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BRENNAN, J., dissenting

496 U. S.

tain warrant relating to murder investigation, entered the premises instead pursuant to a warrant relating to a drug investigation, and searched only the hiding place of the murder weapon, rather than conducting a "top to bottom" search for drugs). Similarly, an officer might use an exception to the generally applicable warrant requirement, such as "hot pursuit," as a pretext to enter a home to seize items he knows he will find in plain view. Such conduct would be a deliberate attempt to circumvent the constitutional requirement of a warrant "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," and cannot be condoned.

The discovery of evidence in pretextual searches is not "inadvertent" and should be suppressed for that reason. But even state courts that have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits pretextual searches. See State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781, 788, n. 2, 760 P. 2d 1197, 1204, n. 2 (1988); State v. Kelly, 718 P. 2d 385, 389, n. 1 (Utah 1986). The Court's opinion today does not address pretextual searches, but I have no doubt that such searches violate the Fourth Amendment.*

III

The Fourth Amendment demands that an individual's possessory interest in property be protected from unreasonable governmental seizures, not just by requiring a showing of probable cause, but also by requiring a neutral and detached

The Court also does not dispute the unconstitutionality of a search that goes "so far astray of a search for the items mentioned in the warrant that it [becomes] a general exploratory search for any evidence of wrongdoing that might be found." United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 876 (MD Fla. 1971). Indeed, the Court reiterates that "converting specific warrants into general warrants" is unconstitutional and emphasizes the need for scrupulous adherence to the requirements that warrants particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized and that a warrantless search "be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Ante, at 139-140.

128

Appendix A to opinion of BRENNAN, J., dissenting

magistrate to authorize the seizure in advance. The Court today ignores the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment, which protects possessory interests in the same manner as it protects privacy interests, in order to eliminate a generally accepted element of the plain-view doctrine that has caused no apparent difficulties for law enforcement officers. I am confident, however, that when confronted with more egregious police conduct than that found in this case, ante, at 130-131, such as pretextual searches, the Court's interpretation of the Constitution will be less parsimonious than it is today. I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX A

STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE
INADVERTENT DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT

Ala. Taylor v. State, 399 So. 2d 881, 892 (Ala. 1981)
Alaska Deal v. State, 626 P. 2d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 1980)

Ariz.

Ark.

Colo.

Conn.

State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 464, 724 P. 2d 545, 550 (1986)

Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 263, 724 S. W. 2d 160, 162 (1987)

People v. Cummings, 706 P. 2d 766, 771 (Colo. 1985)

State v. Hamilton, 214 Conn. 692, 701, 573 A. 2d 1197, 1201 (1990)

D. C.

Fla.

Gant v. United States, 518 A. 2d 103, 107 (DC App. 1986)

Hurt v. State, 388 So. 2d 281, 282-283 (Fla. App. 1980), review denied, 399 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1981)

Ga.

Appendix A to opinion of BRENNAN, J., dissenting 496 U. S.

Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 383-384, 254 S. E. 2d 337, 346, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 886 (1979)

Haw. State v. Barnett, 68 Haw. 32, 35, 703 P. 2d 680, 683 (1985)

Ill.

Ind.

Iowa

Kan.

Ky.

La.

Me.

Md.

Mass.

Mich.

Minn.

Miss.

People v. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d 195, 208, 520 N. E. 2d 374, 380-381, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 907 (1988)

Clark v. State, 498 N. E. 2d 918, 921 (Ind. 1986)

State v. Emerson, 375 N. W. 2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1985)

State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 497, 769 P. 2d 666, 669 (1989)

Patrick v. Commonwealth, 535 S. W. 2d 88, 89 (Ky. 1976)

State v. Stott, 395 So. 2d 714, 716 (La. 1981)

State v. Cloutier, 544 A. 2d 1277, 1281, n. 4 (Me. 1988)

Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. 232, 251–252, 554 A. 2d 356, 365 (1989)

Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 330–331,
409 N. E. 2d 719, 727 (1980)

People v. Dugan, 102 Mich. App. 497, 503-505, 302
N. W. 2d 209, 211-212 (1980), cert. denied, 455
U. S. 927 (1982)

State v. Buschkopf, 373 N. W. 2d 756, 768 (Minn.
1985)

Smith v. State, 419 So. 2d 563, 571 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1047 (1983)

Mo.

State v. Clark, 592 S. W. 2d 709, 713 (Mo. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 847 (1980)

128

Mont.

Neb.

Nev.

N. H.

N. J.

N. M.

Appendix A to opinion of BRENNAN, J., dissenting

State v. Hembd, 235 Mont. 361, 368-369, 767 P. 2d 864, 869 (1989)

State v. Hansen, 221 Neb. 103, 108-109, 375 N. W. 2d 605, 609 (1985)

Johnson v. State, 97 Nev. 621, 624, 637 P. 2d 1209, 1211 (1981)

State v. Cote, 126 N. H. 514, 525, 526, 493 A. 2d 1170, 1177-1178 (1985)

State v. Bruzzese, 94 N. J. 210, 237-238, 463 A. 2d 320, 334-335 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1030 (1984)

State v. Luna, 93 N. M. 773, 779, 606 P. 2d 183, 188 (1980)

N. Y. People v. Jackson, 41 N. Y. 2d 146, 150-151, 359 N. E. 2d 677, 681 (1976)

N. C.

N. D.

Ohio

Okla.

Ore.

Pa.

State v. White, 322 N. C. 770, 773, 370 S. E. 2d 390, 392, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 958 (1988)

State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866, 874 (N. D. 1985)

State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St. 3d 301, 308, 533 N. E.
2d 701, 709-710 (1988), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1090
(1990)

Farmer v. State, 759 P. 2d 1031, 1033 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988)

State v. Handran, 97 Ore. App. 546, 550-551, 777 P. 2d 981, 983, review denied, 308 Ore. 405, 781 P. 2d 855 (1989)

Commonwealth v. Davidson, 389 Pa. Super. 166, 175, 566 A. 2d 897, 901 (1989)

R. I.

S. C.

S. D.

Tenn.

Tex.

Vt.

Va.

Appendix B to opinion of BRENNAN, J., dissenting 496 U. S.

State v. Robalewski, 418 A. 2d 817, 824 (R. I. 1980)

State v. Culbreath, 300 S. C. 232, 237, 387 S. E. 2d 255, 257 (1990)

State v. Albright, 418 N. W. 2d 292, 295 (S. D. 1988)

State v. Byerley, 635 S. W. 2d 511, 513 (Tenn. 1982)

Stoker v. State, 788 S. W. 2d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc)

State v. Dorn, 145 Vt. 606, 620-621, 496 A. 2d 451, 459-460 (1985)

Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 949, 275
S. E. 2d 620, 621-622 (1981)

Wash. State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d 193, 196, 737 P. 2d 254, 257 (1987)

W. Va. State v. Moore, 165 W. Va. 837, 852-853, 272 S. E. 2d 804, 813-814 (1980)

Wis.

Wyo.

State v. Washington, 134 Wis. 2d 108, 119-121, 396
N. W. 2d 156, 161 (1986)

Jessee v. State, 640 P. 2d 56, 63 (Wyo. 1982)

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE

INADVERTENT DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT

CA1: United States v. Caggiano, 899 F. 2d 99, 103 (1990)

CA2:

United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F. 2d 12, 16, cert. denied, 493 U. S. 953 (1989)

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