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STEVENS, J., dissenting

496 U. S.

tion-a "student club," with powers and responsibilities defined by that status-that would not exist absent the State's intervention.2

I tend to agree with the plurality that the Constitution does not forbid a local school district, or Congress, to bring organized religion into the schools so long as all groups, religious or not, are welcomed equally if "they do not break either the laws or the furniture."23 That Congress has such authority, however, does not mean that the concerns underlying the Establishment Clause are irrelevant when, and if, that authority is exercised.24 Certainly we should not rush to embrace the conclusion that Congress swept aside these concerns by the hurried passage of clumsily drafted legislation.2

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22 Respondents have sought not merely access to school meeting rooms, but also "the same rights, privileges, terms and conditions accorded to other clubs" at Westside. Brief for Respondents 1, and n. 2. In this respect, at least, this case resembles Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988), more than it does Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. Cf. Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. Law & Ed. 23, 36 (1989) (stressing distinction between "cases. . . in which students seek only to prevent state interference with their communicative activities, and cases. . . in which students seek active assistance in the dissemination of their ideas").

23 The quotation is from Congressman Frank, who spoke in support of the bill on the House floor. 130 Cong. Rec. 20933 (1984).

24 The bill enjoyed "wide, bipartisan" support in both Houses, ante, at 239, but it likewise provoked thoughtful, bipartisan opposition in each body. Senator Chafee was among those who opposed the bill; he warned his colleagues that passing it might secure religious access to the schools only at the price of educational quality: "Legislation to encourage religious and political activity in the schools will do little to resolve our problems in education but could lead to discord between those whose cooperation in the drive for excellence in education is more important than ever." 130 Cong. Rec. 19248 (1984).

25 Professor Laycock summarizes the circumstances of the Act's passage as follows:

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There is an additional reason, also grounded in constitutional structure, why the Court's rendering of the Act is unsatisfying: So construed, the Act alters considerably the balance between state and federal authority over education, a balance long respected by both Congress and this Court. See, e. g., Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 863-864 (1982). The traditional allocation of responsibility makes sense for pedagogical, political, and ethical reasons. We have, of course, sometimes found it necessary to limit local control over schools in order to protect the constitutional integrity of public education. "That [boards of education] are educating

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"The bill was completely rewritten in a series of multilateral negotiations after it was passed by the House and reported out of committee in the Senate. Thus, the committee reports cast no light on the language actually adopted. Senator Hatfield offered the negotiated compromise as a floor amendment in the midst of the Senate's rush to adjourn for the Fourth of July. He repeatedly emphasized that as many as 1,000 people had been involved in the negotiations that produced the compromise version, and that not all the senators sponsoring the compromise agreed with everything in it. Senator Gorton accurately observed that too many cooks had spoiled the broth. But Hatfield had a large majority committed to his compromise, and he resisted any change that might have caused the deal to fall apart. The Hatfield compromise later passed the House under a special rule that precluded amendments and limited debate to one hour." 81 Nw. U. L. Rev., at 37 (footnotes omitted).

26 As a matter of pedagogy, delicate decisions about immersing young students in ideological cross-currents ought to be made by educators familiar with the experience and needs of the particular children affected and with the culture of the community in which they are likely to live as adults. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 271-272. matter of politics, public schools are often dependent for financial support upon local communities. The schools may be better able to retain local favor if they are free to shape their policies in response to local preferences. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49-53 (1973). As a matter of ethics, it is sensible to respect the desire of parents to guide the education of their children without surrendering control to distant politicians. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-403 (1923).

STEVENS, J., dissenting

496 U. S.

the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 637; see also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33 (1990). Congress may make similar judgments, and has sometimes done so, finding it necessary to regulate public education in order to achieve important national goals.

The Court's construction of this Act, however, leads to a sweeping intrusion by the Federal Government into the operation of our public schools, and does so despite the absence of any indication that Congress intended to divest local school districts of their power to shape the educational environment. If a high school administration continues to believe that it is sound policy to exclude controversial groups, such as political clubs, the Ku Klux Klan, and perhaps gay rights advocacy groups, from its facilities, it now must also close its doors to traditional extracurricular activities that are noncontroversial but not directly related to any course being offered at the school. Congress made frequent reference to the primacy of local control in public education, and the legislative history of the Act is thus inconsistent with the Court's rigid definition of "noncurriculum related groups." In

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27 See, e. g., 130 Cong. Rec. 19217 (1984) (“I am fully committed to the proposition that schools and education in general must be under the guidance and control of local school districts, local school boards, State school boards, and so forth. But where there is an action that is taken by such an official body, representing the public schools, which denies a right that is guaranteed under the Constitution, then the Congress of the United States, I think, has a duty and an obligation to step in and remedy that violated right") (statement of Sen. Hatfield). The Court does not suggest that Westside has deprived its students of any constitutionally guaranteed rights in this case. See also id., at 20941 ("The bill only applies if the school voluntarily creates a limited open forum. Everything is left to the

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deed, the very fact that Congress omitted any definition in the statute itself is persuasive evidence of an intent to allow local officials broad discretion in deciding whether or not to create limited public fora. I see no reason-and no evidence of congressional intent-to constrain that discretion any more narrowly than our holding in Widmar requires.

III

Against all these arguments the Court interposes Noah Webster's famous dictionary. It is a massive tome but no match for the weight the Court would put upon it. The Court relies heavily on the dictionary's definition of "curriculum." See ante, at 237. That word, of course, is not the Act's; moreover, the word "noncurriculum" is not in the dictionary. Neither Webster nor Congress has authorized us to assume that "noncurriculum" is a precise antonym of the word “curriculum." "Nonplus," for example, does not mean "minus" and it would be incorrect to assume that a "nonentity" is not an "entity" at all. Purely as a matter of defining a newly coined word, the term "noncurriculum" could fairly be construed to describe either the subjects that are "not a part of the current curriculum" or the subjects that "cannot properly be included in a public school curriculum." Either of those definitions is perfectly "sensible" because both describe subjects "that are not related to the body of courses offered by the school." See ante, at 237. When one considers the basic purpose of the Act, and its unquestioned linkage to our decision in Widmar, the latter definition surely is the more "sensible."

I respectfully dissent.

local option. Everything is left to the local administrators and the local school board") (statement of Rep. Goodling).

Syllabus

496 U.S.

ILLINOIS v. PERKINS

CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

No. 88-1972.

Argued February 20, 1990-Decided June 4, 1990

Police placed undercover agent Parisi in a jail cellblock with respondent Perkins, who was incarcerated on charges unrelated to the murder that Parisi was investigating. When Parisi asked him if he had ever killed anybody, Perkins made statements implicating himself in the murder. He was then charged with the murder. The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress his statements on the ground that Parisi had not given him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, before their conversations. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that Miranda prohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Held: An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response. The Miranda doctrine must be enforced strictly, but only in situations where the concerns underlying that decision are present. Those concerns are not implicated here, since the essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are lacking. It is Miranda's premise that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation, whereby the suspect may feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess. That coercive atmosphere is not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate and whom he assumes is not an officer having official power over him. In such circumstances, Miranda does not forbid mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust. The only difference between this case and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293-which upheld the placing of an undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information-is that Perkins was incarcerated. Detention, however, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that such use of an undercover agent renders involuntary the incarcerated suspect's resulting confession. Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1-which held that an inmate's statements to a known agent were inadmissible because no Miranda warnings were given-is distinguishable. Where the suspect does not

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