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vide expressly that the Organized Militia should be available for service “either within or without the territory of the United States.” 12
When the Army made plans to invoke that authority by using National Guard units south of the Mexican border, Attorney General Wickersham expressed the opinion that the Militia Clauses precluded such use outside the Nation's borders. 13 In response to that opinion and to the widening conflict in Europe, in 1916 Congress decided to "federalize” the National Guard. 14 In addition to providing for greater federal control and federal funding of the Guard, the statute required every guardsman to take a dual oath-to support the Nation as well as the States and to obey the President as well as the Governor-and authorized the President to draft members of the Guard into federal service. The statute expressly provided that the Army of the United States should include not only “the Regular Army,” but also “the National
12 Section 4, 35 Stat. 400.
13 “It is certain that it is only upon one or more of these three occasions when it is necessary to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the United States —that even Congress can call this militia into the service of the United States, or authorize it to be done.” 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 322, 323–324 (1912).
“The plain and certain meaning and effect of this constitutional provision is to confer upon Congress the power to call out the militia 'to execute the laws of the Union' within our own borders where, and where only, they exist, have any force, or can be executed by any one. This confers no power to send the militia into a foreign country to execute our laws which have no existence or force there and can not be there executed.” Id., at 327.
Under Attorney General Wickersham's analysis, it would apparently be unconstitutional to call forth the militia for training duty outside the United States, even with the consent of the appropriate Governor. Of course, his opinion assumed that the militia units so called forth would retain their separate status in the state militia during their period of federal service.
14 See Wiener, 54 Harv. L. Rev., at 199–203.
Guard while in the service of the United States,” 15 and that when drafted into federal service by the President, members of the Guard so drafted should “from the date of their draft, stand discharged from the militia, and shall from said date be subject to” the rules and regulations governing the Regular Army. $111, 39 Stat. 211.
During World War I, the President exercised the power to draft members of the National Guard into the Regular Arriy. That power, as well as the power to compel civilians to render military service, was upheld in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).16 Specifically, in those cases, and in Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3 (1918), the Court held that the plenary power to raise armies was “not qualified or restricted by the provisions of the militia clause." 17
15 The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 166, provided in part: "That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.”
16 “The possession of authority to enact the statute must be found in the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress power 'to declare war; ... to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; ... to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.' Article I, § 8. And of course the powers conferred by these provisions like all other powers given carry with them as provided by the Constitution the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.' Article I, § 8.” 245 U. S., at 377.
17 “This result is apparent since on the face of the opinion delivered in those cases the constitutional power of Congress to compel the military service which the assailed law commanded was based on the following propositions: (a) That the power of Congress to compel military service and the duty of the citizen to render it when called for were derived from the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to declare war and to raise armies. (b) That those powers were not qualified or restricted by the provisions of the militia clause, and hence the authority in the exercise of the war power to raise armies and use them when raised was not subject to limitations as to use of the militia, if any, deduced from the militia
The draft of the individual members of the National Guard into the Army during World War I virtually destroyed the Guard as an effective organization. The draft terminated the members' status as militiamen, and the statute did not provide for a restoration of their prewar status as members of the Guard when they were mustered out of the Army. This problem was ultimately remedied by the 1933 amendments to the 1916 Act. Those amendments created the "two overlapping but distinct organizations” described by the District Court - the National Guard of the various States and the National Guard of the United States.
Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National Guard unit have simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States. In the latter capacity they became a part of the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Army, but unless and until ordered to active duty in the Army, they retained their status as members of a separate State Guard unit. Under the 1933 Act, they could be ordered into active service whenever Congress declared a national emergency and authorized the use of troops in excess of those in the Regular Army. The statute plainly described the effect of such an order:
“All persons so ordered into the active military service of the United States shall from the date of such order stand relieved from duty in the National Guard of their respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia so long as they shall remain in the active military service of the United States, and during such time shall be subject
clause. And (c) that from these principles it also follows that the power to call for military duty under the authority to declare war and raise armies and the duty of the citizen to serve when called were coterminous with the constitutional grant from which the authority was derived and knew no limit deduced from a separate, and for the purpose of the war power, wholly incidental, if not irrelevant and subordinate, provision concerning the militia, found in the Constitution. Our duty to affirm is therefore made clear.” 247 U. S., at 6.
to such laws and regulations for the government of the
Id., at 161. Thus, under the “dual enlistment” provisions of the statute that have been in effect since 1933, a member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal service.
Until 1952 the statutory authority to order National Guard units to active duty was limited to periods of national emergency. In that year, Congress broadly authorized orders to "active duty or active duty for training” without any emergency requirement, but provided that such orders could not be issued without gubernatorial consent. The National Guard units have under this plan become a sizable portion of the Nation's military forces; for example, “the Army National Guard provides 46 percent of the combat units and 28 percent of the support forces of the Total Army.” 18 Apparently gubernatorial consents to training missions were routinely obtained until 1985, when the Governor of California refused to consent to a training mission for 450 members of the California National Guard in Honduras, and the Governor of Maine shortly thereafter refused to consent to a similar mission. Those incidents led to the enactment of the Montgomery Amendment and this litigation ensued.
18 App. 12 (testimony of James H. Webb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 15, 1986).
The Governor's attack on the Montgomery Amendment relies in part on the traditional understanding that “the Militia” can only be called forth for three limited purposes that do not encompass either foreign service or nonemergency conditions, and in part on the express language in the second Militia Clause reserving to the States “the Authority of training the Militia.” The Governor does not, however, challenge the authority of Congress to create a dual enlistment program. 19 Nor does the Governor claim that membership in a State Guard unit —or any type of state militia-creates any sort of constitutional immunity from being drafted into the Federal Armed Forces. Indeed, it would be ironic to claim such immunity when every member of the Minnesota National Guard has voluntarily enlisted, or accepted a commission as an officer, in the National Guard of the United States and thereby become a member of the Reserve Corps of the Army.
The unchallenged validity of the dual enlistment system means that the members of the National Guard of Minnesota who are ordered into federal service with the National Guard of the United States lose their status as members of the state militia during their period of active duty. If that duty is a training mission, the training is performed by the Army in which the trainee is serving, not by the militia from which the member has been temporarily disassociated. “Each member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States who is ordered to active duty is relieved from duty in the National Guard of his State or Territory, or of Puerto Rico or the District of Columbia, as
19 “The dual enlistment system requires state National Guard members to simultaneously enroll in the National Guard of the United States (NGUS), a reserve component of the national armed forces. 10 U. S. C. $$ 101(11) and (13), 591(a), 3261, 8261; 32 U. S. C. $$ 101(5) and (7). It is an essential aspect of traditional military policy of the United States. 32 U. S. C. $ 102. The State of Minnesota fully supports dual enlistment and has not challenged the concept in any respect.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 9 (footnote omitted).