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in petitioner's home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. App. 43. It rejected petitioner's argument that our decision in Coolidge required suppression of the seized evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its discovery was not inadvertent. App. 52-53. The court relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P. 2d 1305 (1972). In that case the court noted that the discussion of the inadvertence limitation on the "plain-view" doctrine in Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge had been joined by only three other Members of this Court and therefore was not binding on it. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for review. App. 78.

Although the officer viewed other handguns and rifles, he did not seize them because there was no probable cause to believe they were associated with criminal activity. App. 30; see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 327 (1987).

2"In Coolidge, the police arrested a murder suspect in his house and thereupon seized his automobile and searched it later at the police station,

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Because the California courts' interpretation of the "plainview" doctrine conflicts with the view of other courts, and because the unresolved issue is important, we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 889 (1989).

finding physical evidence that the victim had been inside the vehicle. The record disclosed that the police had known for some time of the probable role of the car in the crime, and there were no 'exigent circumstances' to justify a warrantless search. Accordingly, the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart concluded that the seizure could not be justified on the theory that the vehicle was itself the 'instrumentality' of the crime and was discovered 'in plain view' of the officers. Justice Stewart was of the opinion that the 'plain-view' doctrine is applicable only to the inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence.

"If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as precedent, we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the discovery of petitioner's car was no more 'inadvertent' than in Coolidge. However, that portion of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which proposed the adoption of new restrictions to the 'plain-view' rule was signed by only four members of the court (Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.). Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan declined to join in that portion of the opinion, and the four remaining justices expressly disagreed with Justice Stewart on this point." North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d, at 307-308, 502 P. 2d, at 1308 (citations omitted).

See, e. g., Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F. 2d 930 (CA10 1987); United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 780 F. 2d 213 (CA2 1986); United States v. Roberts, 644 F. 2d 683 (CA8), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 821 (1980); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648 (CA5 1980); Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S. W. 2d 272 (App. 1981); State v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P. 2d 701 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 409 N. E. 2d 719 (1980); State v. Sanders, 431 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87, 652 P. 2d 673 (1982); Clark v. State, 498 N. E. 2d 918 (Ind. 1986); State v. Eiseman, 461 A. 2d 369, 380 (R. I. 1983); State v. McColgan, 631 S. W. 2d 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Tucker v. State, 620 P. 2d 1314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Dingle, 279 S. C. 278, 306 S. E. 2d 223 (1983). See also the cases cited in the Appendices to JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, post, at 149-153. At least two other state courts have agreed with the California Supreme Court. See State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P. 2d 969, 974 (1974); State v. Romero, 660 P. 2d 715 (Utah

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